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A well-established characteristic of intestate succession laws
in most American jurisdictions is that only the spouse of the decedent is required to share the inheritance with other classes of
heirs, usually the issue, parents, or brothers and sisters of the
decedent.' A recent study sponsored by the American Bar Association (ABA study) has suggested that this characteristic of in-,
testate succession fails to adequately reflect the distributive
. ~ ABA study proposes revision
preferences of the d e ~ e d e n t The
1. See infra text accompanying notes 87-101. Only nine of the fifty states depart
from the general rule and in those states the sharing among classes is on a very limited
basis. See infra text accompanying notes 102-03.
2. Fellows, Simon & Rau, Public Attitudes about Property Distribution a t Death
RESEARCH
J.
and Intestate Succession Laws in the United States, 1978 AM. B. FOUND.
319. The authors conclude that the distributive preferences of a decedent should be reflected in the intestate succession law:
Testamentary freedom should include the right not to have to execute a
will in order to have accumulated wealth pass to natural objects of the decedent's bounty. Moreover, unless the statutory scheme invoked in the absence
of a will conforms to the likely wishes of a person who dies without having
executed a valid will, it creates a trap for the ignorant or misinformed. The
alternative defensible rationale for adoption of a particular distributive pattern
in an intestacy statute is that it serves society's interests. There are four identifiable community aims: (1) to protect the financially dependent family; (2) to
avoid complicating property titles and excessive subdivision of property; (3) to
promote and encourage the nuclear family; and (4) to encourage the accumulation of property by individuals. If society's well-being requires a distributive
pattern different from the determined wishes of intestate descendants, the decedents' wishes should be subordinated. But our society places high value on
testamentary freedom. Thus, the preferred distributive pattern of intestate decedents should be given full effect and should be deviated from only if necessary to satisfy an overriding societal interest. To do otherwise would be contrary to our concept of testamentary freedom.
Id. a t 323-24 (footnotes omitted).
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of American statutes to include a scheme of proportional sharing
in the decedent's estate among heirs belonging to different
classes.
The principal proposal of the ABA study was that "siblings
share in the estate with parent^."^ This proposal was based on
responses to a telephone survey in which respondents were
asked: "Indicate the percentage of your estate that you would
want to give to each survivor if you are survived by your father,
your mother, and an adult brother and sister."' The distribution
pattern of preferences by respondents for these relatives was
split with about forty percent favoring distribution to one or
both parents and about forty percent favoring distribution to all
four. If we assume a general preference (based on a weighted
average of the preference patterns in the study6) to distribute to
the father-mother-brother-sister combination in fixed proportions of 2.5-2-1-1, then it may be assumed that a decedent survived by the heirs listed in the survey question would want his
or her estate of $13,000 distributed in the following way: $5,000
3. Id. at 386. It is interesting to note that the Statute of Distribution 22 & 23 Car. 2,
ch. 10 (1670), on which American statutes are generally based, provides for joint sharing
between the widow and a class of heirs, but it was thought to be unsatisfactory. In 1686
Parliament provided for joint sharing between a mother and brothers and sisters when
the praepositus died without wife, father, or children. 1 Jac. 2, ch. 17, 8 7 (1685). See T.
ATKINSON,
HANDBOOK
OF THE LAWOF WILLS47 (2d ed. 1953).
4. Fellows, Simon & Rau, supra note 2, at 346.
5. The distribution patterns found in the study were as follows:

The Five Dominant Distribution Patterns for the
Father-Mother-Brother-Sister Relation Set (Percent)'
Distribution Pattern by Percent
of Estate to:
Father Mother Brother Sister

---100
0
50
25
0

0
100
50
25
0

0
0
0
25
50

...

Other

Total

0
0
0
25
50
.....

.....
.

....

Percent of
Respondents
No. of
in Pattern Respondents
7.3
1.6
31.9
40.3
7.1
11.7

-

55
12
239
302
53
88
-

99.9

749

*1 missing case.
Id. at 346. Weighting each pattern by the percent of repondents in the pattern produces
a weighted average distribution pattern as follows:

Father

Mother

Brother

Sister

33.325

27.625

13.625

13.625
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to the father, $4,000 to the mother and $2,000 each to the
brother and sister. Intestate succession laws presently existing in
thirty-nine states would ignore such preferences and distribute
the entire estate to the parents.
The ABA study did not investigate the preferences of respondents concerning shared inheritances among other classes,
such as between issue and siblings or between issue and parents.
However, it is evident that the totally exclusive inheritance by
one class of heirs contains certain inadequacies and may require
amendment in the direction of proportional shares to be distributed among two or more classes of heirs.
The purpose of this article is not to study further the distributive preferences of decedents-for which there is certainly a
need. Rather, it is to present some of the problems which arise
when proportional shares are incorporated in a scheme of intestate succession and. to propose various techniques for dealing
with these problems suggested by a study of the Islamic legal
system, which has incorporated the idea of proportional shares
in its intestate succession law. Therefore, the article begins with
a description of the Islamic system followed by a survey of existing American intestate succession laws. It then discusses the
various techniques used in the Islamic system to accommodate a
scheme of fixed proportional shares and suggests how they may
be used in an American scheme. The conclusions of this article
will be confined to problems arising in the construction of a
scheme of proportional shares. There is no attempt to expand on
the substantive conclusions of the ABA study concerning the
proportions which should be allocated among the different classes of heirs.

The Islamic law of intestate succession proved a viable
method for distributing decedents' estates for over a thousand
years in the Islamic world and continues to influence, if not regulate, the distribution of intestate estates there today. Islamic
law-which is based on scholarly interpretations of the Qur'an
and the traditions ascribed to Muhammad, as well as customs of
the local culture-divided the heirs of an intestate decedent into
three major classes: those who possess a right to inherit fixed
shares (Sharers); those who take the remainder after distribu-
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tion of the fixed shares by virtue of their agnatic6 relationship to
the decedent (Agnates); and those who take a remainder portion
only in the absence of living blood relatives among the first two
classes (Blood Relatives). Minor variations exist among the different schools of Islamic law7 and, within schools, among different legal scholar^.^ However, in its finally evolved form, the Islamic scheme constitutes a fairly unified, albeit complex body of
rules, the knowledge of which has been said (in a famous dictum
attributed to the Prophet) to "equal one half the sum total of
human knowledge!"O Despite its complexity, the essence of the
Islamic scheme of shared inheritance among different classes of
heirs may be summarized in a few pages.1•‹
6. The term "agnatic" characterizes the relationship through male descent or ascent.
The agnatic granddaughter is the daughter of a son or of a son's son or of a son's son's
son, etc.; the agnatic grandfather is the father of the father or of the father's father or of
the father's father's father, etc.
7. The four sunni schools of Islamic law are the Hanafi, Shafi'i, Maliki and Hanbali.
The law of intestate succession will be described for these fodr schools based on a
Hanbali treatise of the 13th century, Ibn Qudama, Kitab al-Fara'id (Book of Distributive Shares), in 6 KITABAL-MUGHNI
(1367 H., i.e., 1948 A.D.) [hereinafter cited as
MUOHNI].This treatise was chosen as a reference for Islamic law because of its importance, not only as a source of Hanbali law (still used in Saudi Arabia today), but also as a
comparative work. Professor Noel Coulson has written a comprehensive book on the Islamic law of intestate succession, N. COULSON,
SUCCESSION
IN THE MUSLIM
FAMILY
(1971).
Although Professor Coulson does not cite any authoritative sources as a general basis for
his work, a careful comparison of his work with the MUCHNI
reveals that both expound
essentially the same law. I have chosen to digest the MUGHNI
in order to provide a more
summarized account of the law, as well as to provide references to an original Arabic
source in this area of the law. All translations from original Arabic are the author's.
Arabic terms have been transliterated both in the text and the footnotes with a minimum of diacritical marks.
8. Different Islamic legal scholars mentioned in this article include: Abu Hanifa
(died 150 H.1767 A.D.), the eponym of the Hanifa school of Islamic law; Abu Yusuf (died
182 H.1798 A.D.) and Shaybani (died 189 H.1804 A.D.), two disciples of Abu Hanifa;
Malik (died 179 H.1795 A.D.), the eponym of the Maliki school of Islamic law; and Shafi'i
(died 204 H.1820 A.D.), the eponym of the Shafi'i school of Islamic law. Some of the
greatest disagreements concerning the law occurred between Abu Yusuf and Shaybani,
both of whom belonged to the Hanafi school.
9. Anderson, Recent Reforms in the Islamic Law of Inheritance, 14 INT'L& COMP.
L.Q. 349, 349 (1965).
10. This description of the Islamic scheme is concerned solely with the distribution
of the net estate of an intestate decedent to regular heirs and does not examine the
individual's freedom to distribute his property by testamentary disposition, or impediments to or conditions of inheritance, death-sickness, advancements, bequests, or the
effect of slavery, illegitimacy, or guardianship on intestate succession. For a discussion of
these subjects, as well as a more detailed description of the scheme of intestate succession, see N. COULSON,
SUCCESSION
IN THE MUSLIMFAMILY
(1971).
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A. The Sharers (dhawu al-furud)
In pre-Islamic times the intestate's wealth was inherited by
his closest male agnatic relative; women were not considered
useful in combat or in the defense of tribal territory and, therefore, did not enjoy the same rights of inheritance as men." An
important reform introduced by Islam was the assignment of
fixed shares to certain female relatives of the decedent. The
Prophet was determined to give females a share in intestates'
wealth, and to this end he included three verses in the Qur'an12
11. F. PELTIER& G.H. BOUSQUET.
LES SUCCESSIONS
ACNATIQUES
MITIGEES84-86
(1935).
12. THEHOLYQUR'AN181-82, 235-36 (A. Ali trans. 1946):

IV, 11
God (thus) directs you
As regards your children's
(Inheritance): to the male,
A portion equal to that
Of two females: if only
Daughters, two or more
Their share is two-thirds
Of the inheritance;
If only one, her share
Is a half.
For parents, a sixth share
Of the inheritance to each,
If the deceased left children;
If no children, and the parents
Are the (only) heirs, the mother
Has a third; if the deceased
Left brothers (or sisters)
The mother has a sixth.
(The distribution in all cases
Is) after the payment
Of legacies and debts.
Ye know not whether
Your parents or your children
Are nearest to you
In benefit. These are
Settled portions ordained
By God; and God is
All-knowing, All-wise.
IV, 12
In what your wives leave,
Your share is a half,
If they leave no child;
But if they leave a child,
Ye get a fourth; after payment
Of legacies and debts.
In what ye leave,
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which ensured women a share in the estates of close family
Their share is a fourth,
If ye leave no child;
But if ye leave a child,
They get an eighth; after payment
Of legacies and debts.
If the man or woman
Whose inheritance is in question,
Has left neither ascendants nor descendants,
But has left a brother
Or a sister, each one of the two
Gets a sixth; but if more
Than two, they share in a third;
After payment of legacies
And debts; so that no loss
Is caused (to any one).
Thus is it ordained by God;
And God is All-knowing,
Most Forbearing.
IV, 176
They ask thee
For a legal decision.
Say: God directs (thus)
About those who leave
No descendants or ascendants
As heirs. If it is a man
That dies, leaving a sister
But no child, she shall
Have half the inheritance:
If (such a deceased was)
A woman, who left no child,
Her brother takes her inheritance:
If there are two sisters,
They shall have two-thirds
Of the inheritance
(Between them): if there are
Brothers and sisters, (they share),
The male having twice
The share of the female
Thus doth God make clear
To you (His law), lest
Ye err. And God
Hath knowledge of all things.
Verse IV, 12 appears to contradict verse IV, 176 by giving the brother and sister
each a one-sixth share as opposed to giving a two-thirds share to two sisters, and if there
be a brother, a double share to him over the sister. The consensus reached in Islam to
explain this apparent contradiction is that verse IV, 12 refers to uterines and verse IV,
176 refers to germanes and consanguines. A recent study has suggested that, contrary to
this explanation, both verses refer to germanes and consanguines, but the first deals with
testate succession and the second with intestate succession. See Powers, The Islamic
Low of Inheritance Reconsidered: A New Reading of Q. 4:12B,55 STUDIA
ISLAMICA61
(1982).
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members in conjunction with the inheritance of the male
agnates.13 These verses create a class of Sharers consisting of the
husband, wife, uterine brother and sister,14 mother, -father,
daughter, germane sister,16 consanguine sister,16 agnatic grandfather, grandmother, and agnatic granddaughter of the decedent
who inherit according to a fixed share scheme.
The fixed share of an intestate's estate allotted to each heir
of the Sharer class is summarized in Table 1. The fixed share
varies as shown in Table 1, depending on the existence or nonexistence of certain specified heirs.
TABLE 1

FIXED
SHARES
OF THE SHARER
CLASS
HEIR

WITH

-

(1)
(2)

Husband"
"

-

Agnatic descendant

(3)

Wife'"

Agnatic descendant

(4)

"

-

Agnatic descendant

(5)
(6)

Uterine
Brother or
Si~ter'~
" "

Agnatic descendant

WITHOUT

Agnatic descendant
o r male agnatic
ascendant

-

-

Agnatic descendant
or male agnatic

ascendant

SHARE
114
112

118
114

0

116 or, if
more
than
one, 113
collectively

13. It is possible that women did have a right of intestate succession in Mecca
& G H BOUSQUET,
supra note 11, a t 99-102.
before the Qur'anic reforms. See F PELTIER
14. A uterine brother or sister has the same mother as the decedent but a different
father.
15. A germane brother or sister has the same parents as the decedent.
16. A consanguine brother or sister has the same father as the decedent but a different mother.
supra note 7, a t 178(3)-178(6); QUR'ANIV, 12.
17. MUGHNI,
18. MUGHNI,
supra note 7, a t 178(4)-178(8); QUR'ANIV, 12. There may be one or
more wives who share In the wife's share.
19. MUGHNI,
supra note 7, a t 166(20)-167(8), 183(10)-183(12); QUR'ANIV, 12. ACcording to Malik and Shafi'i, if one or more germane brothers (or one or more germane
sisters converted into residuaries by a germane brother) would be totally excluded from a
share in the inheritance due to the presence of uterines (i.e., where they inherit with the
husband and the mother (or grandmother)), he or they inherit equally with the uterines
supra note 7, a t 180(17)-181(17).
qua uterines. MUGHNI,
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HEIR
MotherZ0
"

(9)

"

(10)

"

(11) Fatherz'
(12)

"

(13)
"
(14) Daughterzz
(15)
"

WITH
WITHOUT
Agnatic descendant
Agnatic descendant
Two or more
brothers or sisters
Father
Agnatic descendant
or two or more
brothers or sisters
Agnatic
descendant,
more than one
brother or sister,
or father
Male agnatic
descendant
Female agnatic
Male agnatic
descendant
descendant
Agnatic descendant
Son
Son

(16) Germane Sistera3 Male agnatic
descendant or
father (or,
according to Abu
Hanifa, agnatic
grandfatherz4)

-

SHARE
116
116
Residue
113

116

116 plus
residue
Residue
Residue
112 or, if
more
than
one, 213
collectively
0

The published edition of MUCHNIindicates that the share of one-third is divided
among the uterine brothers and sisters "equally, to the male the equivalent of the portion of two females" (bi as-sawiya li adh-dhakar mithl hazz al-'unthayayn). MUGHNI,
supra note 7 , a t 181(10). B u t two manuscripts of the work a t Dar al-Kutub, the main
library in Cairo, show that "two females" is an error in the text and should read "the
MSS 18(7) and 23(7) Fiqh Hanbal [classification of
female" (al-'untha). IBN QUDAMA,
the two manuscripts] AL-MUCHNI.
20. MUGHNI,supra note 7 , a t 176(4)-176(5), 177(11)-177(12), 179(20)-179(22);
QUR'ANIV, 11. With the father alone the mother receives her Qur'anic share of one-third,
but with the spouse and the father she inherits one-third of the remainder after the
spouse. This results effectively in her being a residuary with the father and sharing in
one-third of the residue.
21. MUOHNI,
supra note 7 , a t 177(3)-177(11),177(15)-177(17);QUR'ANIV, 11.
22. QUR'ANIV, 11.
23. MUCHNI,supra note 7 , a t 166(6)-166(7),168(12)-168(13), 168(16), 169(17);
QUR'ANIV, 176. For inheritance with uterines, see supra note 19.
24. MUGHNI,
supra note 7 , a t 215(10)-215(11),215(15).
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HEIR
(17) Germane Sister

WITH
Germane brother,
female agnatic
descendant, or
agnatic
grandfather (also
according to Abu
Yusuf, Shaybani,
Malik, and
ShaWi2v
-

(19) Consanguine
Sisterz7

Male agnatic
descendant,
germane brother,
or father (or,
according to Abu
Hanifa, agnatic
grandfatherz8)
Two germane
sisters
Consanguine
brother, female
agnatic
descendant, or
agnatic
grandfather (also
according to Abu
Yusuf, Shaybani,
Malik, and
ShaWiZ8)
One germane sister
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WITHOUT
Male agnatic
descendant or
father (or,
according to Abu
Hanifa, agnatic
grandfatherze)

SHARE
Residue

Agnatic
descendant,
germane brother,
or male agnatic
ascendant

112 or, if
more
than
one, 213
collectively

Consanguine
brother
Male agnatic
descendant,
germane brother,
or father (or,
according to Abu
Hanifa, agnatic
grandfathers0)

0

Agnatic
descendant, male
agnatic ascendant,
germane brother,
or consanguine
brother

116

Residue

25. Id. at 217(22)-218(21). For identification of these jurists, see supra note 8.
26. MUGHNI,
supra note 7, a t 215(10)-215(11), 21505).
27. Id. a t 166(6)-166(7), 166(15)-166(16), 168(12)-168(13), 168(16), 169(17), 174(3)174(9), 175(11)-175(12); QUR'ANIV, 176.
supra note 7, a t 215(10)-215(11), 215(15).
28. MUGHNI,
29. Id. a t 217(22)-218(21).
30. Id. a t 215(10)-215(11), 215(15).
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HEIR

WITH

(23)

Consanguine
Sister

Agnatic
descendant, male
agnatic ascendant,
germane brother,
consanguine
brother, or
germane sister

(24)

Agnatic
Grandfather3'

F a t h e r or nearer
agnatic
grandfather
Male agnatic
descendant

(25)

" "

(26)

" "

(27)

" "

(28)

GrandmotherS2

Female agnatic
descendant

-

Mother or nearer
grandmother (with
modifications
according to Abu
Hanifa, Malik, a n d
Shafi'P)

WITHOUT

SHARE

112 or, if more
t h a n one, 213
collectively

F a t h e r or nearer
agnatic
grandfather
Father, nearer
agnatic
grandfather, or
male agnatic
descendant
Father, nearer
agnatic
grandfather, or
agnatic descendant

-

0

116
116 or
residue,
whichever is
greater
Residue

0

31. Id. a t 177(3)-178(1). The grandfather differs from the father by inheriting as a
residuary with germane and consanguine brothers and sisters. (Abu Yusuf, Shaybani,
Malik and Shafi'i are in accordance, but Abu Hanifa maintains the exclusion of these
collaterals by the grandfather). Id. a t 215(10)-215(11), 215(15), 217(22)-218(21). If the
grandfather's share in the residue in the presence of these collaterals is greater than onesixth of the total inheritance, it is computed without taking the one-sixth share into
account (as will be more fully explained in the text accompanying notes 43-44 infra). See
also examples in MUGHNI,
supra note 7, a t 227(9)-227(10), 227(19)-227(20). Therefore,
his share becomes "1/6 or residue, whichever is greater" rather than "116 plus residue" as
in the case of the father's inheritance with a female agnatic descendant and without a
male agnatic descendant. See supra Table 1, pp. 274-77.
supra note 7, at 206(1), 206(14)-206(15), 206(20), 209(9)-210(5). The
32. MUGHNI,
Prophet gave the grandmother a one-sixth share. See id. at 214(4). Not all grandmothers
are entitled to inherit as Sharers. On the maternal side only one line of grandmothers-the mother of the mother and of the mother's mother and of the mother's mother's
mother, etc.-participates in the inheritance. On the paternal side, the two lines of
grandmothers stemming from the father and the father's father are admitted. Malik and
his followers admit only the maternal line of grandmothers and the paternal line stemming from the father. Abu Hanifa and his followers and Shafi'i (according to one report)
admit the maternal line of grandmothers and the paternal lines of grandmothers stemming from the father and every agnatic grandfather. MUGHNI,
supra note 7, a t 208(3)209(8).
33. Malik and Shafi'i (according to Shafi'i's second statement on the matter) main-
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HEIR

(29) Grandmother

WITH

WITHOUT

-

Mother or nearer
grandmother (with
modifications
according to Abu
Hanifa, Malik, and
Shafi'is4)

116

Higher male
agnatic descendant
Higher or equal
male agnatic
descendant
Higher or equal
male agnatic
descendant

Residue

(30) Agnatic
Higher36 male
G r a n d d a ~ g h t e r ~agnatic
~
descendant
(31)
Equal male agnatic
descendant
(32)
Higher female
agnatic descendant
"

"

"

"

(33)

" "

(34)

"

(35)

" "

"

[I984

Lower male
agnatic descendant
in the presence of
two or more higher
female agnatic
descendants
Two or more
higher female
agnatic
descendants
-

SHARE

116

Residue

Male agnatic
descendant

0

Higher or equal
male agnatic
descendant or
higher female
agnatic descendant

112 or, if
more
than
one, 2/3
collectively

If the sum of the fractional fixed shares of the Sharers
equals unity (i.e. = 1.0), the inheritance is divided in accordance
with those fixed shares. If the sum is greater than unity, the
share of each is proportionately decreased
Thus, in the
case of a decedent who leaves a father, mother, two daughters,
tain that a nearer paternal grandmother does not exclude a further maternal grandmother, while Abu Hanifa and his followers and ShaWi (according to Shafi'i's first statement) maintain the contrary in accordance with Ibn Qudama. MUGHI,supra note 7, a t
209(16)-210(1). Furthermore, Malik, Shafi'i and the ashab ar-ra'y (i.e., the Hanafis)
maintain that a paternal grandmother is excluded by a male agnatic ascendant through
whom she is connected to the praepositus. Id. a t 211(4)-212(3). With this approach a
controversy is raised over whether the other grandmothers take the whole of the grandmother's share (one-sixth) as if the paternal grandmother were nonexistent, or only the
share they would have taken had the paternal grandmother not been excluded. Id. a t
211(20)-212(10).
34. Id.
35. Id. a t 169(15)-174(2).
36. I.e., nearer in degree to the praepositus.
37. MUGHNI,
S U P M note 7, a t 184(7)-184(9).
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and a wife to inherit a $13,500 estate, the mother takes a share
of one-sixth (first category under Mother in Table I), the father
takes a share of one-sixth plus residue (second category under
Father), the two daughters each take one-third (second category
under Daughter), and the wife takes one-eighth (first category
under Wife). Since these shares total one and one-eighth (116
116
213
1/8), the share of each is proportionately decreased, so that the father actually takes 4/27, the mother 4/27,
the daughters 8/27 each, and the wife 3/27. Their shares in the
$13,500 estate are $2,000 (father), $2,000 (mother), $4,000 (each
daughter), and $1,500 (wife). If the sum of the fixed shares is
less than unity, the remainder of the inheritance after distribution to those with fixed shares goes the Sharers who have been
made residuaries and the Agnates. In the absence of fixed
shares, the residuaries take the whole i n h e r i t a n ~ e . ~ ~

+

+

+

B. Residuaries
In addition to the sharers who may be entitled to a residuary interest, there are two classes of potential heirs to the residue of a decedent's estate after distribution of fixed shares to
the Sharer class: Agnates ('asaba) and Blood Relatives (dhawu
al-arham).
1. Agnates ('asaba)

The Agnates are the male heirs listed below among whom
the first existing heirs in order of priority inherit the remainder
of an estate to the exclusion of other A g n a t e ~ : ~ ~
(I) sons;
(2) nearest in degree of agnatic grandsons;
(3) father;
(4) nearest in degree of agnatic grandfathers, germane
brothers, and consanguine brothers, with germane brothers excluding consanguine brothers;40
38. Id at 168(14)-168(15). But see rnfra text accompanying notes 43-44 (exception
when the grandfather and one germane or consanguine sister are in competition with the
husband and mother).
supra note 7, at 178(19)-179(19).
39. MUGHNI,
40. Germane and consanguine brothers are not excluded by the agnatic grandfather.
Id. at 215(16)-215(17), 217(22)-218(21). Abu Yusuf, Shaybani, Malik and Shafi'i are in
accordance on this point. Id at 215(18), 218(2). Abu Hanifa maintains that they are
excluded by the agnatic grandfather. Id. at 215(10)-215(11), 215(15). One situation exists
in which germane brothers are considered as uterines. See supra note 19.
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(5) nearest in degree of male agnatic descendants of germane and consanguine brothers, with the germane's descendants
excluding the consanguine's descendants of equal degree;
(6) father's germane brothers;
(7) father's consanguine brothers;
(8) nearest in degree of male agnatic descendants of the father's germane and consanguine brothers, with the germane's
descendants excluding the consanguine's descendants of equal
degree;
(9) relatives of the nearest in degree of agnatic grandfathers
who inherit in the following order of exclusive priority:
(a) germane brothers,
(b) consanguine brothers,
(c) nearest in degree of male agnatic descendants of
germane and consanguine brothers, with the germane's descendants excluding the consanguine's
descendants of equal degree.

Thus, for example, when a decedent leaves only an uncle,
one son, and two grandsons, the son will take the whole estate. If
the decedent also leaves heirs belonging to the Sharer class then
the son will take a residuary interest after the distribution has
been made to the Sharers.
When two or more heirs are entitled to take the residue, it
is distributed generally in accordance with the priorities established for the Agnates. Consequently, when residuaries among
the Sharers are Agnates or female Sharers inheriting in conjunction with Agnates, the Agnates exclude all Agnates following
them in order of priority. When a germane or consanguine sister
inherits as a residuary with a female agnatic descendant, she
takes an inheritance like that which her brother would have
taken,"' and appears to exclude all Agnates who rank after her
brother in order of priority. This would include the exclusion of
the consanguine sister by the germane sister when a female agnatic descendant survives the de~edent."~
Determining the share of a grandfather can become quite
involved. For example, when germane or consanguine brothers
or sisters inherit with the grandfather, the share of the grandfather is determined by taking the maximum share of the
following:
41. MUGHNI,
supra note 7, at 169(6).
42. See, e.g., id. at 222(10)-222(11).
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(1) one-sixth of the total estate as a fixed share;

(2) one-third of the estate remaining after deduction of
fixed shares not going to germane or consanguine brothers or sisters or himself;
(3) a male's share of such remaining estate after a nominal
division is made among the brothers and sisters and himself
with males receiving double the portion of females; or
(4) if the grandfather is in competition with the husband,
the mother, and one germane or consanguine sister, an initial
distribution of fixed shares is made to all, the shares are decreased proportionately (by 'awl), and then the grandfather
takes two-thirds of the collective entitlement of himself and the
sister (8/27 of the total estate).43
Once the grandfather has taken his allowable share, the
shares of the germane and consanguine brothers and sisters in
any residue remaining are determined as follows: (1) germanes
exclude consanguines (except when the germane is only one sister, in which case she takes a share to the extent of one-half of
the total inheritance, if the remaining residue is that large, after
which any remaining residue goes to the consanguines); and (2)
as between a germane brother and sister or between a consanguine brother and sister, the male receives double the share of
the female.44
Except for the case of the grandfather in competition with
the germane or consanguine brothers or sisters, the residuaries
who inherit share equally, but with the male taking double the
portion of the female.4bIf there are no residuaries who take and
the sum of the fixed shares does not add to unity, each fixed
share is increased proportionately (radd), except for the spouse's
share which remains constant.46 However, according to Malik
and Shafi'i, when there are no other residuaries there is no proportionate increase and the remainder escheats to the public
treasury (bayt al-mal).47
Thus, in the case of a decedent who leaves a father, mother,
brother, and sister to inherit a $13,500 estate, the father is first
43. Id. at 218(4)-220(2), 223(13)-223(18).
44. Id. at 218(12)-218(14), and examples at 220(3)-223(12).
supra note 7, at 171(5)-171(7)
45. QUR'ANIV, 11 (son and daughter); MUGHNI,
(granddaughter and grandson); id. at 175(15)-175(17) (germane brother and sister; consanguine brother and sister). For the mother and father, see supra note 20.
46. MUGHNI,
supra note 7, at 201(9)-202(3). Abu Hanifa and his followers are in
accordance. Id. at 201(14)-201(15).
47. Id. at 202(3)-202(5).
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in order of priority and takes to the exclusion of the brother.
The father also excludes the sister (first category under Germane Sister in Table 1) and then takes a two-thirds share as
residue after the mother takes her one-third (third category
under Mother and third category under Father in Table 1).
Their shares in the $13,500 estate are $9,000 (father) and $4,500
(mother).
2. Blood Relatives (dhawu al-arham)48

If there are no blood relatives among the Sharers or Agnates
surviving the decedent, the Blood Relatives of the deceased are
entitled to share in the inheritance." The spouse is not a blood
relative and will inherit his or her maximum fixed share. The
Blood Relatives will inherit that part of the estate not going to
the spouse, and if there is no spouse, they will take the whole
inheritan~e.'~
Among the Blood Relatives, shares in the inheritance are
generally determined according to the doctrine of tanzil,
whereby each relative is put in the position (manzila) of the
Sharer or Agnate (known generally as "ordinary heirs") with
However, in the Hanafi school, the
whom he is ~onnected.~'
shares of Blood Relatives are determined according to the doctrine of relationship (qaraba), whereby each Blood Relative is
considered in his direct relationship to the decedent and according to the ranking of the Agnates.
a. Tanzil. Under the doctrine of tanzil the ordinary heir
with whom a Blood Relative is connected for purposes of inheritance is determined as follows:
(1) for descendants of the decedent, by tracing the line of
ascent to the first ordinary heir;'=
48. The term dhawu al-arham may be used generally to refer to all blood relatives
but is used here to refer only to blood relatives other than Sharers and Agnates. See id.
a t 202(1)-202(2),202(8)-202(10),229(3)-229(4);QuR'AN,VIII,75. Therefore, "Blood Relatives" is capitalized when used in this restricted sense. For a list of these relatives, see
supra note 7 , a t 229(4)-229(8).Malik and Shafi'i do not recognize this group of
MUGHNI,
heirs. Id. a t 229(11)-229(12).
49. Id. a t 229(8)-229(9), 229(20)-229(21). Abu Hanifa is in accordance. Id. a t
232(15)-232(16).Malik and Shafi'i do not recognize this group of heirs and give the inheritance to the public treasury (bayt al-mal). Id. a t 229(11)-22902).
50. Id. a t 231(14)-231(20),237(4)-237(5).
51. Id. a t 231(10)-231(16).The doctrine of tanzil elaborated in this study is that of
Ibn Qudama, who differs in some particulars with others who espouse the doctrine.
52. See, e.g., id. at 233(1)-233(4).
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(2) for descendants of brothers or sisters of the decedent, by
tracing the line of ascent to the first ordinary heir;63
(3) for ascendants of the decedent, by tracing the line of
descent to the first ordinary heir;54
(4) for brothers and sisters of ascendants of the decedent,
by tracing the collateral line to their brother or sister who is an
ascendant of the decedent and, if that ascendant is not an ordinary heir, by tracing the line of descent from that ascendant to
the first ordinary heir;5b and
(5) for descendants of brothers and sisters of ascendants of
the decedent, by tracing the line of ascent to the brother or sister of an ascendant of the decedent, then the collateral line to
that ascendant, then the line of descent from that ascendant until the first ordinary heir is reached.b6
A single existing relative from the Blood Relatives takes the
entire inheritan~e.~'
If more than one Blood Relative exists, the
right of each to inherit is determined initially by the proximity
of his relationship to the ordinary heir he represents. If relatives
representing the same ordinary heir are in varying degrees of
proximity to that ordinary heir, the nearer in degree exclude the
more remote.b8 If relatives representing different ordinary heirs
are in varying degrees of proximity to their ordinary heirs, the
nearer in degree exclude the more remote, but only if they are in
the same class of relative^.^^ For this purpose the Blood Relatives are divided into four classes-descendants, fraternal relatives, maternal relatives, and paternal relative^.^^
53. See, e.g., ~ d .a t 232(12)-232(13), 233(1)-233(5),245(12)-245(16).
54. See, e.g., td. a t 251(22)-252(4).
55. See ~ d .At 232(7)-232(15),and examples a t 251(9)-251(19).
56. See, e.g., ~ d .a t 233(20)-233(22),234(2), 246(10)-247(13),251(20)-251(21).
57. Id. a t 233(9)-233(10).
58. Id. a t 233(10)-233(13).
59. Id. a t 234(5)-234(7).
60. Ibn Qudama knows of no one who has counted the classes and explained them,
except for Abu al-Khattab, whose count of five leads to results which no one supports.
Id. a t 234(15)-234(18).From Khiraqi (a tenth-century scholar whose Mukhtasar serves
as the basis for Ibn Qudama's commentary in Mughni) Ibn Qudama deduces that the
classes are four. Id. a t 234(19)-235(2).Ibn Qudama mentions that it is possible that the
classes are three and that one is best, but later examples confirm his recognition of four
classes. Id a t 236(3)-236(7),and examples at 246(2)-246(6!,248(15)-249(5).
The relatives constituting each of the four classes respectively are the descendants
of the decedent, the descendants of brothers and sisters of the decedent, the other relatives stemming from the mother, and the other relatives stemming from the father. See,
e.g., id. a t 235(2)-236(2).However, it appears that the paternal grandmother is considered a maternal relative, for the purpose of this classificat~on,when her relatives exist
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The inheritance is then divided among the ordinary heirs
represented by Blood Relatives who have not been excluded.
Each ordinary heir represented takes the share he would have
received in competition with the other ordinary heirs represented, and that share devolves on the relatives representing
him.61 The share of the ordinary heir is distributed to his relatives as if he were the decedent and they his
with certain
exceptions:
(1)Descendants of the decedent or of a brother or sister of
the decedent inherit per stirpess3 the share of their ordinary
heir, with two schools of thought on the manner in which the
shares are divided. One school equalizes (man sawwa) between
male and female and gives the male an equal share with the female. The other school gives preference (man faddala) to the
male and gives the male double the share of the female, unless
the ordinary heir is a uterine brother or sister in which case the
male takes an equal share with the female.64
(2) The father and mother of the mother's father, inheriting
alone, take shares of two-thirds and one-third r e s p e c t i ~ e l y . ~ ~
(The distribution to higher ascendants related to the same ordinary heir remains unclear.66)
(3) A brother and sister of an ascendant of the decedent,
with relatives of the mother or maternal grandmother. See, e.g., id. a t 251(19)-252(4).

Whether she is considered a maternal relative with other relatives is not clear from
MUGHNI.
61. Id. a t 234(3)-234(7). The presence of the spouse does not affect the determination of these shares, except according to one view not espoused by Ibn Qudama, whereby
the existing spouse is considered initially in competition with the ordinary heirs for the
purpose of determining the ratio of their shares. After the ratio is determined, the spouse
takes his or her maximum fixed share and each group of relatives representing the ordinary heirs takes its share of the remaining portion in proportion to the predetermined
ratio. Id. a t 237(4)-237(10).
62. See id. a t 233(10)-233(13).
63. Inheritance per stirpes is the taking of the share one's parent w6uld have taken
had he been alive, and that parent's share is the one his parent would have taken and so
forth on up the line. In the case here described, where two or more children are descended from the same parent, they take equally except where it is indicated that a male
takes double the share of a female.
64. See MUGHNI,
supra note 7, a t 238(15)-239(10), 243(6)-243(7), and examples a t
239(14)-239(22), 240(14)-240(17), 240(18)-241(2) (example of per stirpes devolution
where the ordinary heir is a descendant of the decedent), 241(8)-241(12) (example of per
stirpes devolution where the ordinary heir is a sister of the decedent), 241(17)-241(18),
242(3)-242(5), 243(8)-243(10), 245(1)-245(5), 245(19)-246(4).
65. Id. a t 252(2).
66. E.g., when the parents of the mother's paternal grandfather are in competition
with the mother of her paternal grandmother.
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who are not ordinary heirs and are either germane or consanguine, take their shares equally according to those who equalize
between the male and fem,ale. According to those who give a
preference to the male, the brother takes double the share of the
sister .?'
(4) Descendants of a brother or sister of an ascendant of the
decedent inherit per stirpes the share of their ordinary heir, or,
if their ordinary heir is an ascendant of the decedent, they inherit per stirpes the share which would have been taken by their
own ascendant who is the brother or sister of'an ascendant of
the decedent. According to those who equalize, the male shares
equally with the female. Those who give a preference to the
male give the male double the share of the female unless the
ordinary heir is uterine, in which case the male takes an equal
share with the female.6s
Thus, in the case of a decedent who leaves two paternal
aunts and a cousin who is the daughter of his mother's sister to
inherit a $13,500 estate, the paternal aunts are put in the position of the father, and the cousin is put in the position of the
mother. Neither excludes the other because the aunts are paternal relatives and the cousin is a maternal relative. Since the
mother would have received one-third and the father two-thirds,
the aunts each take one-third and the cousin takes one-third.
Their shares in the $13,500 estate are $4,500 each.
67. See MUGHNI,
supra note 7, a t 238(15)-239(10),and examples a t 249(12)-249(17)
(for maternal aunt and uncle).
68. See id. a t 238(15)-239(10), 244(1)-244(6), 244(21)-244(22), and examples a t
239(14)-240(2), 245(1)-245(5), 246(2)-246(11), 247(9)-247(13), 249(8)-249(12), 251(5)251(21). Per stirpes devolution, while not explicitly mentioned for this group of heirs,
appears to be implied.
When the ordinary heir is an ascendant of the decedent, it is not clear from Ibn
Qudama what share the descendants of a brother or sister of an ascendant of the decedent take in competition with a relative who is an ascendant of that ordinary heir, e.g.,
when the sons of the mother's germane, consanguine, and uterine brothers are in competition with the mother's paternal grandfather. The general rule is that the paternal
grandfather excludes nephews, which would argue for the grandfather taking the whole
inheritance. But in the absence of the grandfather, the general rule is that the germane
brother's son takes to the exclusion of the consanguine and uterine brother's sons. This
is not the case for the sons of the mother's brothers in the absence of her paternal grandfather. The sons are represented by their fathers for purposes of the rules of exclusion:
the consanguine brother is excluded, the uterine brother is allocated one-sixth and the
germane brother five-sixths of the inheritance, which then devolves to the sons of the
uterine and germane brothers respectively. Id. a t 245(3)-245(5). Query whether the sons
of the mother's brothers are represented by their fathers for purposes of the rules of
exclusion when in the presence of the mother's paternal grandfather, and if so, whether
the paternal grandfather of the mother is represented by her father.
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b. Qaraba. Under the doctrine of qaraba followed by the
Hanafi school in lieu of tanzil, a Blood Relative inherits an interest in the intestate's estate according to his direct relationship to the decedent and according to the Agnate rankings.
Thus, descendants exclude descendants of the decedent's parents, and the descendants of nearer ascendants exclude the-descendants of further ascendant^.^^ Within each of the classes of
descendants, the relatives who are nearer in degree to the decedent exclude the more remote.?O Where relatives of the same
class are all equal in degree to the deceased, relatives who are
closest in degree to ordinary heirs, who are their ascendants but
not ascendants of the decedent, exclude the others.71 A division
exists between the followers of Abu Yusuf and ShaybanP2 concerning the rules of priority and apportionment among the relatives not excluded in the application of the doctrine of qaraba.
( I ) Abu Yusuf. Abu Yusuf directs that distribution be made
per capita73 with the male taking double the share of the female.74When the class consists of descendants of the decedent's
parents or higher ascendants, germanes exclude consanguines,
consanguines exclude uterines, the issue of germanes exclude the
issue of consanguines,and the issue of consanguines exclude the
If the relatives remaining after this exclusion
issue of uterine~.?~
are from both the maternal and paternal sides, the relatives on
the maternal side take one-third and the relatives on the paterIn this
nal side take two-thirds of the inheritance c~llectively.~~
regard, descendants of great grandparents on either the maternal or paternal side are further subdivided into maternal and
69. Id. at 232(15)-232(20), Ibn Qudama does not explain the position of the ascendants within this order except to say that Abu Hanifa himself gave precedence to the
father's mother, the father's mother's mother, etc., over the children of the daughters. Id.
at 232(19).
70. See, e.g., id. at 241(21)-241(22), 245(12)-245(13), 247(5)-247(7), 249(6)-249(8),
249(18)-249(19).
71. See, e.g., id. at 241(23)-242(2) (descendants), 245(13)-245(14) (descendants of
parents), 246(10)-246(12), 247(8)-247(9) (descendants of paternal aunts and uncles),
251(8)-251(9).
72. See supra note 8.
73. Le., according to their number ( ' a h 'adadihim).
74. MUGHNI,supra note 7, at 240(7)-240(9), and examples a t 240(14)-241(7) (descendants), 241(8)-241(20) (descendants of parents).
75. Id. at 244(6)-244(7), and examples at 245(14)-245(16), 246(10)-246(12), 248(5)248(6), 249(21)-249(23).
76. See, e.g., id. at 248(5)-248(6), 249(21)-249(23), 251(15)-251(16).
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paternal relatives and given a collective share of one-third and
two-thirds respectively of the collective share of their side.77
(2) Shaybani. Shaybani's approach differs from that of Abu
Yusuf. For the class of descendants he directs that the estate be
divided initially between the male and female ascendants of the
heirs a t the first generation under the decedent differing in sex.
The females are allocated a share for each heir claiming through
them and the males are allocated a double share for each heir
claiming through them. The collective shares of the males and
females are then further subdivided among the males and females of the next lower generation under each of them differing
in sex, and the subdivision continues in like manner until the
heirs take their shares, the male taking double the share of each
female under each subdivision. If there are no generations between the heirs and the decedent which differ in sex, distribution is made per capita with the male taking double the share of
the female.78
For the class of descendants of the decedent's parents,
Shaybani directs that the estate be divided initially among the
brothers and sisters of the decedent, who have heirs claiming
through them, according to the normal principles of distribution
to these relatives but with each brother and sister counting as
however many heirs claiming through him or her. The subsequent distribution of the share of each brother and sister to
their descendants is made in the same way as the decedent's estate is distributed to his descendants, except that male and female issue of uterines are allocated equal shares.79
Within the class of descendants of the decedent's grandparents or higher ascendants, germanes exclude consanguines, consanguine~exclude uterines, the issue of germanes exclude the issue of consanguines, and the issue of consanguines exclude the
issue of uterines80 If the relatives remaining after this exclusion
are from both the maternal and paternal sides, the relatives on
77. See, e.g., id. at 251(8)-251(9). Further subdivision for descendants of higher ascendants is implied.
78. Id. at 240(10)-240(13), and examples at 240(14)-241(8). The text does not refer
to more than one division among males and females at a generation between the heirs
and the decedent, but implies a successive subdivision for each generation differing in
sex.

79. Id. at 243(5)-243(7), 244(6)-244(9), and examples at 241(8)-241(19), 243(4)243(5), 243(11)-243(18), 245(7)-245(8).
80. Id. at 244(6)-244(9), and examples at 246(10)-246(12), 248(5)-248(6), 249(21)249(23).
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the maternal side take one-third and the relatives on the paterIn this
nal side take two-thirds of the inheritance c~llectively.~~
regard, descendants of great-grandparents on either the maternal or paternal side are further subdivided into maternal and
paternal relatives and given a collective share of one-third and
two-thirds respectively of the collective share of their side.s2 The
subsequent distribution of the estate is not described explicitly
by Ibn Qudama but appears to be the same as for the class of
descendants of the decedent's parents.
Thus, for example, in the case of a decedent who leaves two
paternal aunts and a cousin who is the daughter of his mother's
sister to inherit a $13,500 estate, all three are descendants of
grandparents, but the aunts are nearer in degree to the decedent
and therefore exclude the cousin. Each aunt takes one-half the
$13,500 estate.
Finally, if the decedent dies with no blood relative, the public treasury (bayt al-mal) takes the share of the inheritance not
going to a surviving spouse.s3
The particular fixed shares which were ordained in the
Qur'an are unimportant to U.S. intestate succession laws since
they depend on social and historical factors peculiar to Islam
and are not suited to American culture.84However, some of the
techniques used to distribute shares to various heirs in the Islamic system may shed some light on how to approach problems
of refining the American system of intestate succession. Before
examining these techniques, the intestate succession laws presently existing in the United States will be examined to determine the extent to which they use the concept of fixed shares.
81. See supra note 76.
82. See supra note 77.
83. But see supra note 49 (exceptions of Malik and Shafi'i). I t should be noted that
an heir who has a dual relationship with the decedent inherits as a separate individual
under each title. MUGHNI,
supra note 7, a t 252(5)-252(7), and examples a t 186(7)186(19), 252(9)-252(20).According the Shafi'i, Abu Yusuf, and reasoning by analogy from
the word of Malik, there is an exception for the case of a grandmother who is two grandmothers to the decedent. They claim she will inherit only as one grandmother. Id. a t
210(11)-210(17).
84. The distribution of a double share to the male over the female is not only
counter to our ideas of propriety but actually contradicts fundamental notions of fairness
expressed in the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. Nevertheless, in Islam
the duty of the husband to provide for the support of his family without any set-off from
the wife's earnings, as well as other duties, justifies the unequal division of wealth. See
Fellows, Simon & Rau, supra note 2, a t 386 for the finding that the surviving spouse
should inherit the entire estate in preference to the decedent's family of orientation.
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Each state in the United States has enacted a statute that
lists the persons who are or who may be heirs to part of an intestate decedent's estate and the amounts each inherits. Although
the list of heirs who may be entitled to some portion of the decedent's estate is relatively similar from state to state,sbthere are
significant differences in the portions of the estate the heirs receive when certain individuals survive the decedent and others
do not. Each state has adopted some form of fixed share distribution to determine the respective shares of each class of heirs
entitled to participate in the estate.
Under existing intestate statutes there are two patterns of
sharing among classes. The first pattern, which exists in all
states, involves sharing among a surviving spouse and other classes of heirs according to various fixed share schemes. The second
pattern involves sharing among other classes of heirs when there
is no surviving spouse. Sharing according to the second pattern
occurs only in nine states.s6
A. Sharing Among Surviving Spouse and Other Heirs
The differences among the state intestate inheritance laws
primarily involve the existence of a spouse who may receive a
85. All states list the following persons who may be entitled to part of the decedent's estate: 1) the spouse, 2) the decedent's issue, 3) the decedent's parents, and 4) the
decedent's brothers and sisters. In virtually all states these heirs take in order of priority
to the exclusion of all others. If none of these heirs exists, differences begin to appear
among the states concerning the next persons to inherit: (1) eight states (Arizona, Hawaii, Kansas, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Tennessee, and Wisconsin) name the
decedent's grandparents (Hawaii adds great-grandparents; Ohio adds next of kin and
step-children; Wisconsin adds nieces and nephews and next of kin); (2) sixteen states
(Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Nebraska, New Jersey,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming) name grandparents, and aunts and uncles (Pennsylvania adds children and
grandchildren of aunts and uncles; Illinois adds great-grandparents and next of kin;
Utah adds next of kin); (3) seven states (Arkansas, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, New
York, Rhode Island, and Virginia) name grandparents, aunts and uncles, great-grandparents, and great-aunts and great-uncles, and in some cases further kindred; (4) eleven
states (California, Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Vermont) merely add "next of kin" to the
list (Massachusetts, Michigan, and Minnesota also add nieces and nephews); (5) seven
states (Georgia, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, South Carolina, Utah, and West Virginia)
and the District of Columbia add some combination of all these heirs (in Utah, issue of
parents and grandparents take by right of representation; in the District of Columbia,
great-grandparents, great-uncles, and great-aunts are not included; West Virginia includes the spouse's kindred).
86. See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
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statutory fixed sum or a statutory share in conjunction with
other heirs. The spouse's treatment in the different state statutes directly affects when and how much the other heirs will receive. In the following discussion, the states will be divided into
three categories depending on the classes of heirs with which the
spouse shares the inheritan~e.'~
1. States i n which spouse shares only with surviving issue

In seventeen states the spouse inherits the entire estate to
the exclusion of all other heirs when the decedent dies without
issue." Among these seventeen states there are three basic patterns of distribution when both a spouse and issue survive the
decedent. In two states, Arizona and Montana, the spouse inherits the entire estate even if there are surviving issue.89 In four
other states-Colorado,
Florida, Ohio and Wisconsin-the
spouse inherits a fixed dollar amount from the estate and the
remainder is divided between the spouse and issue according to
a designated fraction.OO In several cases the practical effect of
87. The discussion in this section focuses primarily on the shares that particular
h e m inherit through intestate succession, including the effect of the existence or nonexistence of an heir on the distributive share of another. When distinctions affect the distribution scheme, this discussion will distinguish between different types of heirs within
a particular class, such as between issue who are issue of the surviving spouse and those
who are not. Community property variation, illegitlrnacy, and simllar distinctions have
all been omitted in order to simplify and help clarify this description.
88. The states are Arizona (ARIZREV STATANN •˜ 14-2102 (1975)), Arkansas (ARK
STAT.ANN 61-149 (1971)), Colorado (COLO REV STAT •˜ 15-11-102 (1973)), Florida
(FLA STAT ANN •˜ 732.102 (West 1976)), Georgia (GA CODEANN $8 113-902, -903
(1982)), Illinois (ILL ANN STATch. llO1/z, $ 2-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983) (Probate Act
of 1975, •˜ 2-I)), Kansas (KAN STAT ANN 59-504 (1983)), Minnesota (MINN STAT.
525.16 (1975)), Mississippi (MISS CODEANN •˜ 91-1-7 (1972)), Montana (MONTCODE
ANN •˜ 72-2-202 (1983)), New Mexico (N.M. STATANN 5 45-2-102 (1978)), Ohio (OHIO
REV CODEANN 2105.06 (Page 1976)), Oregon (OR REV STAT 112.035 (1983)), Tennessee (TENNCODEANN •˜ 31-203 (Supp. 1983)), Vlrginia (VA CODE•˜ 64.1-1 (Supp.
1983)), West Virginia (W VA CODE•˜ 42-1-1 (1982)), and Wisconsin (WIS STAT ANN
$ 852.01 (West 1971)).
89. ARIZ REV STAT ANN 14-2102 (1975); MONT CODEANN 3 72-2-202 (1983).
Both states require that the surviving issue be the issue of the surviving spouse in order
for the spouse to recelve the entlre estate. If thls requirement is not met, then in Arizona
the spouse receives one-half the estate and the surviving issue receives the other half. In
Montana, if there is only one survlving issue who is not the issue of the surviving spouse,
then the soouse receives one-half the estate and the issue receives the other half. If there
is more than one survlving issue who is not issue of the surviving spouse, then the spouse
receives one-thlrd of the estate and the issue receives two-thirds.
90. COLO REV STAT g 15-11-102 (1973); FLA STAT ANN •˜ 732.102 (West 1976);
OHIOREV CODEANN 2105.06 (Page 1976); WIS STATANN $852.01 (West 1971). These
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this scheme is to give the entire estate to the spouse when the
statutory dollar amount exceeds the net worth of the estate, because persons who die with wills tend to be wealthier than people who die ~ i t h o u t . ~In
' the final eleven states in this
group-Arkansas, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Mexico, Oregon, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia-the spouse receives a designated fraction of the total estate, but no fixed sum.92
2. States in which spouse shares with issue or parents of

decedent
In eighteen states the surviving spouse inherits the entire
estate only when no issue and no parents survive.B3The spouse
states list certain restrictions on the actual amount to be received. In Ohio, the spouse
receives the first $30,000 if one or more of the surviving issue are issue of the surviving
spouse. If none of the issue is issue of the surviving spouse, then the spouse receives only
the first $10,000 of the estate. As for the designated share, Ohio gives the spouse one-half
the remainder if there is only one surviving issue; if there are more, then the spouse
receives one-third. In Florida, the spouse receives the first $20,000 plus one-half of the
remainder of the estate unless one or more issue are not issue of the surviving spouse. In
such a situation, the spouse receives only one-half the estate. Both Colorado and Wisconsin give the spouse the first $25,000 plus one-half of the balance of the estate. As in the
other states, Wisconsin and Colorado give the surviving spouse less if there are issue of
the decedent who are not issue of the spouse. Colorado gives the spouse one-half the
estate, while Wisconsin gives the spouse one-half if there is only one surviving issue (not
the issue of the surviving spouse) and one-third if there are more than one such issue
surviving.
91. See Fellows, Simon & Rau, supra note 2, at 324-25.
92. ARK.STAT.ANN.$5 61-149, -201 to -302 (1971); GA. CODEANN. 113-902, -903
(1982); ILL.REV.STAT.ch. 110'/2, •˜ 2-1 (Smith-Hurd 1983) (Probate Act of 1975, 3 2-1);
KAN.STAT.ANN.•˜ 59-504 (1983); MINN.STAT.8 525.16 (1975); MISS. CODEANN.8 91-1-7
(1972); N.M. STAT.ANN.•˜ 45-2-102 (1978); OR. REV.STAT.•˜ 112.035 (1983); TENN.CODE
ANN.3 31-203 (Supp. 1983); VA.CODE•˜ 64.1-19 (Supp. 1983); W. VA.CODE 42-2-1, 431-1(1982). Illinois, Kansas, and Oregon give the spouse one-half of the estate if there are
surviving issue. Georgia, Minnesota, and Tennessee make distinctions based upon how
many issue survive. Minnesota and Tennessee give the spouse one-third of the estate or
an issue's share, whichever is greater. Georgia gives the spouse one-fifth or an issue's
share, whichever is greater. Arkansas, Virginia, and West Virginia all give the spouse her
elective dower or curtesy share when there are surviving issue.
Arkansas' distribution scheme is unique because it requires the spouse to be married
continuously for more than the three years preceding the intestate's death to be entitled
to the entire estate. If married for this three-year period, the spouse receives the entire
estate, provided that there are no surviving issue. ARK.STAT.ANN. 61-149 (1971). In
Mississippi, the spouse shares equally with the surviving issue. New Mexico gives the
surviving spouse one-fourth of the estate and the surviving issue the other three-fourths.
STAT.
93. The states are Alabama (ALA.CODE•˜ 43-8-41 (1982)), Alaska (ALASKA
13.11.010 (1972)), Connecticut (CONN.GEN.STAT.ANN. 45-273a(b) (West 1981)), DelREV.STAT.8 560:2-102
aware (DEL. CODEANN.tit. 12, •˜ 502 (1979)), Hawaii (HAWAII
(Supp. 198211, Idaho (IDAHO
CODE•˜ 15-2-102 (197911, Indiana (IND.CODEANN.8 29-1-2-1
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shares the estate with either issue or parents, but issue take to
the exclusion of parents. The distinction between this group and
the first is that parents have a greater likelihood of receiving a
share in the decedent's estate because they can inherit a portion
of the estate along with the spouse. As in the first group, three
basic patterns exist. In fourteen states-Alabama, Alaska, Conneticut, Idaho, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Utah-the spouse receives a fixed dollar amount and
also shares in a fixed proportion of the remainder as designated
by statute.94 Two other states-Delaware and North Carolina-follow a similar fixed amount scheme but draw distinctions between real and personal property.95 In the final two
(Burns 1972)), Maine (ME. REV.STAT.ANN.tit. 18-A, 2-102 (1964)), Maryland (MD.EST
& TRUSTSCODEANN.•˜ 3-102 (Supp. 1983)). Missouri (Mo. ANN.STAT.$ 474.010 (Vernon
Supp. 1984)), Nebraska (NEB.REV.STAT.•˜ 30-2302 (1979)), New Hampshire (N.H. REV.
STAT.ANN.•˜ 561:l (1974)), New Jersey (N.J. STAT.ANN. 3B:5-3 (West 1983)), New York
(N.Y. EST. POWERS
& TRUSTSLAW•˜ 4-1.1 (McKinney 1981)), North Carolina (N.C. GEN.
STAT. 29-14 (Supp. 1983)). North Dakota (N.D. CENT.CODE$ 30.1-04-02 (1976)), Pennsylvania (PA. CONS.STAT.ANN.tit. 20, 8 2102 (Purdon Supp. 1983)), and Utah (UTAH
CODEANN.•˜ 75-2-102 (1978)).
STAT.•˜ 13.11.010 (1972); CONN.GEN.STAT.
94. ALA.CODE•˜ 43-8-41 (1982); ALASKA
ANN.•˜ 45-273a(b) (West 1981); IDAHOCODE•˜ 15-2-102 (1979); ME. REV.STAT.ANN.tit.
18-A, •˜ 2-102 (1964); MD. EST.& TRUSTSCODEANN3 3-102 (Supp. 1983); MO:ANN STAT.
3 474.010 (Vernon Supp. 1984); NEB.REV.STAT.•˜ 30-2302 (1979); N.H. REV.STAT.ANN.3
561:l (1974); N.J.STAT.ANN.•˜ 3B:5-3 (West 1983); N.Y.EST.POWERS
& TRUSTS
LAW•˜ 41.1 (McKinney 1981); N.D. CENT.CODE8 30.1-04-02 (1976); PA.CONS.STAT.ANN.tit. 20,
2102 (Purdon Supp. 1983); and UTAHCODEANN. •˜ 75-2-102 (1978). The fixed dollar
amount varies from state to state as follows: Alaska, Idaho, Maine, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, and North Dakota give the spouse the first $50,000 of the estate; in Nebraska the
fixed amount is $35,000; in Pennsylvania the amount is $30,000; in Missouri $20,000; and
in Maryland $15,000. In each of these states the surviving spouse also receives one-half
the remainder of the estate with the other half going to surviving issue or parents. However, if there are issue surviving and one or more are not issue of the surviving spouse,
the spouse inherits only a half fixed share of the estate and the issue receive the other
half. Alabama, Connecticut, New York, and Utah also give the spouse a specific dollar
amount, but it varies, depending on whether the spouse shares with issue or parents. In
Alabama and Utah, the spouse receives the first $50,000, plus one-half the remainder of
the estate if sharing with issue, but receives the first $100,000 plus one-half the remainder if sharing with parents. In Connecticut, the spouse receives the first $50,000 plus
one-half of the estate if sharing with issue, but receives the first $50,000 plus threefourths of the estate if sharing with parents. All four states also have statutes providing
that, if one or more of the surviving issue are not issue of the surviving spouse, the
spouse takes one-half and the issue take the other half. In New York, the spouse receives
the first $4,000 plus one-half the remainder of the estate if sharing with one issue, $4,000
plus one-third of the remainder of the estate if sharing with more than one issue, and
$25,000 plus one-half the remainder of the estate if sharing with one or both parents.
95. DEL.CODEANN.tit. 12, •˜ 502 (1979); N.C. GEN.STAT.8 29-14 (Supp. 1983). Delaware gives the spouse the first $50,000 plus one-half the balance of the personal estate
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states in this group-Hawaii and Indiana-the spouse inherits
only a fixed share in conjunction with either the issue or
parent^.^'
3. States in which spouse shares with surviving issue, parents,

or brothers and sisters of decedent
The last major group includes ten states and the District of
C o l ~ m b i aThese
. ~ ~ states give the surviving spouse the entire estate only if there are no surviving issue, no surviving parents,
and no surviving brothers and sisters of the decedent. There are
two basic subcategories in this group. In five states-South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, Washington, and Wyoming-the spouse
receives a larger fixed share when sharing with parents or brothers and sisters than when sharing with issue.B8In the other five
and a life estate in the real property, whether the spouse shares with issue or parents.
(The fixed amount is omitted if one or more of the issue are not issue of the surviving
spouse.) North Carolina gives the spouse the first $15,000 plus a child's share of the
remainder of personal property or one-third, whichever is greater, and an identical share
of real property. If the spouse is sharing with parents, the spouse receives the first
$25,000 plus one-half the remainder of personal and real property.
96. HAWAII
REV.STAT. 560:2-102 (Supp. 1982); IND.CODEANN. 29-1-2-1 (Burns
1972). Hawaii gives the spouse one-half of the estate whether sharing with issue or with
parents. In Indiana, a spouse sharing with issue receives an issue's share or one-third,
whichever is greater. If any of the issue are not issue of the surviving spouse, then the
spouse's share in the real property is only a life estate in one-third. If the spouse shares
the estate with parents, then the spouse receives three-fourths of the estate.
97. The states are California (CAL.PROBCODE•˜ 224 (West 19-56)), Kentucky (KY.
REV.STAT.ANN. $3 391.010, .030 (Baldwin 1978)), Michigan (MICH.COMP.LAWSANN.
3 700.105 (West 1980) (also requires that there be no surviving nieces and nephews)),
Nevada (NEv. REV.STAT.•˜ 134.050 (1981)). Oklahoma (OKLA.STAT.ANN. tit. 84, 3 213
(West 1970)), South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED
LAWSANN. $ 29-1-8 (1976)), Texas (TEx.
PROB.CODEANN.•˜ 38 (Vernon 1980)),Vermont (VT. STAT.ANN.tit. 14, $ 551 (1974) (also
requires that there be no surviving next of kin)), Washington (WASH.REV.CODEANN. 3
11.04.015 (Supp. 1983)),Wyoming (WYO.STAT.3 2-4-101 (1980)), and the District of Columbia (D.C. CODEANN. •˜ 19-302 (1981)).
29-1-5, -6 (1976); TEX. PROB.CODEANN. •˜ 38
98. S.D. CODIFIED
LAWSANN.
(Vernon 1980); VT. STAT.ANN. tit. 14, $5 461, 474, 551 (1974); WASH.REV.CODEANN.
$ 11.04.015 (Supp. 1983); WYO.STAT.•˜ 2-4-101 (1980). South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming give the spouse only a fixed share when sharing with issue, but when sharing with
parents or brothers and sisters, the spouse also receives a fixed sum. South Dakota gives
the spouse one-third or an issue's share, whichever is greater when the issue survive.
When sharing with parents or brothers and sisters, the spouse receives the first $100,000
plus one-half the balance of the estate. Vermont gives the spouse an elective share of
one-third of the value of all the real estate of which the decedent died seised (one-half
when sharing with only one of the surviving spouse's issue). When sharing with parents
or brothers and sisters, the spouse receives the first $25,000 plus one-half the balance of
the estate. Wyoming gives the spouse the first $20,000 plus three-fourths of the balance
of the estate when sharing with parents or brothers and sisters. The spouse receives only
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states-California,
Kentucky,
Michigan,
Nevada,
and
Oklahoma-and in the District of Columbiaee the spouse receives the same share regardless of the existence of any other
class inheriting in conjunction with the spouse.
4. Extended sharing with spouse

In five other states-Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Rhode
Island, and South Carolina-the pattern of intestate succession
does not fit into any of the three preceding groups. In each of
these states except Louisiana, a spouse may be required to share
the intestate estate with uncles or aunts, grandparents, greatgrandparents, great-aunts and great-uncles, or even the "lineal
ancestors" or "surviving kindred" of the decedent.loOIn Louisiana, the spouse takes only if there are no descendants, parents,
or brothers or sisters (or their descendant^).'^'
one-half the estate when sharing with issue. The other two states in this subcategory
only give the spouse a fixed share, hut the fixed share is greater when sharing with parents or brothers and sisters. Washington gives the spouse one-half when issue survive
and three-fourths when sharing with parents or brothers and sisters. Texas gives the
spouse one-third of the personal estate and a one-third life estate in real property when
sharing with issue, and all the personal property and one-half the real property in fee
simple when sharing with parents or brothers and sisters.
99. CAL.PROB.CODE• ˜ $ 221, 223 (West 1956); KY. REV.STAT.ANN.•˜ 392.020 (Baldwin 1978); MICH COMP.LAWSANN.•˜ 700.105 (West 1980); NEV.REV.STAT.$3 134.040,
.050 (1981); OKLA.STAT.ANN. tit. 84, 8 213 (West 1970); D.C. CODEANN. • ˜ • ˜ 19-303, -304
(1981). Kentucky gives the spouse a fixed dower/curtesy share. California, Michigan, Nevada, and Oklahoma each give the spouse one-third or an issue's share, whichever is
greater, when sharing with issue, and one-half the estate when sharing with parents or
brothers and sisters. (Michigan gives the first $3,000 of the personal estate to the spouse
if there are no issue. For real property, the Michigan statute gives only a one-third interest when sharing with one surviving issue.) The District of Columbia gives the spouse
one-third of the estate when sharing with issue and one-half when sharing with parents
or brothers and sisters.
100. In South Carolina, the spouse shares the estate either with issue (one-third or
an issue's share, whichever is greater), with parents or brothers and sisters (one-half the
estate), or with lineal ancestors (one-half the estate). S.C. CODEANN.$ 21-3-20 (Law. Coop. 1976). Massachusetts gives the spouse one-half the estate when sharing with issue,
and the first $50,000 plus one-half the remainder of the estate when sharing with surviving kindred. MASS.GEN.LAWSANN.ch. 190, $ 1 (West Supp. 1983). Rhode Island gives
the surviving spouse a dower/curtesy share of personal property and a life estate in real
property. The remainder interest in the real property, and a portion of any remaining
personal property, then go to the first surviving class of heirs from the following list:
issue, parents, brothers and sisters, grandparents, uncles and aunts, great-grandparents,
great-uncles and great-aunts, and nearest lineal ancestors. R.I. GEN.LAWS•˜•˜33-1-1 to -210 (1969). Iowa gives the spouse $50,000 or one-third of the estate, whichever is greater,
if there are issue and $50,000 plus one-half if there are no issue. IOWACODEANN.$8
633.211-.212 (West 1964 & Supp. 1983).
101. LA. CIV.CODEANN.art. 894 (West Supp. 1984).
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B. Sharing Among Classes of Heirs Other than Surviving
Spouse
Only nine states-Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, South Carolina, Texas, and Wyoming-require sharing among classes of heirs when no spouse
survives the decedent.lo2The remaining forty-one states and the
District of Columbia do not require sharing among classes in the
absence of a surviving spouse. Rather, the estate is distributed
to the class of heirs with the greatest statutory priority, beginning with issue of the decedent, to the exclusion of all other classes of heirs. Even in the nine states that provide for sharing
among classes in the absence of a surviving spouse, the surviving
issue of the decedent take the entire estate. Sharing among classes occurs only among the parents and siblings of the decedent
when neither issue nor spouse survive. The respective shares of
the siblings and parents vary according to individual state
1aw.lo3
The preceding discussion indicates the very limited use
American states make of fixed share distributions and sharing
among different classes of heirs. The following section of this article discusses the problems that arise when joint sharing is incorporated into a scheme of intestate succession and delineates
some of the techniques suggested by the Islamic system for dealing with these problems. However, because of differences between American and Islamic history and social circumstances,
many of the substantive aspects of the Islamic system are inappropriate for transfer to the American system. Nevertheless, the
experience of the Islamic system in dealing with the problems of
102. GA. CODEANN.5 53-4-2 (1982); ILL. ANN.STAT.ch. llO1/z 3 2-1 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1983) (Probate Act of 1975, 5 2-1); IND.CODEANN.5 29-1-2-1 (Burns 1972); LA.
Crv. CODEANN.art. 891 (West Supp. 1984); MISS. CODEANN.5 91-1-3 (1972); Mo. ANN.
STAT.5 474.010 (Vernon Supp. 1984); S.C. CODEANN.5 21-3-20 (Law. Co-op. 1976); TEX.
PROB.CODEANN. 5 38 (Vernon 1980); WYO.STAT.5 2-4-101 (1980).
103. In Georgia, Mississippi, Missouri, South Carolina, and Wyoming, the father
and mother share equally with brothers and sisters in the estate. In Mississippi, Missouri, and Wyoming, if the parents and siblings do not survive, the grandparents and
uncles and aunts share equally. In Indiana, the father and mother share equally with
brothers and sisters, except that a parent takes no less than one-fourth of the estate. In
Louisiana, brothers and sisters take subject to a usufruct in favor of the parents. In
Texas, the father and mother receive equal portions in the whole estate, but a sole surviving parent takes one-half and the other half goes to the brothers and sisters. In Illinois, the father and mother share equally with brothers and sisters, but a sole surviving
parent takes a double portion.
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fixed shares may provide some insight into how we can incorporate such a scheme into our own system.

IV. TECHNIQUES
In American law there is generally an order of exclusive priority by which heirs take the estate of the decedent: (1) the
spouse, (2) the decedent's issue, (3) the decedent's parents, (4)
the decedent's brothers and sisters, and (5) others.lo4At present
the American scheme incorporates a system of fixed shares almost exclusively between the spouse and children. The ABA
study suggests that the distributive preferences of the testator
would best be served by also permitting the following heirs to
inherit with each other: the spouse with the mother, the spouse
with the issue, the parent(s) with the siblings, and the son with
the issue of other, deceased sons.105However, much work remains to be done in this area. The ABA study does not present
results concerning the sharing of the inheritance between the
following heirs who do inherit together in the Islamic scheme:
parents with children, siblings with children, grandparents with
children, the spouse with grandchildren, the spouse with grandparents, the spouse with siblings, grandchildren with parents,
grandchildren with grandparents, grandchildren with siblings,
parents with grandparents, and grandparents with siblings.10e
Furthermore, this list mentions only combinations of two different heirs and does not refer to combinations of three or more
heirs who might inherit together.
Jurisdictions seeking to reform their intestate succession
laws to provide a larger group of heirs who share concurrently in
an inheritance will face two major problems: (I) the fear of disturbing a time proven system that has provided a simple and
satisfactory method of distributing an intestate decedent's estate; and (2) the difficulties of apportioning the estate among
members of various classes of heirs. The techniques used in the
Islamic law of inheritance may be helpful in dealing with both of
these problems.

A. Reform of a Time Proven Scheme Through Amendment
One problem that hinders reform of intestate succession
104. See supra note 85.
105. See generally Fellows, Simon & Rau, supra note 2.
106. See generally supra Table 1, pp. 274-78.
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laws is the uncertainty concerning the changes to be made and
the fear of disturbing a system having the advantages of a simple scheme and a long history. This fear might be mitigated by
dismissing the idea of reform in favor of the idea of amendment.
The scheme of intestate succession among the pre-Islamic tribes
favored the Agnates' inheritance in a simple order of exclusive
priority. Later, Islamic law amended this scheme to include
fixed shares for certain designated individuals. The system of
fixed shares, promulgated initially through three verses in the
Qur'an, was simply grafted into the Agnatic succession scheme.
As a result, it was possible to make certain changes in Islamic
inheritance law without reconsidering the whole scheme of intestate succession.
If the goal were to further the usual intent of the testator
and allow certain heirs to inherit with others under American
intestate laws, a scheme of fixed shares that more closely reflected the testator's intent could be adopted by way of amendment to existing statutes without destroying the existing scheme
of intestate succession.
The uncertainty concerning the changes that should be
made will remain until further surveys such as those contained
in the ABA study have been conducted. The ABA study was not
meant to be complete. However, as the need for certain changes
becomes apparent, it should be possible to implement them
through successive amendments to the intestate succession laws
without waiting for a total picture of sweeping reform. Gradual
change in this matter will allow greater flexibility for experimentation and should diminish the problem of uncertainty.

B. Apportionment Through Designated Fixed Shares
Some of the problems in apportioning an estate among various classes of heirs include: (1) how a fixed share will be designated for a specific heir; (2) how the proportionate share of each
class of inheriting heirs will be determined; (3) what adjustments will be made when the total of the fixed shares is either
greater or less than unity; and (4) how an inheritance will be
apportioned when only remote heirs survive the decedent.
Islamic law has developed a systematic method of answering
or dealing with each of these problems. This method provides
tested solutions that draftsmen of intestate laws may wish to
consider in adopting inheritance reforms.
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1. Designation of fixed shares

Once the combination of heirs who will inherit together has
been determined, Islamic law provides several different ways in
which a fixed share may be designated for a specific heir:
(I) A fixed share may be designated only if certain persons
survive the decedent with the fixed sharer. For example, the
husband and wife in the Islamic system receive a designated
share of one-fourth and one-eighth respectively if they survive
with an agnatic descendant.lo7 Likewise, the mother receives a
fixed share of one-sixth if she survives with an agnatic descendant,lo8 and the father receives a fixed share of one-sixth if he
survives with a male agnatic descendant.lo9
(2) A fixed share may be designated only if certain persons
survive the decedent and other persons do not. For example, in
the Islamic system, the mother surviving with two or more
brothers or sisters but without an agnatic descendant receives a
fixed share of one-sixth.l1•‹The consanguine sister who survives
with one germane sister but without an agnatic descendant or a
male agnatic ascendant or a germane brother or a consanguine
brother receives a fixed share of one-sixth.'" An agnatic grandfather who survives with a male agnatic descendant but without
a father or a nearer agnatic grandfather receives a fixed share of
one-sixth.l12 An agnatic granddaughter who survives with a
higher female agnatic descendant but without a higher or an
equal male agnatic descendant receives a fixed share of onesixth.l13
(3) It is also possible for a fixed share to be designated only
if certain persons do not survive the decedent with the fixed
sharer. For example, in the Islamic system, the husband and
wife are entitled to receive respective shares of one-half and onefourth only if they survive the decedent without an agnatic descendant.l14 A uterine brother or sister is entitled to a fixed
share of one-sixth if he or she survives the decedent without an
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

supra
supra
supra
supra
supra
supra
supra
supra

Table
Table
Table
Table
Table
Table
Table
Table

1, lines 1 & 3, p. 274.
1, line 7, p. 275.
1, line 11, p. 275.
1, line 8, p. 275.
1, line 22, p. 276.
1, line 25, p. 277.
1, line 32, p. 278.
1, lines 2 & 4, p. 274.
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agnatic descendant or a male agnatic ascendant."' A mother
who survives without an agnatic descendant or two or more
brothers or sisters or a father is entitled to a fixed share of onethird."' A daughter who survives without a son is entitled to a
fixed share of one-half."' Likewise, a germane sister who survives without an agnatic descendant or a germane brother or a
male agnatic ascendant is entitled to a fixed share of one-half.'18
A consanguine sister is entitled to the same share in similar, although not identical, circumstan~es."~Other heirs who fall
within this category are the grandmotherlZ0 and the agnatic
granddaughter.lZ1
These three methods of determining the designated share
for a specified heir under Islamic law should be of particular
concern to those seeking intestate law reform. These methods
require critical focus on whether an heir should always inherit
the same fixed share or whether the presence or absence of other
objects of the intestate's bounty should affect the fixed share of
any or all other heirs. Although the fixed shares under the Islamic system may not prove workable in modern American society, they nevertheless may serve as a model upon which the
framework of American reform may be based.
2. Allocating shares among classes

The fixed share described in Islamic law applies to a class of
heirs and requires that the proportion of the estate which that
class receives be fixed regardless of whether another class of
heirs is added to or dropped from the list of sharers.
The ABA study indicates that following the Islamic concept
of allocating a fixed portion to each class would produce desirable results for American jurisdictions. If the decedent leaves a
father, mother, and brother and sister, the ABA study concluded
that preferences for distribution among the surviving father,
mother, and brother and sister of the decedent was 2.5-2-2.122
Does this mean that the father should always inherit 514 of the
115.
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117.
118.
119.
120.
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Table 1, line 15, p. 275.
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Table 1, line 35, p. 278.
text accompanying note 5.
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siblings' share in order to reflect distributive preferences? Suppose the decedent is survived only by the father and the brother
and sister. This hypothesized set of survivors was presented to
the respondents in the telephone survey of the ABA study. A
weighted average of the patterns for these three relatives inheriting without the mother indicates that the distributive preferences would still be 2.5-2.123
However, what would happen if there were only one brother
surviving with the father, or five brothers, or even fifteen brothers? The fixed proportion allocated to the class of siblings ultimately would require that the absolute share of each sibling decrease as the number of siblings increase. The problem is not
solved by allocating a fixed proportion to each heir, rather than
to each class, because ultimately the father's absolute share
would become an insignificant amount in combination with an
increasing number of shares to brothers and sisters. One solution
to this problem would be to vary the fixed share given to a class
depending on the number of persons in the class. Islamic law
uses this approach in the case of sisters, daughters, and granddaughters inheriting in conjunction with other heirs. A sister,
daughter, or granddaughter will ordinarily be entitled to inherit
one-half, but two or more sisters, daughters, or granddaughters
would collectively inherit two-thirds of the estate.12'
123. The distribution patterns found in the study were as follows:

The Four Dominant Distribution Patterns for the
Father-Brother-Sister Relation Set (Percent)*
Distribution Pattern by
Percentage of Estate to:
Father
Brother
Sister
100
50
33
0
Other

0
25
33
50

..... .

Percent of
Respondents
No. of
in Pattern Respondents

0
25
33
50
...

....

Total. . . . .

29.2
15.4
36.4
7.6
11.3
-

219
115
273
57
85
-

99.9

749

*1 missing case.

Fellows, Simon & Rau, supra note 2, at 346. Weighing each pattern by the percentage of
respondents in the pattern produces a weighted average distribution pattern as follows:
Father

Brother

Sister

49.033

19.783

19.783

124. See supra Table 1, lines 15, 18, 23, 35, pp. 275-78.
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Distributive preferences in the United States might be analyzed to determine not only if siblings should inherit with parents, but also how much the proportionate share of siblings
should be increased when there is an increase in surviving membership of that class. It may be determined that two siblings
should take a larger share than one and ten siblings should take
a larger share than two. A maximum fixed share should also be
contemplated in order to avoid minimizing the shares of he'irs in
other classes.
3. Adjustment to fixed shares to provide for total distribution

An additional problem that has not confronted American
intestate succession systems is designating certain fixed shares
to individuals and finding that the total of these shares in a particular case adds to greater than or less than unity. At present, a
spouse is entitled to inherit a designated share with surviving
issue or, in some states, with surviving parents or surviving siblings. The spouse is given a fixed share and the remainder is divided among the class that inherits with the spouse. There are
some states that alter the proportion of the estate going to the
spouse depending upon the number of issue surviving. However,
there is never a problem of the shares totalling to other than
unity because the shares are specified for each combination.
In an intestate scheme which incIudes several combinations
of heirs inheriting in conjunction with one another, the specification of shares for each combination might well become unwieldy.
The Islamic solution to this problem has been to designate fixed
shares for joint sharers with and without certain other persons
surviving the decedent but not for every combination of heirs.
When these fixed shares do not add to unity, the shares are proportionately increased or decreased until unity results. In Islamic law this process is called 'awl (decrease) and radd
(increase).
Care should be taken in constructing a scheme of fixed
shares to minimize the possibility of a situation in which the
proportionate decrease of fixed shares may be necessary to bring
the total to unity. When fixed shares are grafted upon an already existing system in which heirs inherit in an order of exclusive priority, the class that would otherwise inherit the whole
estate will usually take as residuaries. A system of fixed shares
that is too generous in shares allocated to the sharing class may
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totally exclude or drastically reduce the share of a residuary who
once had an exclusive right to the inheritance.
One way in which the Islamic scheme protects the interest
of the residuary is to include him in the class that receives a
fixed share. In the case of the father who inherits with a female
agnatic descendant but without a male.agnatic descendant, the
father is entitled to a fixed share of one-sixth plus any remaining residue. If the father survives the decedent with two daughters and the husband of the decedent, the two daughters would
be entitled to a two-thirds share (8/12), the husband would be
entitled to a one-fourth share (3/12), and the father would be
left with the remaining residue of one-twelfth. However, because
the father is entitled to a one-sixth fixed share plus any remaining residue, he is entitled to a minimum share of one-sixth
(2112). Through the process of radd, the two daughters are then
entitled to split an 8/13 share, the husband is entitled to a 3/13
share, and the father is entitled to a 2/13 share.'26 A similar
combination of fixed share with residue is given to the agnatic
grandfather when he inherits with a female agnatic descendant
but without a father or a nearer agnatic grandfather or a male
agnatic d e s ~ e n d a n t . ' ~ ~
Islamic law further protects members of the residuary class
by varying the fixed share of one class of heirs as the class of
residuary heirs increases in number. In the Islamic system the
mother who survives the decedent without an agnatic descendant or a father is entitled to a fixed share of one-third if she
survives with one brother of the decedent, but she is entitled to
a fixed share of only one-sixth if she survives with two or more
brothers of the decedent.''? This variation in the fixed share of
the mother permits the brothers to have greater shares as their
number increases from one to two.
4. Apportionment of the estate among remote heirs

As the heirs designated to take from the decedent become
further removed and less important as objects of the decedent's
bounty, distributive preferences may indicate that they be totally excluded from the inheritance by the survival of any heir
existing in a closer degree to the decedent. There is no reason to
125. See supra Table 1, line 12, p. 275.
126. See supra Table 1, line 26, p. 277.
127. See supra Table 1, lines 8 & 10, p. 275.
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distinguish this set of heirs from those who inherit presently in
classes according to an order of exclusive priority, except insofar
as the fixed shares of certain heirs are grafted upon the closer
set of heirs and not those further removed. If there are no heirs
who inherit as residuaries in the first set, it may be determined
that the testator's distributive preferences are to give the entire
estate to the fixed sharers and to increase their shares proportionately if they do not total to unity when first determined. For
simplicity of presentation in an intestate succession law, a division could be made between the primary heirs who inherit with
fixed sharers and the secondary heirs who inherit only if there
are no primary heirs or fixed sharers. This distinction has been
made in the Islamic system between the Agnates and the Blood
Relatives.
Most American states do not provide for the inheritance by
heirs beyond a certain degree removed from the decedent. There
is an interest in limiting the number of potential takers in order
to avoid the "laughing heir" (one who is so loosely linked to his
benefactor as to suffer no sense of bereavement at his loss).128
On the other hand, a laughing heir may be preferred to the state
taking by escheat.
If a preference is found to give to the secondary heirs, it
may be difficult to determine the distributive preferences of the
testator concerning the inheritance of each of those relatives.
With the assumption that the testator would prefer a distribution pattern analogous to that of the distribution to the first two
classes of heirs, Islamic law provides two different methods for
implementing such a preference: tanzil and qaraba. Either of
these methods could be adapted to meet the needs of American
intestate reform.
According to the doctrine of tanzil, each secondary heir is
put in the position of one of the primary heirs with whom he is
connected. The connection with the primary heir is determined
in a particular way, and the right of each heir to inherit is determined initially by the proximity of his relationship to the primary heir he represents. If he is entitled to inherit, he will take
the share which would have devolved on the primary heir in conjunction with the other primary heirs represented. Tanzil recognizes that the testator may want to benefit the nearest relative
128. Cavers, Change in the American Family and the "Laughing Heir," 20
208 (1935).

REV.202,

IOWA L.
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to a deceased relative of the first two classes in the same way
that he would have benefitted the latter. Therefore, each Blood
Relative stands in the shoes of the ordinary heir with whom he
is connected.
According to the doctrine of qaraba, each secondary heir is
considered in his direct relationship to the decedent. Mutually
exclusive classes of heirs are determined, and within the class
that is to inherit, relatives who are nearer in degree to the decedent exclude the more remote. When the relatives are all in
equal degree to the decedent, the relatives who are closest in
degree to primary heirs may exclude others. This latter doctrine
provides for classes of heirs that resemble the mutually exclusive
categories of the American system, but within the class that inherits, the heirs are determined by degree of relationship.

The problems accompanying the incorporation of 'fixed
shares in an intestate succession law are manifold. The remarks
made here only begin to touch on them. I hope, however, that
this presentation of the manner in which the Islamic system has
already dealt with problem areas will help to illuminate solutions to some of the obstacles that accompany intestate law reform. I also hope that the detailed discussion of the American
system will indicate the severe lack of experimentation in the
several states for intestate succession reform. The ABA study
indicates possible areas in which substantive reform is needed.
This article's comparative analysis suggests techniques for implementing potential reforms. Further study in both areas is
needed, but it rests with the states to provide a forum for the
testing of such reforms.

An Insider's Perspective on the Significance of
the German Criminal Theory's General System
for Analyzing Criminal Acts
Professor Dr. Wolfgang Naucke*

Over the past several years, increasing attention has been
paid in the United States to German criminal law and criminal
theory. This is a reflection not only of the preeminent position
of German criminal law in countries outside the common law orbit,' but also of the burgeoning literature on the German criminal system in the United state^.^ This article 'explores one of the
* Vice President, Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Frankfurt a.M., West Germany; Professor of Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure, Criminology, and Legal Philosophy, Johann Wolfgang Goethe University. An earlier version o f this paper was presented
to the law faculty at U.C.L.A. during 1979. The author wishes to thank Mr. David Morrison, J.D., who was a Fulbright Scholar at the faculty of law, University o f Frankfurt a.M.
in 1979, for assistance in translating this paper. He also wishes to thank Professor W .
Cole Durham, Jr. o f the J . Reuben Clark Law School for assistance in preparation of the
introduction to this article and in making a number o f refinements in the text.
1. See Hall & Wagner, Foreword to Symposium: The New German Penal Code, 24
AM.J. COMP.
L. 589, 589 (1976); Durham, Book Review, 1979 UTAHL. REV.629, 634.
RETHINKING
CRIMINAL
LAW (1978); J. LANGBEIN,
COMPARA2. See, eg., G. FLETCHER,
T I V E CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE:
GERMANY
(1977); Arzt, Responses to the Growth of Crime in
the United States and West Germany: A Comparison of Changes in Criminal Law and
INT'L L.J. 43 (1979); Bradley, The Exclusionary Rule in
Societal Attitudes, 12 CORNELL
Germany, 96 HARV.L REV 1032 (1983); Clausnitzer, The Statute of Limitations for
Murder in the Federal Republic of Germany, 29 INT'L & COMP.L.Q. 473 (1980); Daly,
Intoxication and Crime: A Comparative Approach, 27 INT'L & COMP.L.Q. 378 (1978);
Damaska, The Reality of Prosecutorial Discretion: Comments on a German Monograph,
29 AM.J . COMP.
L. 119 (1981); Eser, The Politics of Criminal Law Reform: Germany, 21
AM.J. COMP.
L 245 (1973); Felstiner, Plea Contracts in West Germany, 13 LAW & SOC'Y
REV.309 (1979); Fletcher, The Right Deed for the Wrong Reason: A Reply to Mr. Robinson, 23 UCLA L. REV 293 (1975); Fletcher, Proportionality and the Psychotic Aggressor:
A Vignette in Comparative Criminal Theory, 8 ISRAEL L. REV.367 (1973); Fletcher, The
Theory of Criminal Negligence: A Comparative Analysis, 119 U. PA. L. REV.401 (1971);
Goldstein & Marcus, Comment on Continental Criminal Procedure, 87 Y A L EL.J. 1570
(1978); Goldstein & Marcus, The Myth of Judicial Supervision in Three "Inquisitorial"
Systems: France, Italy, and Germany, 87 YALEL.J. 240 (1977); Herrmann, The Rule of
Compulsory Prosecution and the Scope of Prosecutorial Discretion in Germany, 41 U.
CHI.L. REV.468 (1974); Horton, Life Imprisonment and Pardons in the German Federal
Republic, 29 INT'L & COMP.L.Q. 530 (1980); Horton, Abortion Law Reform in the Ger-
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central structural features of German criminal law, which can be
described as the German theory's "general system for analyzing
criminal acts." (The underlying German term, Straftatsystem,
has no precise English equivalent and can also be translated as
the "general system for structuring criminal analysis," or more
briefly, as the "general analytical system" or as the "criminal
These phrases will be used interchangeably
analysis struct~re."~man Federal Republic, 28 INT'L& COMP.L.Q. 288 (1979); Hoskins, A Comparative Analysis of the Crime of Conspiracy i n Germany, France and the United States, 6 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 245 (1973); Hughes, Pleas Without Bargains, 33 RUTGERS
L. REV.753
(1981); Johnson & Drew, This Nation Has Money for Everything-Except Its Courts, 17
JUDGES'J , Summer 1978, a t 8; Kappel & Leuteritz, Wife Battering i n the Federal Republic o f Germany, 5 VICTIMOLOGY
225 (1980); Langbein, Judging Foreign Judges Badly:
J. 4 (1979); Langbein, Land Without Plea BarNose Counting Isn't Enough, 18 JUDGES'
gaining: How the Germans Do I t , 78 MICH.L. REV.204 (1979); Langbein & Weinreb,
Continental Criminal Procedure: "Myth" and Reality, 87 YALEL.J. 1549 (1978); McGehee, Child Abuse i n the Federal Republic of Germany, 6 VICTIMOLOGY
215 (1981);
O'Keefe & Czeniek, A S t u d y of the Drug Laws of the Federal Republic of Germany, 32
FOODDRUGCOSM.L.J. 488 (1977); Peltzer, T h e Criminal Responsibility and Personal
Liability of the Director i n the Bankruptcy of His Company: Germany, 9 INT'L BUS.
LAW.33 (1981); Scheerer, T h e New Dutch and German Drug Laws: Social and Political
Conditions for Criminalization and Decriminalization, 12 L. & SOC'YREV.585 (1978);
Silving, Comments o n Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws-A Comparative Analysis,
34 REVISTA
DEL COLEGIO
DE ABOGADOS
DE P.R. 107 (1973); Symposium: T h e New German
Penal Code, 24 AM. J. COMP.L. 589 (1976) (articles by Arzt, Binavince, Darby, Eser,
Fletcher, Hall, Herrmann, Luderssen, Oehler, Ryu, Silving, and Wagner); Teske & Arnold, Comparison o f the Criminal Statistics o f the United States and the Federal Republic o f Germany, 10 J. CRIMJUST.359 (1982); Volkmann-Schluck, Continental European Criminal Procedures: True or Illusive Model?, 9 AM.J. CRIM.L. 1 (1981); Weigend,
Sentencing i n West Germany, 42 MD L. REV. 37 (1983); Note, Anti-Terrorism: T h e
INT'L L.F. 167 (1980); Note, Positivist Roots of
West German Approach, 3 FORDHAM
Criminal Law and t h e West German Criminal Law Reform, 10 RUT.-CAM.L.J. 613
(1979); Comment, T h e West German Day-Fine System: A Possibility for the United
States?, 50 U . CHI. L. REV.281 (1983).
3. Literally translated, "Straftatsystem" means simply "criminal act system," but
this translation fails to convey the structural and methodological significance of the
Straftatsystem as a basic organizing principle of German criminal law. No translation of
the term can be fully adequate, since there is no precise equivalent to the Straftatsystem
within the American legal system and American legal practice. Thus, any set of English
words will fail to adequately convey what is involved because of the lack of a corresponding institutional referent within American legal culture. In an effort t o bridge this language gap, it has proven useful to employ a number of English terms that would not be
obvious choices a t the level of literal translation. The word "general" is added to indicate
the expectation that the Straftatsystem is the method of analysis to be applied in all
cases. Moreover, the Straftatsystem is general in the same sense that the "general part"
(allgemeiner Teil) of criminal law is general: it relates to features of criminal conduct
that go beyond the specific crimes of the "special part" (besonderer Teil). Not surprisingly, German texts on the general part are typically organized around the basic features
of the general system for structuring criminal analysis. See, e.g., J . BAUMANN.
LEHRBUCH
DES STRAFRECHTS:
STRAFRECHT:
ALLCEMEINER
TEIL(8th ed. 1977); H. JESCHECK,
ALLGEMEINER
TEIL (3d ed. 1978); R. MAURACH,
DEUTSCHES
STRAFRECHT:
ALLCEMEINER
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in this article to refer to the German Straftatsystem.) This system is an intellectual framework that defines and delimits the
approach that a German jurist adopts in determining whether
particular conduct violates the norms of the substantive criminal
law. It is parallel in systemic significance to the Model Penal
Code's innovative "element analysis" method~logy,~
but has
much deeper philosophical and cultural roots. This article will
TEIL (4th ed. 1971); E. SCHMIDH~USER,
STRAFRECHT:
ALLGEMEINER
TEIL (2d ed. 1975); G.
STRATENWERTH,
STRAFRECHT:
ALLGEMEINER
TEIL (3d ed. 1981).
T h e terms "analyzing" and "analytical" are used because the Straftatsystem is fundamentally concerned with what American lawyers would describe as legal analysis.
More particularly, the Straftatsystem provides a structure for analyzing the basic constituents of criminal liability: whether the relevant prohibitory norm has been violated,
whether justificatory circumstances are present, and whether culpability or accountability is negated by pertinent excusing conditions. Technically, i t might be more accurate to
think of the Straftatsystem as an effort a t "synthesis" rather than "analysis," since its
key function is to bring together the various constituents of liability and the wider values
that shape our thought about criminal norms, justifications, and excuses in a structured
methodology for resolving particular cases. But Americans tend to use the term "anelysis" indiscriminately t o cover both the "breaking down" (analytic) and the "gathering
together" (synthetic) aspects of the process of reasoning used in deciding cases. "Anslysis" is thus the better term to use in conveying the meaning of Straftatsystem to American lawyers.
The terms "structure" and "structuring" used in two of the suggested translations
reflect the fact that the Straftatsystem constitutes not only a method of analysis, but a
structure or structuring of thought. Perhaps these come to the same thing, but there are
contexts in which the structural dimension of the Straftatsystem is not adequately
evoked by the English word "system." The term System in German has stronger structural overtones than the cognate English term.
One further point about the term System must be made. T h e Straftatsystem is not
to be thought of as a system of criminal law in the sense that one might speak of a
"philosophical systemw-i.e., as a theoretical or metaphysical construct accounting for a
particular sector of thought or reality. This is not to say that German criminal theorists
have not utilized the Straftatsystem as a central feature of comprehensive accounts of
German criminal law. They have. Indeed, as noted above, most texts on the "general
part" of German criminal law are organized around the basic features of the Straftatsystem. Moreover, as this article contends, the general system for analyzing criminal acts
does reflect a constellation of values connected with the ideal of rule of law (Rechtsstaatlichkeit). Conceivably, in a n age more conducive to philosophical system building, a
criminal theorist might attempt to construct a system embodying these values. The point
for present purposes, however, is that Straftatsystem is to be thought of as a practical,
systematic method for structuring analysis of liability for criminal actions, rather than as
some particular thinker's philosophical systematization of criminal law.
German criminal law scholars often refer not only to the Straftatsystem, but also to
the Straftatlehre (literally, "criminal act doctrine"). The latter is merely the body of
doctrine or theory about the former. No effort has been made to distinguish between
translations of these two terms in this article, since from the perspective of American
readers, the two blend together as a linked theoretical approach to analyzing criminal
liability.
4. See generally Robinson & Grall, Element Analysis in Defining Criminal Liability: The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN.L. REV.681 (1983).
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describe how the general analytical system operates in practice
and will then explore the deeper values it reflects and protects.
My aim is to provide an overview of a central feature of German
criminal methodology, and then to reflect a t a more general level
on the relationship between legal methodology and legal values.

A. "Wild Postering": A Representative Problem
For those familiar with the significance of the "general theory for analyzing criminal actsw5in German criminal thought,
the topic addressed by this article may sound extremely broad. I
think, however, that the subject is central to a number of significant theoretical and practical issues. The nature of the subject
may become more clear if I begin with a legal issue that is currently the subject of frequent debate in Germany.
German courts are time and again confronted by the following set of facts: A group of young people has difficulty gaining
public attention for their political views, and to remedy this
problem they decide to "advertise." They have some posters
printed and paste them up as firmly as possible in as many locations as they see fit.6 The modern glues are quite permanent,
and the material is often bonded to the surface to which it is
attached. I t is usually a tremendous inconvenience to remove
the posters or fliers, and is sometimes impossible.
Under German criminal law, the question is whether the
foregoing conduct is sufficient to constitute the crime of damaging property under section 303 of the German Criminal Code.?
There are conflicting opinions, and the courtse and scholarse de5. See supra note 3.
6. In Germany this is called wildes Plakatieren, which may be translated as "wild
postering," or more tamely, as "unauthorized advertising."
7. Section 303 provides, "Wer rechtswidrig eine fremde Sache beschadigt oder zerstort, wird mit Freiheitsstrafe bis zu zwei Jahren oder mit Geldstrafe bestraft."
STRAFGESETZBUCH
[STGB] 9 303 (W. Ger.). This may be translated as follows: "Whoever
wrongfully damages or destroys an object not belonging to him shall be punished by
imprisonment for a term not to exceed two years or by a fine."
N
[JZ]
8. See Oberlandesgericht [OLG], Oldenburg, W. Ger., 1978 J U R I ~ T EZEITUNG
70; OLG, Karlsruhe, W. Ger., 1978 JZ 72; OLG, Oldenburg, W. Ger., 1978 NEUEJURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT
[NJW] 1656; OLG, Karlsruhe, W. Ger., 1978 NJW 1636; see also
1978 NJW 1637-42; Judgment of Nov. 13, 1979, Bundesgerichtshof in Strafsachen
[BGHST], W. Ger., 29 BGHST 129.
& F. SCHR~DER.
STRAFRECHT:
BESONDERER
TEIL 267 (6th
9. See, e.g., 1 R.MAURACH
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fend their views with numerous arguments. It is unsettled
whether firmly pasting a flier or poster on an object damages
that object. Those who believe that it does must turn to further
questions. Conceivably, such property damage is justified by the
right to freedom of speech. Even someone who does not accept
the argument that free speech rights legitimize property damage
might still argue that the young people should not be punished
because they (mistakenly) thought that their right to freedom of
speech justified their actions. These are difficult legal issues in
Germany and they place great demands on the breadth and precision of analysis.

B. Fundamental Tools of Legal Analysis in the German
System
The German lawyer must have total command of two fundamental and distinct tools of legal analysis to discuss properly
the question of the punishability of unauthorized advertising:
knowledge of the pertinent code sections and mastery of the
general system for analyzing criminal acts.
1. Knowledge of code provisions

Knowledge of the the pertinent code sections entails knowledge not only of the wording of the applicable statutory texts
but also a sound understanding of how they are to be interpreted. In the "wild postering" situation, one must know the
text of section 303 of the German Criminal Code. According to
the text of section 303, the damage or destruction of an object is
a prerequisite for liability. The German lawyer must be aware
that, according to the accepted interpretation of section 303,
cases of unauthorized advertising fall within the statute's prohibition of "damaging" as opposed to "destroying" property.l0 He
or she must also be conscious of the various legal interpretations
of the word "damage." Interpretations of this term are associed. 1977); STREE,
STRAFGESETZBUCH:
KOMMENTAR,
•˜ 303, Marginal No. 8 (A. Schonke & H.
SchrSder, 21st ed. 1982). For a summary of the various positions, see Dolling,
Sachbeschadigung durch Plakatieren uom Gebrauchsgegenstiinden, 1981 NJW 207;
Gossel, Wildes Plakatieren und Sachbeschadigung im Sinne des $ 303 STGB, 1980
JURISTISCHE
RUNDSCHAU
[JR] 184; Maiwald, Unbefugtes Plakatieren ohne Substanzuerletzung keine Sachbeschadigung?, 1980 J Z 256; Thoss, Sachbeschadigung
durch unbefugtes Plakatieren?, 1978 NJW 1612; Katzer, Das unbefugte Plakatieren als
Auslegungsproblem der Sachbeschadigung (8 303 STGB) (Diss. Frankfurt a.M. 1982).
10. See supra note 7 .
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ated with three different views of the interests protected by section 303. The interests protected by this statute might reflect
concerns with (1) the physical integrity of the object; (2) the object's functional capacities; or (3) the authority of the owner to
determine what can and cannot be done with the object." If the
protected interest is seen as the physical integrity or the functional capacity of the property, unauthorized advertising does
not constitute damaging property. Pasting up a placard usually
destroys neither the physical integrity nor the functional capacity of an object. If, on the other hand, the interest protected by
making it a crime to damage property is the owner's authority
over the object, then unauthorized advertising does constitute
damaging property. Indeed, unauthorized advertising unavoidably invades the authority of the owner over his property.
Familiarity with, and the ability to discuss, these issues are
part of the knowledge of the code that is required for a German
jurist to work effectively with section 303.

2. The general system for analyzing criminal acts
Familiarity with the code, however, does not provide the
German lawyer with enough knowledge to make a thorough legal
analysis of unauthorized advertising. He must also be master of
the second tool of legal analysis, the general system for analyzing criminal acts. In this general analytical system are collected
those features of crime that are common to all crimes, whether it
be damaging property, theft, murder, or anything else.12 If,
therefore, unauthorized advertising is to be punishable under
German law, it must be found to exhibit the general paradigmatic features of crime as determined by German criminal theory, as well as the particular elements of section 303 established
by statute.
By pouring the question of liability for specific conduct
through the filter of the general system for analyzing criminal
acts, we are adding something-and not just a little some11. See, e.g., G . ARZT,
STRAFRECHT.
BESONDERER
TEIL,VERM~GENSDELIKTE
9 ff. 1978;
& F SCHR~DER.
STRAFRECHT.
BESONDERER
TEIL265 ff. (6th ed. 1977)'('Das
1 R. MAURACH
Wesen der Sachbeschiidigung").
STRAFRECHT:
ALL12. For an overview of the West German literature, see BAUMANN,
CEMEINER TEIL171 ff. (8th ed. 1977); H. JESCHECK,
LEHRBUCH
DES STRAFRECHTS:
ALLCEMEINER TEIL155 ff. (3d ed. 1978); 1 R. MAURACH
& H. ZIPF, STRAFRECHT:
ALLCEMEINER
STRAFRECHT:
ALLGEMEINER
TEIL22 ff., 139
TEIL157 ff. (6th ed. 1983); E. SCHMIDHAUSER,
ff. (2d ed. 1975); G . STRATENWERTH.
STRAFRECHT:
ALLGEMEINER
TEILI 57 ff. (3d ed. 1981).

3051

ANALYZING CRIMINAL ACTS

311

thing-to the law as written by the legislature. My central concern in this article is this "filling out" of the code's text by the
general analytical system. In order to appreciate how this "filling
out" process operates, we turn first to a brief description of the
main elements of the system.
The general analytical system describes the main features of
criminal action with the German terms Tatbestandsmassigkeit
(definition of the offense), Rechtswidrigkeit (wrongfulness), and
Schuld (culpability).13 Whatever the governing code provision
may be, every criminal act must be wrongful and culpable conduct that conforms to (i.e., is violative of) the definition of the
offense. Unauthorized advertising can only be punished if it violates the definition, is wrongful, and is culpable. These central
elements are discussed with much effort and pomp in Germany.
13. These translations of the German terminology are necessarily rough and imperfect. The basic structural features of criminal action they identify and the contrasts between them have been explored a t length by Professor George P. Fletcher. See G.
FLETCHER,
RETHINKING
CRIMINAL
LAW454-504, 552-69, 575-79 (1978); see also Durham,
Book Review, 1979 UTAHL. REV.629, 634-40. In the main, the translations I am using
follow those used by Professor Fletcher, but a few comments are in order.
First, Tatbestandsmassigkeit connotes more than what American lawyers normally
mean by the definition of an offense. The first part of the word, Tatbestand, means
"that of which the [criminal] act consists." The suffix -massigkeit means "the state or
condition of being subject to." In actuality, then, the German term refers not to the
definition of an offense itself, but to the state of being subject to or in conformity with
(i.e., in violation of) the definition or prohibitory norm (which specifies what the criminal
act consists of). In many ways, the phrase "elements of an offense" constitutes a better
translation of the core term Tatbestand, since it preserves the German term's ambiguous
reference to both the norm and the prohibited conduct. One could thus translate
Tatbestandsmassigkeit as "the state or condition of fulfilling the defined elements of a
criminal offense." I t is simpler, however, to refer to this feature of criminal acts as the
definition of the offense, or as the state of fulfilling or violating the definition.
Turning to Rechtswidrigkeit, I prefer the translation "wrongfulness" to Fletcher's
rendition of the term as "wrongdoing." A literal translation would be "the state or condition of being against the law" or more simply "unlawfulness." I share Fletcher's view
that this is inadequate because, to an American reader, this might suggest that Rechtswidrigkeit has t o d o only with the state or condition of being inconsistent with positive
law. The German term Recht, which means both "law" and "right" has moral overtones
that are independent of positive law. While I thus agree with Fletcher on the major
translation issue here-namely,
that an unduly positivistic rendition should be
avoided-I prefer "wrongfulness" to "wrongdoing" because the former preserves the
sense that Rechtswidrigkeit is a characteristic of actions, rather than the "doing" itself.
Schuld could be literally translated as "guilt," but the question of guilt tends to be
thought of in English as the final determination that a defendant is criminally liable, not
as a more limited issue about whether the defendant may fairly be held accountable for
his conduct. "Culpability," with its overtones of accountability and moral responsibility,
is a closer translation.
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The discussion, however, has not achieved a conclusive result.14
A few main points, however, are undisputed.

a . T h e d e f i n i t i o n of a n o f f e n s e . T h e word
Tatbestandsmassigkeit embraces all of the elements of a particular crime that are found in the applicable code section. A rough
American equivalent would be the phrase "elements of the offense."16 There is a Tatbestand or definition of theft, homicide,
fraud, and so on. The problems of interpretation mentioned earlier16 that arise in connection with applying section 303 to "wild
postering" are questions about whether such conduct fits within
the scope of the definition of damaging property. A German law
student writing an exam on this issue, or for that matter, a German judge deciding a "wild postering" case, would be regarded
as engaging in improper analysis if he or she tried to treat these
questions at a different stage of the analysis-i.e., as an issue of
wrongfulness or culpability.
Demanding that the problem of determining which legal interest is protected by section 303 be treated as a problem of the
definition of damaging property affects more than the mere formal ordering of legal analysis. This demand also aids the decision of substantive issues. The content of the definition of a
crime cannot be extended beyond that formulated by the legislature. In the context of section 303, for example, the authority of
the property owner to determine what may happen to his property is protected only to the extent this authority is asserted to
prevent damage to, or destruction of, the property. From this
perspective it would take a strained interpretation to hold unauthorized advertising to be a violation of section 303, since such
conduct leaves the property intact and intrudes solely upon the
owner's authority. Further, the notion of Tatbestandsmassigkeit
itself, in its German usage, necessarily implies that the perpetrator's deed ( T a t ) be unambiguously and conspicuously antisocial.
If, however, the definition of the crime of damaging property
were tied to the authority of the owner to control his property,
the determination of whether a particular act satisfied the elements of the definition would be dependent upon whether the
property owner viewed the act as an incursion upon his author14. See H . JESCHECK.
LEHRBUCH
DES STRAFRECHTS.
ALLGEMEINER
TEIL159-72 (3d ed.
1978); E. SCHMIDHAUSER,
STRAFRECHT:
ALLGEMEINER
TEIL159 ff. (2d ed. 1975).
15. See supra note 13.
16. See supra text accompanying note 11.
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ity. But this latter definition does not comport with accepted
theory concerning the nature of the definition of criminal acts.
Thus, this theory makes it more difficult to punish "wild postering" as a violation of section 303.17
b. Wrongfulness. Rechtswidrigkeit, or wrongfulness,
embraces all the statutory and extrastatutory general grounds
for holding that conduct which is violative of the definition may
still be found to be justified, thereby escaping punishment. Selfdefense is a classic justification that negates the wrongfulness of
an act. The right to free speech, which some "wild posterers"
cite as the source of the legitimacy of their activity, is a doubtful
justification in their case;lBbut it is in any event an argument
that must be legally analyzed under the heading of wrongfulness. The category of wrongfulness in the general analytical system not only provides the proper place for the discussion of such
justifications but also provokes the discussion of doubtful
justification.
c. Culpability. The first task of the element of Schuld
or culpability in the general analytical system is to secure the
status of culpability as an indispensible prerequisite to punishment. A result of the culpability requirement is that the lawyer
must carefully consider possible grounds for excusing the actor,
even though his conduct is violative of the definition of the
crime and is wrongful. Insanity and duress are illuminating examples of the doctrines that serve to negate culpability in this
manner. A party availing himself of either of these defenses typically claims that while he has engaged in conduct specified in
the definition of some crime, and though he has done so without
justification, he cannot fairly be held responsible for what he
did.
Legal discussions of unauthorized advertising commonly encounter the view that this conduct conforms to the definition of
damaging property and is wrongful. Those who defend this position are not, however, finished with their analysis. They must
take up the further problem presented by the possibility that
the actor thought he had a right to paste up posters. In the
terms of the theory of the general analytical system, this is a
17. See OLG.Karlsruhe, W.Ger., 1978 JZ 72; Thoss, supra note 9, at 1613.
18. Just as in the United States, free speech rights in West Germany constitute constraints on state action, and do not confer unfettered license to encroach on the rights of
others.
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problem of culpability. A perhaps overly simplistic formulation
is that the category of culpability marshals all of the arguments
favoring a finding of not guilty that are based on the subjective
state of the accused and insures that they are considered in
every case.

C. Application of the General Analytical System
Knowledge of the statute and the general system for analyzing criminal acts are the two tools of analysis that the German
criminal lawyer must employ in order to decide every case. The
law student must, from the very beginning of his studies, become sure of his ability to handle both. The practicing criminal
lawyer is, for the most part, uninterested in the subtleties of the
academic discussion of refinements in the theory of the general
analytical system, but he recognizes that the basic elements of
the structure guide his work. This can be seen in the German
courts' decisions on unauthorized advertising. Judges apply the
general analytical system as a matter of course as the framework
for analyzing and deciding cases.'@
The use of these two tools of analysis is made more interesting by a further feature of the legal landscape. The power to
decide cases is not evenly distributed between the statute and
the general analytical system. Rather, the latter is given priority.
Law students learn, for example, that a statute can only be applied in a manner permitted by the system. Every statute must
submit to being reordered and reinterpreted by way of the general analytical system before it can be applied. The statute as
formulated by the legislature is not applied directly; prior to application the statute is passed through the sieve of this system
and undergoes a structural metamorphosis in that process.
Thus, the provision of the German Criminal Code covering
damage to property is not applied directly and verbatim to the
case of unauthorized advertising. I t must first be subjected to
the strict regimen of the general analytical system. Its provisions
must first be dissected into the categories of the definition,
wrongfulness, and culpability, and only then applied.
19. See, e.g., OLG, Oldenburg, W. Ger., 1978 JZ 70; OLG, Karlsruhe, W. Ger., 1978
NJW 1636; 29 BGHST 129.
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It can be concluded from the discussion to this point that
the general system for analyzing criminal acts is successfully
able to force conformity with its dictates upon criminal statutes.
Its structuring of legal materials and legal analysis transcends
the dictates of the positive law. This is a rather remarkable state
of affairs. In accord with the tradition in Europe since the Renaissance, German criminal law is inseparably bound to legislation. The maxim nulla poena sine lege, with its requirements of
prospectivity and fair warning by statute, is a zealously guarded
constitutional principle in West Germany;20 and yet, the same
criminal law that is supposedly bound to and by legislation
yields to the nonlegislated general system for analyzing criminal
acts.
I want to discuss some troubling aspects of this relationship
between legislation and the general analytical system. The goal
is to justify, if possible, the preeminent position of this system
vis-a-vis legislation.

A. Transpositive Features of the General Analytical System
The German Criminal Code itself does not require that attention be paid to the general system for analyzing criminal acts.
The Code does presuppose application of the system a t many
points. The words for definition, wrongfulness, and culpability
are repeatedly usede21But this is not a consistent legislative
practice. No provision exists from which one could derive the
legislative intent that the structure be used in applying the
Code's sections.
German scholars of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries thought that they could derive the main features of the
general structure by studying the text of the Code.22 They
thought of the Code as a kind of physical object, and hoped that
by constantly observing it they could discover its inner order.
20. GRUNDCESETZ
[GG] art. 103 abs. 2 ( W . Ger.); STGB 8 1 ( W . Ger.); see P. BOCKALLGEMEINER
TEIL10 ff. (3d ed. 1979); J. WESSELS, STRAFRECHT:
ALLGEMEINER
TEIL8 ff. (12th ed. 1982).
21. See, e.g., STGB •˜ 11 abs. 1 nr. 5 (W. Ger.); see also id. $8 13, 17, 20, 32, 34, 35.
DIE LEHREVOM VERBRECHEN
(1906); K. BINDING.
DIE
22. See, e.g., E. BELING.
NORMEN
UND IHRE UBERTRETUNC (1872); F. VON LISZT, LEHRBUCH
DES DEUTSCHEN
STRAFRECHTS
116 ff. (14th ed. 1905).

ELMANN, STRAFRECHT:
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The structure of offenses seemed to be a kind of scientific discovery. The requirement of respect for the structure was
founded on its status as a law of nature.
This justification of the preeminence of the general analytical system underestimates, however, the nature of the claim that
this system makes. This justification rests on the notion that the
main features of the general system are an intrinsic part of the
Code;23but the argument has a scarcely acceptable consequence.
Another set of statutes-for example, a code that did not recognize wrongfulness or culpability as prerequisites of punishment-would of necessity lead quickly and unswervingly to another theory of the structure of offenses. This is precisely what
the general analytical system will not allow. It is not tied to a
given body of positive law. Rather, the theory of the general analytical system requires that all positive legislation conform to
it.
The fact that the positive criminal law of a particular country a t a particular time happens to give credence to the categories of definition, wrongfulness, and culpability is a political accident. A theory of the general structure of crimes cannot be
founded on such an accident. P u t another way, the general system for analyzing crimes demands to be recognized even when
the positive criminal law does not conform to it. Legal theory
then becomes criticism of nonconforming positive law. At any
rate, it is clear that the general analytical system is not derived
from the positive law; on the contrary, it comes before and sets
itself above positive law.

B. The Propriety of Placing the General Analytical System
Above the Positive Law
We are left with the question of whether such patronizing
treatment of legislation is acceptable in a legal system in which
statute is supreme. With respect to this question, the credentials
of the general system for structuring criminal analysis are impressive. The system is often praised in German literature as the
guarantor of order, certainty, and impartiality in the application
of individual statutes.24 These credentials provide some insight
23. See, e.g., H. JESCHECK, LEHRBUCH
DES STRAFRECHTS:
ALLCEMEINER TEIL157 (3d
37-38 (11th ed. 1969); H. MAYER,
ed. 1978); H. WELZEL, DAS DEUTSCHE STRAFRECHT
STRAFRECHT:
ALLGEMEINER TEIL41-42 (1953).
DES STRAFRECHTS:
ALLCEMEINER TEIL155-57 (3d ed.
24. See H. JESCHECK. LEHRBUCH
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into the vastness of the claim staked out by the general analytical structure on the landscape of the criminal law. In Germany,
this general analytical system is the hallmark of sophisticated
lawyerly professionalism. Let legislators write the statutes as
they please-our structure insures at least order, certainty, and
impartiality in the statutes' application. This is the first clear
signal that the general analytical system entails more than a formal model that helps one better organize and explicate statutory
language. Embodied within the general system for structuring
criminal analysis are certain basic elements that are essential to
any process that calls itself just.
Admittedly, an explanation of why the general analytical
system developed its particular structural features (i.e., violation
of the definition, wrongfulness, and culpability) is still required.
A continuing respect for these elements promotes order, certainty, and impartiality in the administration of justice. But
these goals are attainable in other ways. One could, for example,
number the characteristics of a particular crime arbitrarily, beginning with number one and ending when each characteristic
had been assigned a number. Order, certainty, and impartiality
could be insured by requiring courts to work down this checklist
in every case.26
However, much more than the simple, formal ordering of
the process of deciding an individual criminal case is sought in
German criminal law by invoking the general system for analyzing criminal acts and, in particular, by structuring analysis in
terms of the categories of violation of the definition, wrongfulness, and culpability. These categories seek rather to impose certain substantive values in connection with the making of particular decisions-values that are not necessarily contained in the
individual criminal statutes being applied.
The substance imparted by the three main categories of the
general analytical structure is different for each category. The
category of violation of the definition seeks to insure that the
criminal justice system does not impose criminal liability without first establishing that a precise statutory rule has been broken by the perpetrator. The category of wrongfulness seeks to
1978); Welzel, Zur Dogmatik im Strafrecht, in FESTSCHRIFT
FUR MAURACH
3 (1972).
25. Element analysis under the American Law Institute's MODELPENAL
CODEproceeds in essentially this fashion. It assumes that the process of carving up the characteristics of a crime is essentially arbitrary, and that the only genuine issue to be faced in
making a determination of liability is whether all the elements have been satisfied.
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insure that general justificatory exceptions militating against liability are sought, clarified, and considered in every case. The
category of culpability seeks to insure that punishment does not
follow on the mere showing that, objectively viewed, a rule has
been violated without justification. It forces attention to the person of the perpetrator and requires special attention to the excuses he offers for his
Clearly, then, the substantive values of the general analytical structure entail a precise legal program. In order to shore up
this program against the ever present risk of legislation that
runs afoul of its dictates, and especially to safeguard its authority in times when the positive legislation of a country tends toward disregarding it, secure foundations must be found to justify
and protect the program.
In Germany, as in the United States, constitutional principles are cited for this purpose. The category of violation of'the
definition as a general characteristic of crime is commonly
thought to be founded on the provision in the West German Basic Law (Grundgesetz, the West German constitutional document) that punishment can only be legislatively ~rescribed.~'
Another commonly defended position attempts to ground the
status of culpability as a general prerequisite of punishment on
the article of the Basic Law that declares the dignity of the person to be i n v i ~ l a b l e . ~ ~
But these efforts to derive some of the features of the general analytical system from constitutional provisions are not so
much genuine justifications as displays of the European tendency to argue for every legal conception as if it had legislative
origins. In fact, West Germany has no constitutional provision
requiring that, for conduct to be punishable, it must, in addition
to being violative of a statute, satisfy the various categories of
the general system for analyzing criminal acts. That is, the insistence that criminal liability attaches only where conduct violates
a definition and is wrongful and culpable is not rooted exclusively in constitutional provisions. The most that one can say is
26. See supra note 12.
27. GG art. 103, abs. 2.
LEHRBUCH
DES STRAFRECHTS:
ALLGE28. GG art. 1, abs. 1. Compare H. JESCHECK,
MEINER TEIL99 ff. (3d ed. 1978); W. NAUCKE.
STRAFRECHT.
EINEEINFBHRUNG
102 ff. (4th
ed. 1982).
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that the cited West German constitutional provisions and the
general structure of offenses can be traced back to a common
legal tradition.

C. The General Analytical System and Just Punishment
This tradition is the real foundation for the demand that
the positive law only be applied as the general analytical structure allows. The structure represents the results of lengthy deliberations in the realms of political and moral philosophy, as
well as the result of numerous experiments in real world politics.
This is, to be sure, a rather sweeping statement. We would
do well to try to flesh out more precisely the meaning of the
contention that the general system for analyzing criminal acts
imparts the most durable results of prolonged endeavors in political and moral theory and practice.
What is meant is primarily that this general analytical
structure is not merely a scholarly or legislative construction. It
is instead a reservoir of political experience gained during
lengthy periods of legal history. One could probably show that
the basic features of the theory were already known and valued
long before the beginning of the modern history of criminal law.
The political experience that the general analytical structure of offenses seeks to secure for the decision of every case can,
in my opinion, be described more or less as follows: Deviation
from the accepted norms of society should not be responded to
with uncontrolled violence. The first reaction, rather, should be
to try to gain distance from the deviant event. This distance is
attained by binding oneself to a definite and formal pattern of
analysis.
To phrase the idea pointedly, applying the statute according
to the program of the general analytical structure is a contrasting image to a violent act as well as to any summary execution of
punishment. The general system for analyzing criminal acts reflects the discursive, objective way in which Western philosophical tradition thinks about a subject-crime
and punishment-that offers resistance to the tendency to react to breaches
of established norms with unfettered and arbitrary power. The
degree to which a theory of the general structure of offenses like
the German theory is followed is an indication, I believe, of the
distance that a system of criminal law has put between itself and
the direct, forceful, and manipulative imposition of the will of
the majority on deviant individuals in society. The general ana-
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lytical structure, or its functional equivalent, is thus not only a
practical criterion to be applied in deciding particular cases, but
also an indicator of the level of criminal law culture a particular
society has attained.
From the vantage point of the general analytical structure
and its use, one is able to specify the position of the criminal in
the criminal process. The structure, whose main features I have
described, guarantees that the criminal is in a precisely definable
legal position regardless of the exact construction of a particular
statute. The general structure guarantees (I) that the particular
statutory violation must be established (fulfillment of the requirements of the definition); (2) that the criminal can defend
himself with general justifications of his conduct (wrongfulness);
and (3) that attention is devoted to the accused as a person by
allowing him to raise any relevant excusing conditions
(culpability).
The theory of the general system for analyzing criminal acts
thus contains the minimum conditions that must be maintained
if punishment is to be just. The demand that the positive law
only be enforced within the framework described by the structure is nothing more than the demand that the minimum conditions for just punishment be p r e s e r ~ e d . ~ ~

IV. CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion has established that the relationship between the German criminal theory's general analytical
structure and the positive law has a number of important
features.
First, whatever the content of everchanging criminal laws
may be, the structure of offenses imbues the decision of every
case with the results of long-term, extrastatutory considerations
of justice that constitute some of our deepest traditions in criminal law. The general structure represents politically, philosophically, and morally proven traditions in a quickly evolving world
of expedient legislation. There is much in the considerations
that have shaped the theory of the general analytical structure
that is traceable to particular European or German developments. I believe some of these developments to be responses to
29. See W. NAUCKE,
STRAFRECHT:
EINEEINFUHRUNG
240 ff. (4th ed. 1982); W.
NAUCKE.
GRUNDLINIEN
EINER RECHTSSTAATLICHPRAKTISCHEN ALLGEMEINEN STRAFTATLEHRE
(1979).
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issues that are distinctively German and that do not have
broader ramifications for other legal cultures. But it would be
premature to treat problems concerning the general analytical
structure as problems of a single country's law.30 Discussions
with American colleagues have convinced me that the basic features of the structure are clearly perceptible in American law.
This lends credence to the view that the values implicit in the
general system for analyzing criminal acts have a natural lawlike
character that transcends national boundaries.
Second, it appears that, at least to some extent, the emergence of a general system for analyzing criminal acts depends on
accidents of national, political, legal, and, in particular, procedural developments. But if, as I have argued, the recognition
and application of the general analytical system is an indicator
of the level of criminal law culture a particular society has attained, then work on refining and developing the theory of such
systems of analysis cannot be limited by national boundaries.
Finally, while linguistic usage and legal conceptualization in
the theory of general systems for structuring legal analysis may
differ from country to country, it should not be difficult to examine the results of national discussions of such issues in fruitful ways. By focusing on the contribution these discussions make
to clarifying and refining the place of the criminal law in a democracy, we can make joint strides toward a larger objective: the
furtherance of justice in punishment.

30. For an extended analysis of the features of the general analytical structure disRETHINKING
CRIMIcernible in common law approaches to criminal law, see G. FLETCHER,
NAL LAW391-875 (1978).

COMMENTS

Philosophical Hermeneutics: Toward an
Alternative View of Adjudication
Adjudication is interpretation: it is the process by which a
judge comes to understand a legal text and express its meaning.'
Two opposing views of adjudication prevail in Anglo-American
jurisprudence. The first sees judicial interpretation as being objectively constrained by legal rules and institutional principles
that compel a correct determination of textual meaning.2 The
second sees judicial interpretation as being subjectively determined by personal value preferences that render textual meaning contingent and r n ~ l t i p l e . ~
In a crucial way, these two opposing views of adjudication
are mirror images. Both views assume that interpretation is an
essentially free and discretionary activity; their disagreement
turns on whether freedom and discretion can be effectively constrained. While the first view insists that effective constraints
are available, the second view maintains that they are not. As a
result, both views focus their discussions largely on the availability of interpretive constraints. In the process, however, their dis1. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN.L.REv. 739 (1982). See generally
Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 T E X .L. REV. 527 (1982). In this comment, "text"
connotes any written document, including reported judicial decisions, statutory and constitutional law, administrative regulations, and such writings as wills and contracts. In
each instance, the writing is an object o f interpretation. However, "text" does not connote only written documents. For example, Paul Ricoeur has argued that meaningful
social action shares the constitutive features o f a written text, and that the methodology
o f the social sciences is similar t o the procedures for the interpretation o f written texts.
P. RICOEUR,
The Model o f the Text: Meaningful Action Considered as a Text, in HERM E N E U T I C S A N D T H E HUMAN
SCIENCES
197-221 (1982). In other words, the interpretation
o f "text" includes the interpretation o f social actions and relationships. See C. GEERTZ,
T H EINTERPRETATION OF CULTURES
3-30, 452 (1973) (culture is an "acted document," an
"ensemble o f texts," whose analysis is similar t o reading a manuscript); see also Taylor,
Understanding i n Human Science, 34 REV. METAPHYSICS
25 (1980);Taylor, Interpretation and the Sciences of Man, 25 REV. METAPHYSICS
3 (1971).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 6-46.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 47-98.
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cussions fail to examine the validity of the assumption that interpretation is free and discretionary. For this reason, AngloAmerican jurisprudence remains irresolvably divided in its views
of adjudication.
Philosophical hermeneutics rejects the view of interpretation that is assumed, but never directly examined, in AngloAmerican juri~prudence.~
Philosophical hermeneutics contends
that interpretation is not a free and discretionary activity but
rather a dialogical interaction between interpreter and text that
is made possible through their mutual participation in a common medium of history and language. In other words, neither
interpreter nor text independently determines textual meaning;
both interpreter and text interdependently contribute to the determination of textual meaning. Thus, contrary to the Anglo4. Philosophical hermeneutics was first elaborated by Hans-Georg Gadamer. See H.
GADAMER,
TRUTHAND METHOD(1975). It is a general theory of interpretation that was
developed as a challenge to interpretive assumptions in social science and literary theory,
which are similar to the assumption underlying the opposing views of adjudication in
Anglo-American jurisprudence. Philosophical hermeneutics is commanding increased attention as a powerful critique of traditional interpretive theories in these disciplines.
See, e.g., Z. BAUMAN,
HERMENEUTICS
AND SOCIAL
SCIENCES
(1978); J. BLEICHER,
THEHERMENEUTIC MAC IN AT ION: OUTLINE
OF A POSITIVE
CRITIQUE
OF ~ C I E N T I S M AND SOCIOLOGY
AS METHOD,
PHILOSOCONTEMPORARY
HERMENEUTICS:
HERMENEUTICS
(1982); J. BLEICHER,
PHY AND CRITIQUE
(1980); H. GADAMER,
PHILOSOPHICAL
HERMENEUTICS
(1976); R. HOWARD,
(1982); D. HOY,THECRITICAL
CIRCLE:
LITERATURE,
HISTHREEFACESOF HERMENEUTICS
TORY AND PHILOSOPHICAL
HERMENEUTICS
(1978); R. PALMER,
HERMENEUTICS:
INTERPRETATION THEORY
IN SCHLEIERMACHER.
DILTHEY,
HEIDEGGER,
AND GADAMER
(1969); P. RICOUER,
HERMENEUTICS
AND THE HUMAN
SCIENCES
(1981).
Recently, philosophical hermeneutics has gained some attention in Anglo-American
jurisprudential literature. See, e.g., Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 BU.L. REV. 204, 221-22 (1980); Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982
Term-Forward: Names and Narrative, 97 HARV.
L. REV.1 , 6 n.11 (1983); Fiss, Objectiuity and Interpretation, 34 STAN.L. REV.739,745 n.12 (1982); Hermann, Phenomenology,
Structuralism, Hermeneutics and Legal Study: Applications of Contemporary Continental Thought to Legal Phenomena, 36 U. MIAMIL. REV.379, 398-409 (1982); Leedes,
An Acceptable Meaning of the Constitution, 61 WASH.U.L. Q. 1003 (1984); McIntosh,
Legal Hermeneutics: A Philosophical Critique, 35 OKLA.L REV.1 (1982). By contrast,
philosophical hermeneutics is the focus of tremendous jurisprudential discussion in Europe, particularly in West Germany. See, e.g., J. ESSER, VORVERSTXNDNIS
UND
METHODENWAHL
IN DER RECHTSFINDUNG
(1972); W. HASSEMER,
E I N F ~ H R UINN G
DIE GRUNDLAGEN DES STRAFRECHTS
77-80, 113-159 (1981); W. HASSEMER,
TATBESTAND
UND TYPUS:
ZUR STRAFRECHTLICHEN HERMENEUTIK
(1968); J. HRUSCHKA,
DIE KONUNTERSUCHUNGEN
STITUTION DES RECHTSFALLES
(1965); A. KAUFMANN,
ANALOGIE
UND "NATURDER SACHE"
& W. HASSEMER,
EINFUHRUNG
IN RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE
UND RECHT(1965); A. KAUFMANN
STHEORIE DER GEGENWART
(1981); M. KRIELE,THEORIE
DER RECHTSGEWINNUNG
(1976); F.
MULLER,JURISTISCHE
METHODIK
(1976); H. S C H ~ N E M ASOZIALWISSENSCHAFTEN
NN,
UND
JURISPRUDENZ:
EINEE I N F ~ H R UFUR
N GPRAKTIKER
47-53 (1976).
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American jurisprudential view, interpretation is a structured
process of existential constraints.
Philosophical hermeneutics represents a direct theoretical
challenge to Anglo-American jurisprudence because the hermeneutic view of interpretation renders the Anglo-American debate
on the availability of constraints for judicial interpretation
groundless. For this reason, philosophical hermeneutics deserves
attention from the Anglo-American jurisprudential community.
At least, attention to philosophical hermeneutics may initiate
the critical examination of the nature of interpretation that has
heretofore been ignored. At most, attention to philosophical hermeneutics may lead to a transcendence of the opposing views of
adjudication that prevail in Anglo-American jurisprudence.
Part I of this comment contends that Anglo-American jurisprudence is riven by opposing views of adjudication and that
this opposition is based on a common assumption about the nature of interpretation. Part I1 maintains that this opposition-the difference of views concerning the availability of interpretive constraints-has
captured the attention of AngloAmerican jurisprudence and diverted its focus from examining
the validity of the assumption about interpretation upon which
the opposition rests. Next, it examines the nature of interpretation from the perspective of philosophical hermeneutics. Part I11
concludes that the theory of interpretation provided by philosophical hermeneutics represents a direct challenge to the Anglo-American assumption about interpretation and that this
challenge demands an Anglo-American jurisprudential response.

The two opposing views of adjudication found in AngloAmerican jurisprudence may be characterized as objective and
subjective interpretivism. Objective interpretivism represents an
effort to interpret a legal text without the influence of the judicial interpreter's value-orientation, through the construction of
interpretive constraints. Subjective interpretivism represents a
countereffort to deconstruct interpretive constraints in the belief
that interpretation is unavoidably controlled by personal value
preference^.^ Both views presume that interpretation is a free
5. The existence of an objective-subjective opposition has been recognized in legal
scholarship, Tushnet, Legal Scholarship: Its Causes and Cure, 90 YALEL.J. 1205 (1981),
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and discretionary activity-free in the sense that the evaluation
of the text is normatively standardless, and discretionary in the
sense that judgment of the text entails a personal choice based
on privately held values. The difference between objective and
subjective interpretivism lies in their disagreement about the efficacy of constraints for interpretive activity.

A.

Objective Interpretivisrn: T h e Construction of
Constraints

The basic justification for the effort of objective interpretivism to secure value-free interpretation of a legal text is founded
on a fundamental tenet of the Anglo-American administration of
justice: rule of law demands that judicial interpretation occur on
in theories of literary and legal interpretation, Fish, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature, 60 TEX.L. REV.551 (1982); Fiss, supra note 1, a t 739,
in theories of judicial reasoning, Gross, The Theory of Judicial Reasoning-Toward a
Reconstruction, 66 KY.L.J. 801 (1978); Reynolds, The Concept of Ob~ectiuityin Judicial
LEGAL
POSITIVReasoning, 14 W. ONT.L. REV.1 (1975), and in legal history, F. SHUMANN,
ISM 95-119 (1963); Kaufman & Hassemer, Enacted Law and Judicial Decision in German Jurisprudential Thought, 19 TORONTO
L.J. 461 (1969).
Professor Roberto Unger has argued that all Western thought is riven by an antinomy between "universals" (objectivism) and "particulars" (subjectivism) that is manifest
in the persistently irresolvable antinomies of "theory and fact" in the sciences, "reason
and desire" in human studies, and "rules and values" in jurisprudence. R. UNGER,
KNOWLEDGE
AND POLITICS
133-38 (1975). In Professor Unger's view, the universals have
lost touch with the particulars, creating an unbridgeable gulf between them. This gulf
results because of the perception that universals are the only acceptable objects
thought:
The evisceration of particulars consists in treating particulars as fungible examples of some abstract quality. To be sure, the particulars as parts are recognized as more real than the universals as wholes. . . Nevertheless, as the concreteness of the particulars increases, so does their individuality. Therefore, it
becomes impossible t o think or to speak about them in general categories;
hence, given the nature of thought and language, impossible to think or speak
of them a t all. That much is implied by the antinomy of theory and fact.
Id. a t 136.
Ultimately, the objective-subjective opposition in Western thought may be traceable
A HISTORYOF PHILOSOPHY:
to Cartesian metaphysics. See generally 4 F. COPLESTON,
TO LEIBNIZ74-146 (1963). Descartes's ontological dichotomization of the
DESCARTES
world into subject (inquirer) and object (subject matter) yielded only two alternative and
mutually exclusive possibilities for providing an account of the world: subjective valuation or objective description. In other words, explanation is possible only in terms of the
subject or the object; their essential separation precludes explanation relying on both
The Question Concerning Technology, in THE
subject and object. See M. HEIDEGGER.
AND OTHERESSAYS
3 (1977) [hereinafter cited as M.
QUESTION
CONCERNING
TECHNOLOGY
HEIDEGGER.
Question]; M. HEIDEGGER,
The Age of the World Picture, in THEQUESTION
CONCERNING
TECHNOLOGY
AND OTHERESSAYS
115 (1977) [hereinafter cited as M. HEIDEGGER,Age]; M. HEIDEGGER,
BEINGAND TIME122-34 (1927).

.
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a basis other than in accordance with the will of a judge.e In
pursuit of this ideal, objective interpretivists seek to ensure
value-free interpretation in two principal ways. First, they seek
to minimize the normative gaps of the legal system to preclude
the invitation to rely on subjective values. Second, they seek to
maximize the institutional demands on judges to adjudicate in
accordance with the general constitutional character of the legal
system. In other words, the strategy is to contruct constraints on
the judicial interpreter in order to ensure his personal detachment from the legal text.
The hope of achieving personal detachment from the object
of interpretation is the reason for characterizing this view of adjudication as objective. Essentially, objectivity is a demand that
the object of interpretation be allowed to reveal its own meaning
independent of the value-laden interests of the interpreter.' For
instance, in the social and literary sciences objectivity is sought
by way of methodologies that proscribe the personal participation of the interpreter in his work. These methodologies preestablish impersonal criteria of evaluation that are characteristic of
the object of interpretation itself so that the object may reveal
its intrinsic meaning.8 The assumption is that the interpreter's
6. See generally F. HAYEK,
THERULEOF LAW(1975); F. HAYEK,
THECONSTITUTION
LIBERTY
(1960); R. UNGER,
KNOWLEDGE
AND POLITICS
76-103 (1975). Professor Mark
Tushnet has argued that legal objectivity cannot be questioned without undermining the
rule of law and thus the unique function of the judiciary in the American political order.
See Tushnet, supra note 5, at 1206-07; Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A
Critique of Intepretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV.
L. REV.781 (1983) [hereinafOF

ter cited as Tushnet, Following the Rules].

7. A representative definition of objectivity is found in F. CUNNINGHAM.
OBJECTIVITY
SOCIAL
SCIENCE
(1973). An inquiry is objective if and only if:
[a] it is possible for its descriptions and explanations of a subject-matter to
reveal the actual nature of that subject-matter, where "actual nature" means
"the qualities and relations of a subject-matter as they exist independently of
an inquirer's thoughts and desires regarding them," and [b] it is not possible
for two inquirers holding rival theories about some subject-matter and having
complete knowledge of each other's theories. . . both to be justified in adhering
to their theories.
Id. a t 4 (footnote omitted). For other discussions of objectivity, see generally W.
NEWTON-SMITH,
THERATIONALITY
OF SCIENCE
(1981); K. POPPER,OBJECTIVE
KNOWLEDGE
(rev. ed. 1981).
8. One example of such a methodology is found in R. COLLINGWOOD,
THE IDEAOF
HISTORY
(1946). Collingwood argued that, in order to interpret the action of historical
agents, one must take into account the "inside" or "thought-side" of their actions. His
assumption was that historical events express the thought of their agents. Thus, understanding historical events required ascertainment of the thoughts of their agents, which
could be accomplished through "reenactment." By reconstructing the circumstances of
the historical event, the interpreter could project himself back into the position of the
IN
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value-laden interests in the text, if allowed to factor into his interpretation of it, obscures the text's meaning. In jurisprudence,
objectivity is sought in the same way for the same reason. The
methodology is the deductive application of preexisting legal
rules and institutional principles through which the legal text
may be understood in impersonal legal terms, not in terms of
personal nonlegal values.
Objective interpretivism found its first modern expression
in John Austin's construction of a "science of law."9 A basic
agent, "reenactn or "rethink" the reasons for the agent's actions, understand the thought
behind the deeds, and discern the meaning of the event. The methodology of reenactment is objective in the sense that it presupposes the historical interpreter's capacity to
acquaint himself directly with his subject matter (the historical agent) and to derive the
subject matter's own special meaning (the thought behind the acts). Reenactment is also
objective in the sense that it requires the negation of the personal and historical perspective of the interpreter and demands evaluation of the historical event as the agent himself evaluated it. Because the agent and the interpreter share a common rational humanity, the interpreter is presumably qualified to evaluate the agent he., the "text") on its
own terms. For a recent exposition and expansion of Collingwood, see R. MARTIN,HISTORICAL EXPLANATION:
RE-ENACTMENT
AND PRACTICAL
INFERENCE
(1977).
E. D. Hirsch's search for criteria to validate literary interpretations led him to a goal
of interpretation similar to Collingwood's: ascertainment of authorial intention. E.
I N INTERPRETATION
(1967). "The interpreter's primary task is to
HIRSCH,VALID~TY
reproduce in himself the author's 'logic,' his attitudes, his cultural givens, in short, his
world. Even though the process of verification is highly complex and difficult, the ultimate verificative principle is very simple-the imaginative reconstruction of the speaking
subject." Id. a t 242. Professor Hirsch's position has been accepted in other discussions of
the applicability of literary interpretation to judicial interpretation. See, e.g., McIntosh,
supra note 4.
Some judicial interpreters have thought that authorial intention is determinative of
textual meaning. See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290'U.S. 398, 453
(1934) (Sutherland, J., dissenting) ("The whole aim of construction, as applied to a provision of the Constitution, is . . . to ascertain and give effect to the intent, of its framers
and the people who adopted it."). For an analysis and criticism of this theory of adjudication, see Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L.
REV.204 (1980).
This comment relies upon Hirsch's rival in hermeneutic philosophy, Hans-Georg
Gadamer, to critique the prevailing views of interpretation in legal thought. The reason
for this reliance is Hirsch's commitment to objectivity and his resultant inability to contribute to the transcendence of the objective-subjective opposition. For a good introduction to the issues of the Hirsch-Gadamer debate, see D. HOY,supra note 4, a t 11-72.
REASONINGS
62-136 (1964).
9. See generally J. STONE,LEGALSYSTEMAND LAWYERS'
Admittedly, Austin is not the first in the Anglo-American tradition to advocate objective
adjudication. Blackstone wrote "what that law is, every subject knows, or may know, if
he pleases; for it depends not upon the arbitrary will of any judge, but is permanent,
fixed, and unchangeable, unless by authority of parliament." 1 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 151. Elsewhere, he wrote:
T h e judgment, though pronounced or awarded by the judges, is not their determination or sentence, but the determination and the sentence of the law. I t
is the conclusion that naturally and regularly follows from the premises of law
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theme of his legal science was the separation of positive law
from transpositive consideration^.'^ The purpose of this separation was to allow logical analysis of the positive law in order to
ascertain the essential concepts and structures of the legal order
reflected in it." Using this legal scheme required one to
fix in the mind a map of the law, so that all its acquisitions
made empirically in the course of practice, take their appropriate places in a well-conceived system; instead of forming a chaotic aggregate of several unconnected and merely arbitrary
rules. It tends to produce the faculty of perceiving at a glance
the dependencies of the parts of his system . . . .I2

With this legal map, Austin believed that, consistent with his
rational description of law, the dominant method of judicial in-

.

and fact . . which judgment or conclusion depends not therefore on the arbitrary caprice of the judge, but on the settled and invariable principles of
justice.
3 id. a t 434. Indeed, the notion of legal objectivity is ultimately attributable to the
Greeks. Greek mythology portrays the goddess Themis with the sword of justice in her
right hand and the scales of justice in her left. She is blindfolded, symbolizing impartiality. The assumption is that justice originates in judgments that are free from the personal prejudices of the legal administrator. Judgment is reached only through the
mechanical balancing of evidence that is sorted onto the dishes of the scale by other
similarly impartial persons. Reynolds, supra note 5, a t 2. Interestingly, legal objectivity
is not endemic only to Anglo-American jurisprudence; it is the primary paradigm of jurisprudential and judicial analysis in legal systems following the civil law tradition. See
THECIVILLAWTRADITION
(1969).
generally J. MERRYMAN,
10. Throughout his work, Austin pleaded for a strict separation of law as it is and
law as it ought to be:
The existence of law is one thing; its merit or demerit is another. Whether it be
or be not is one enquiry; whether it be or be not conformable to an assumed
standard, is a different enquiry. A law, which actually exists, is a law, though
we happen to dislike it . . . .
J. AUSTIN,
THEPROVINCE
OF JURISPRUDENCE
DETERMINED
AND THE USESOF THE STUDY
OF
JURISPRUDENCE
184 (Library of Ideas ed. 1954). Austin did not dismiss the influence
moral opinion had on the development of law, or conversely, the influence the law had on
moral standards. He believed, however, that the determination of moral norms upon
which law ought to rest was not within the province of jurisprudence but was a subject of
the "science of legislation." Id. a t 127, 372. The science of jurisprudence concerned itself
only with the study of laws once they were posited. See generally Hart, Positivism and
the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV.L. REV.593 (1958); Rumble, The Legal
Positivism of John Austin and The Realist Movement in American Jurisprudence, 66
L. REV.986 (1981).
CORNELL
11. According to Austin, every legal order has the same basic constituent parts. Concepts like duty, right, liberty, injury, punishment, redress, law, sovereignty, and independent political society belong to every legal order because "we cannot imagine coherently
a system of law (or a system of law as evolved in a refined community), without conceiving them as constituent parts of it." J. AUSTIN.supra note 10, a t 367.
ON JURISPRUDENCE
OR THE PHILOSOPHY
OF POSITIVE
LAW
12. 2 J. AUSTIN.LECTURES
1095 (5th ed. R. Campbell 1885).
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terpretation was syllogistic: legal classification of the facts and
their subsumption under general rules.13
Nevertheless, Austin acknowledged the existence of "judiciary law."14 In instances of linguistic ambiguity in legal terms,
interstices in the body of positive law, and social change rendering law archaic, judges are invited to legislate rules on the basis
of their own value-orientations.15 This reality introduced considerable dissymmetry into Austin's rational system of law.16 His
response was to conceive of an institutional mechanism that harmonized particular judge-made rules with the general legal order. Reasoning that judicial activity is an extension of the sovereign's power, Austin concluded that the sovereign could
legitimate judge-made rules either by express acceptance or by
acquiescence to their existence." In other words, judges could be
institutionally constrained from arbitrarily legislating rules to
the extent that they "legislat[e] in subordination to the
s~vereign."'~
Austin's construction of a normatively complete system of
law and an institutional constraint on judicial interpretation was
prototypical for subsequent jurisprudential efforts to achieve le13. See Rumble, supra note 10, a t 1017-18.
supra note 12, a t 620. See generally Hart, supra note 10, a t 608-10
14. 2 J. AUSTIN.
& nn.33-35; Rumble, supra note 10, at 1017-21.
15. Austin saw ambiguous legal terms as "hotbeds of competing analogies. The indefiniteness is incorrigible. A discretion is left to the judge. Questions arising on them. . .
are hardly questions of interpretation or induction, for though the rule were explored
supra note 12, a t 1001
and known as far as possible, doubt would remain." 2 J. AUSTIN,
n.20. Austin also contended that judicial legislation was necessary "to make up for the
supra note 10, at 191.
negligence or the incapacity of the avowed legislator." J. AUSTIN,
In this regard, judicial legislation was of "obvious utility" to adapt law to social change. 2
J. AUSTIN.supra note 12, a t 612. Austin noted that equity courts were created because of
the unwillingness of common law courts to "do what they ought to have done, namely to
model their rules of law and of procedure to the growing exigencies of society, instead of
stupidly and sulkily adhering to the old and barbarous usages." Id. a t 647.
16. Austin wrote:
Wherever, therefore, much of the law consists of judiciary law, the entire
legal system, or the entire corpus juris, is necessarily a monstrous chaos: partly
consisting of judiciary law, introduced bit by bit, and imbedded in a measureless heap of particular judicial decisions, and partly of legislative law stuck by
patches on the judiciary law, and imbedded in a measureless heap of occasional
and supplemental statutes.
2 J. AUSTIN,supra note 12, a t 660.
17. "For, since the state may reverse the rules which [the judge] makes, and yet
permits him to enforce them by the power of the political community, its sovereign will
'that his rules shall obtain as law' is clearly evinced by its conduct, though not by its
express declaration." J. AUSTIN,supra note 10, a t 31-32.
18. 2 J. AUSTIN,supra note 12, a t 510.
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gal objectivity. Thus, nineteenth century legal formalism propounded the view that a legal system is a closed logical system
in which correct decisions are deducible from predetermined legal rules by pure logical operation.'' This formalist view of law
gained widespread acceptance in legal scholarship and judicial
opinions.'O Although strict legal formalism has been largely
abandoned, its substance persists in many contemporary theories of judicial decision.'l This is especially apparent among the
"new analytical j~rists,"'~who seek to document the theoretic
fetter^,"'^ or the preexisting principles of rational decision, that
constrain judicial interpretation.
One of the leading figures in the new analytical movement
has been H. L. A. Hart. His strategy was to minimize the frequency of the linguistic indeterminacy of rules that invites reliance on subjective values. In his estimation, a legal rule has a
"core of certainty" and a "penumbra of
In the core of
19. See generally Horwitz, The Rise of Legal Formalism, 19 AM.J. LEGALHIST.251
(1975). Typically, the following five postulates accompany the legal formalist's position:
[Flirst, that every concrete legal decision [is] the "application" of an abstract
legal proposition t o a "fact situation"; second, that i t must be possible in every
concrete case to derive the decision from abstract legal prepositions by means
of legal logic; third, that the law must actually or virtually constitute a
"gapless" system of legal propositions, or must, a t least, be treated as if it were
such a gapless system; fourth, that whatever cannot be "construed" legally in
rational terms is also legally irrelevant; and fifth, that every social action of
human beings must always be visualized as either an "application" or "execution" of legal propositions, or as an "infringement" thereof.
M. WEBER,LAWIN ECONOMY
A~~ SOCIETY
64 (1954) (footnote omitted).
20. See infra notes 47-49.
21. See Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGALSTUD.351 (1973). Strict legal formalism is the deductive application of preexisting rules. Substituting "rational" and "principles" for "deductive" and "rules" produces a broader definition of formalism: the rational application of preexisting principles. In this definition, "principles" may mean
rules as well as propositions of purpose or value. Professor Kennedy argues that purposebased reasoning is "no less dependent on rules" and "no less vulnerable to the dilemma
of formality" than is traditional rule formalism. Id. a t 396-98; see also Kennedy, Form
and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV.L. REV.1685 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Kennedy, Form and Substance]. For example, under Kennedy's analysis, Hart
and Sack's portrayal of judicial decision as "rational implications of the 'shared purposes'" implicit in the "social order" ultimately possesses the same structure as rule
THELEGALPROCESS
668-69 (Cambridge tent. ed. 1958).
formalism. H. HART& A. SACKS,
22. See generally Summers, The New Analytical Jurists, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 861
(1966).
23. See Greenawalt, Discretion and Judicial Decision: The Elusive Quest for the
Fetters that Bind Judges, 75 COLUM.
L. REV.359 (1975).
24. H. HART,THECONCEPT
OF LAW119 (1961); see also Hart, supra note 10, a t 607.
The problem of penumbral vagueness is inevitable: "the price to be paid for the use of
general classifying terms in any form of communication concerning matters of fact." H.
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certainty, the applicability of the rule to a factual circumstance
is clear. However, in the "fringe of vagueness," the normative
guidance of the rule dissipates, thus imposing a "creative function" upon the judge to resolve the
While syllogistic
reasoning may be appropriate in the core of certainty, it cannot
be employed in the fringe of vagueness, and resort to subjective
values is i n e ~ i t a b l e . ~ ~
HART,supra. a t 125. Because of the finitude of language, language cannot be successfully
employed for the subsumption of the infinity of unique constellations of facts available
in the world. Id. Basically, Hart agrees with the Austrian legal sociologist Karl Wurzel,
who compared concepts in legal rules to photographs with vague and gradually vanishing
outlines. "Every concept in the empirical sciences has its central image and beside it a
zone of transition gradually vanishing into nothingness." K.'WURZEL.METHODS
OF JURIDICAL THINKING
IN SCIENCE
OF LEGAL
METHOD372 (1917). But Hart's more direct philosophical indebtedness for the penumbral vagueness, or "open texture of law," idea is to
SOC'Y119
Waissman's address on verifiability in Supp. vol. 19 PROC.ARISTOTELIAN
H.L.A. HART12-19 (1981).
(1945). See generally N. MACCORMICK,
OF LAW120, 144 (1961).
25. H. HART,THECONCEPT
26. Id. at 122-25. The problem is that linguistic indeterminacy allows multiple
meanings, presenting a judge with "a fresh choice between open alternatives" that cannot be decided with formal logic but only with his "discretion." Id. Elsewhere Hart
wrote:
If a penumbra of uncertainty must surround all legal rules, then their application to specific cases in the penumbral area cannot be a matter of logical deduction, and so deductive reasoning, which for generations has been cherished
as the very perfection of human reasoning, cannot serve as a model for what
judges, or indeed anyone, should do in bringing particular cases under general
rules. In this area men cannot live by deduction alone. And it follows that if
legal arguments and legal decisions of penumbral questions are to be rational,
their rationality must lie in something other than a logical relation to premises.
. . . [I]t seems true to say that the criterion which makes a decision sound in
such cases is some concept of what the law ought to be . . . .
Hart, supra note 10, a t 606-08. Importantly, Hart contended that normative guidance
was not wholly lacking in penumbral areas. Overarching social policies from which legal
rules are derived may cover the "penumbra of doubt."
The point must be not merely that a judicial decision to be rational must be
made in the light of some conception of what ought to be, but that the aims,
the social policies and purposes to which judges should appeal if their decisions
are to be rational, are themselves to be considered as part of the law in some
suitably wide sense of "law". . . . [Ilnstead of saying that the recurrence of
penumbral questions shows us that legal rules are essentially incomplete, and
that, when they fail to determine decisions, judges must legislate and so exercise a creative choice between alternatives, we shall say that the social policies
which guide the judges' choice are in a sense there for them to discover; the
judges are only "drawing out" of the rule what, if it is properly understood, is
"latent" within it. To call this judicial legislation is to obscure some essential
continuity between the clear cases of the rule's application and the penumbral
decisions.
Id. a t 612. To the extent that Hart relies on purpose or value propositions to reach decisions in the penumbra of doubt, his concept of law remains formalistic. See supra note
21.
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However, Hart argued that "preoccupation with the penumbra" is a mistake-one that confuses and obstructs the advance
of juri~prudence.~'
[T]o soften the distinction [between clear and penumbral
cases] is to suggest that all legal questions are fundamentally
like those of the penumbra. It is to assert that there is no central element of actual law to be seen in the core of central
meaning which rules have, that there is nothing in the nature
of a legal rule inconsistent with all questions being open to reconsideration in the light of social poli~y.~"
On the contrary, the meaning of rules is normally not in doubt;
rules have a core of "settled" meaning.29Proper attention t o this
fact might reveal a n "essential continuity" in clear and unclear
~ ~ this reason, Hart's concept of law is
case a d j u d i ~ a t i o n .For
heavily rule-oriented, focusing on the normative constraints imposed on a d j ~ d i c a t i o n . ~ ~
Another of the leading analysts is Ronald Dworkin. Like
Hart, Dworkin acknowledges the existence of "hard cases" in
which "no settled rule dictates a decision."32 However, unlike
Hart, Dworkin contends that a judge is not free to interpret
from nonlegal values,33 but is constrained t o interpret in light of
the political structure of his community. Hard-case adjudication
27. Hart, supra note 10, at 614-15.
28. Id.
29. Id. a t 614.
30. Id. a t 612.
31. "[Tlhe life of the law consists to a very large extent in the guidance both of
officials and private individuals by determinate rules which, unlike the applications of
variable standards, do not require from them a fresh judgment from case to case." H.
OF LAW132 (1961).
HART,THECONCEPT
L. REV.1057, 1060 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
32. Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV.
Dworkin, Hard Cases]. Presumably, "easy" cases would be cases in which rules with
settled meaning do dictate a decision. Dworkin has argued that rules are applicable in an
"all-or-nothing fashion," meaning that "[ilf the facts a rule stipulates are given, then
either the rule is valid, in which case the answer it supplies must be accepted, or it is not,
in which case it contributes nothing to the decision." Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35
U. CHI.L. REV.14, 25 (1967). In short, "rules dictate results, come what may." Id. a t 36.
33. Dworkin interpreted Hart as contending that a judge, who possesses no rules to
guide his adjudication, exercises "strong discretion," meaning that "he is not bound by
any standards from the authority of law. . . ." Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI.
L. REV.14, 35 (1967). However, it is questionable whether Hart can be so interpreted.
See supra note 26; see also Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits of Law, 81 YALEL.J.
823, 845 (1972) (Hart uses "rule" in a broad sense that includes principles and standards); Reynolds, Dworkin as Quixote, 123 U. PA.L. REV.574, 596-99 (1975) (by "discretion" Hart simply means that a judge must use his best judgment in appealing to public
standards in resolving borderline cases).
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requires reference to the set of principles that, comprising a
community's "constitutional morality," are "presupposed by the
laws and institutions of the community" and are therefore inferable from those laws and institution^.^^ By referring to these
principles, a judge is capable of adjudicating a hard case in a
fashion that preserves the institutional integrity of the political
community and achieves the result to which a party is entitled.36
In short, the legal system is "a seamless web" that provides sufficient normative guidance for the correct judicial resolution of
every legal dispute.36
34. Dworkin, Hard Cases, supra note 32, a t 1105-07.
35. Dworkin's argument, which he entitles "the rights thesis," is that judicial decisions in hard cases are characteristically generated by principle not policy. Id. at 1060.
Arguments of principle justify a decision by showing that it respects or secures some
individual or group right; they are distinguishable from arguments of policy that justify a
decision by showing that it advances b r protects some collective goal of the community
as a whole. Id. a t 1059. Dworkin believes that principles are discoverable from the institutional structures that are constitutive and regulative of the context in which the judicial decision must be made. In the case of a game, for example, the adjudication of a
hard case by a referee is institutionally constrained to that particular decision which
preserves the integrity of the game. Id. a t 1078-82. "We do not think that he is free to
legislate interstitially within the 'open texture' of imprecise rules. If one interpretation of
[a] rule will protect the character of the game, and another will not, then the participants have a right to the first interpretation." Id. a t 1080 (footnote omitted). The
uniquely correct interpretation of the rule is found when the referee reconstructs the
game's character by posing to himself different theories about the nature of the game.
(In this respect, Dworkin's interpretation theory is notably similar t o Collingwood's "reenactment" theory. See supra note 8.) When the referee determines which of the theories most appropriately fits the institutional features of the game, then that theory of the
game's character guides his resolution of the dispute. Consequently, only one party has
the right to win the dispute, which right is the referee's obligation to determine in light
of the genuine institutional character of the game. The same applies to a judge who must
enforce "existing political rights" latent in the combination of the constitutional values
and substantive rules of his political community. Dworkin, Hard Cases, supra note 32, a t
1063. For a good discussion and critique of this argument, see Note, Dworkin's "Right
Thesis," 74 MICH.L. REV.1167 (1976); see also Soper, Legal Theory and the Obligation
of a Judge: The HartlDworkin Dispute, 75 MICHL. REV.473 (1977); Greenawalt, Policy,
Rights and Judicial Decision, 11 GA. L. REV.991 (1977).
Rolf Sartorius has expressed views that are consistent with Dworkin's. Sartorius argues that while on occasion "extra-legal" considerations such as policy or value enter
judicial reasoning, "legal principles" are always available to govern their use and, accordingly, "the judge is in all cases ultimately guided by legal principles which severely limit,
if they do not totally eliminate, his discretion." Sartorius, Social Policy and Judicial
Legislation, 8 AM. PHIL.Q. 151 (1971). Moreover, he maintains that "a litigant before a
court of law is not in the position of one begging a favor from a potential benefactor, but
rather in that of one demanding a particular decision as a matter of right, as something
to which the law entitles him." Id. a t 153; see also Sartorius, The Justification of the
171 (1968).
Judicial Decision, 78 ETHICS
36. Dworkin, Hard Cases, supra note 32, a t 1093-96; see also Dworkin, Judicial Discretion, 60 J. PHIL.624, 634 n.7 (1963) ("an arrangement of entitlements"); Note, supra
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In a recent clarification of his position, Dworkin analogizes
The task
hard-case adjudication to a "chain novel" enterpri~e.~'
of a writer to contribute one chapter to a novel-in-progress requires him to determine the direction of developments in prior
chapters. Then, consistent with the demands of coherency for
the entire work, the writer must advance these developments in
the same direction through his chapter.38 Similarly, the task of a
judge to adjudicate a hard case in the common law enterprise
requires him to determine the structure of his legal community-from its profound constitutional arrangement to the details of its statutory schemes and judicial opinions. Then, consistent with the demands of coherency for his work, the judge must
write his decision " 'going on as before' rather than by starting
in a new direction as if writing on a clean slate."3s Indeed, the
note 35, a t 1169-70 (concluding that Dworkin's concept of law is "gapless"). T o the extent that Dworkin asserts overarching legal principles from which legal conclusions can
be deduced, his jurisprudence may be considered formalist in substance. See supra notes
19, 21.
37. Dworkin, "Natural" Law Revisited, 34 U . FLA.L. REV. 165 (1982). T h e "chain
novel" enterprise is described as follows:
Imagine, then, t h a t a group of novelists is engaged for a particular project.
They draw lots to determine the order of play. The lowest number writes the
opening chapter of a novel, which he then sends t o the next number who is
given the following assignment. He must add a chapter to that novel, which he
must write so as to make the novel being constructed the best novel i t can be.
When he completes his chapter, he then sends the two chapters to the next
novelist, who has the same assignment, and so forth.
Id. a t 166-67.
38. Dworkin wrote:
Now every novelist but the first has the responsibility of interpreting what has
gone before . . Each novelist must decide what the characters are "really"
like; what motives in fact guide them; what the point or theme of the developing novel is; how far some literary device or figure consciously or unconsciously
used can be said to contribute to these, and therefore should be extended, refined, trimmed or dropped. He must decide all this in order to send the novel
further in one direction rather than another. But all these decisions must be
made, in accordance with the directions given, by asking which decisions make
the continuing novel better as a novel.
Id. a t 167. For a more thorough examination of the chain-novel enterprise and its consequences for aesthetic and legal interpretation, see Dworkin, supra note 1.
39. Dworkin, supra note 37, a t 168.
Deciding hard cases a t law is rather like this strange literary exercise. The similarity is most evident when judges consider and decide "common-law" cases;
that is, when no statute figures centrally in the legal issue, and the argument
turns on which rules or principles of law "underlie" the related decisions of
other judges in the past. Each judge is then like a novelist in the chain. He or
she must read through what other judges in the past have written not simply
t o discover what these judges have said, or their state of mind when they said
it, but to reach a n opinion about what these judges have collectively done, in

. .
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judge is duty-bound by his participation in the common law enterprise to follow the legal history he findq40 thus, "the constraint, that [he] must continue the past and not invent a better
past, will often have the consequence that [he] cannot reach decisions that he would otherwise, given his own political theory,
want to reach."4'
The construction of constraints on judicial interpretation
has also proceeded outside the analytic movement. This is exemplified in Herbert Wechsler's "neutral principles" and John Hart
Ely's "textual determinism" approaches. Herbert Wechsler's
neutral principles approach requires judges to decide cases on
the basis of general principles that the judges are committed to
apply consistently in all similar cases.42John Hart Ely's textual
the wav that each of our novelists formed an ooinion about the collective novel
so far written. . . . Each judge must regard himself, in deciding the new case
before him, as a partner in a complex chain enterprise of which these innumerable decisions, structures, conventions, and practices are the history; it is his
job to continue that history into the future through what he does on the day.
He must interpret what has gone before because he has a responsibility to advance the enterprise in hand rather than strike out in some new direction of
his own. So he must determine, according to his own judgment, what the earlier decisions come to, what the point or theme of the practice so far, taken as
a whole, really is.
Dworkin, supra note 1, a t 542-43.
40. "A judge's duty is t o interpret the legal history he finds, not to invent a better
history." Dworkin, supra note 1, a t 544.
41. Dworkin, supra note 37, a t 169. Dworkin's chain-novel analogy is a valiant attempt to outflank both objective and subjective interpretivism. Chain novel interpretation is neither purely objective, since i t allows room for reinterpretation of the prior
writings in a way that both unifies and provides new meaning, nor purely subjective,
since i t prevents the interpreter from proceeding independently of prior institutional
writers. In this regard, the chain-novel analogy has much to commend it. Nevertheless,
as Professor Stanley Fish has perceptively and correctly argued, "Dworkin repeatedly
falls away from his own best insights into a version of the fallacies (of pure objectivity
and pure subjectivity) he so forcefully challenges." Fish, supra note 5, a t 552. Dworkin
"posits for the first novelist a freedom that is equivalent t o the freedom assumed by
those who believe t h a t judges (and other interpreters) are bound only by their personal
preferences and desires . . . ." Id. a t 555. Moreover, he views later novelists as "bound by
a previous history in a way that would be possible only if the shape and significance of
that history were self-evident." Id.
42. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV.L. REV.1,
11-12, 15 (1959).
[Tlhe main constituent of the judicial process is precisely that it must be genuinely principled, resting with respect t o every step that is involved in reaching
judgment on analysis and reasons quite transcending the immediate result that
is achieved[,] . . . [resting] on grounds of adequate neutrality and generality,
tested not only by the instant application but by others that the principles
imply[.]
H. WECHSLER,PRINCIPLES,
POLITICS,AND FUNDAMENTAL
LAW21 (1961); see also Bork,
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determinism requires judges to look only to the words of the
document and, when faced with opaque terms, to the intent of
those who wrote it. In Ely's view, judges "should confine themselves to enforcing norms that are stated or clearly implicit in
the written Constitution . . . ."43 In essence, both of these theories assert that the proper institutional role of judicial interpreters is to follow the available norms in good faith and to commit
to the logical implications of their appli~ation.~'
The common element in each of the legal theories
Neutral Principles a n d Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.L.J. 1,6-7 (1971) (advocating a requirement that decisions rest on principles that are neutral in content and
application); Perry, Why the Supreme Court Was Plainly Wrong in the Hyde Amendment Case: A Brief Comment on Harris v. McRae, 32 STAN.L. REV.1113, 1113-14 (1980)
(arguing that the ruling in Harris v. McRae was inconsistent with the operative principle
of Roe v. Wade and criticizing the Court for not being principled).
In his criticism of Wechsler, Professor Martin Shapiro observed a n essential objectivism in the "neutral principles" approach:
[Nleutral principles or standards are really the objective and eternal rules embedded in a "Blackstonian" body of law and the Constitution, which the judge
discovers and applies to the case before him. When the defenders of neutral
principles speak of the judge as motivated by reason, not will, they visualize
the common law judge who did not command (make law) but simply discovered by deductive and analogical reasoning which of the great verities of the
common law controlled the particular set of facts before him. Since the common law itself was the embodiment of reason and was applied by a purely
reasonable process, there was no need of, nor could there be any room for,
judicial prejudice, fiat, or preference.
Shapiro, The Supreme Court a n d Constitutional Adjudication: Of Politics and Neutral
Principles, 31 GEO.WASH.L. REV.587, 593 (1963) (footnote omitted).
43. J. ELY,DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST1, 3, 13-17 (1980). Professor Ely felt secure in
asserting that Roe v. Wade was wrongly decided because he found it obvious that the
purported right there vindicated was based on no "value inferable from the Constitution" and "lacks connection with any value the Constitution marks as special." Ely, The
Wages of Crying Wolf, A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALEL.J. 920, 933, 949 (1973).
Professor Ely's understanding of interpretation resembles Professor Thomas Grey's. See
Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN.L. REV.843 (1978); Grey, Do We Have a n Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN.L. REV. 703 (1975).
T h e term "textual determinism" is adopted from Professor Owen Fiss who appropriately found the term t h a t usually attaches t o Ely's work, "interpretivism," to be misdescriptive. Fiss, supra note 1, a t 743. As will be shown in part I1 of this comment, interpretation is in fact much more than that contemplated in Professor Ely's approach.
Professor Ely's "textual determinism" facially resembles Professor George Christie's
objectivism. Christie, Objectivity in the Law, 78 YALEL.J. 1311 (1969). Concluding that
contemporary legal theorists had failed to "confirm our intuition that judicial decisionmaking is objective," Professor Christie argued that only "those marks on paper called
statutes and cases" could be accepted as the fixed reference points for judicial interpretation. Id. a t 1326.
44. See Tushnet, Following the Rules, supra note 6 (arguing that Ely's and Wechsler's theories are inconsistent with liberalism).
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presented-Austin's legal science, Hart's minimization of penumbral doubt, Dworkin's hard case argument, Wechsler's neutral principles, and Ely's textual determinism-is the effort to
ensure that the legal text is interpreted without the influence of
the judicial interpreter's value-orientation. In each case, normative gaps in the body of law are minimized, and institutional demands on the judicial interpreter are maximized, with the design
of ensuring that the legal text is interpreted in harmony with
the external legal order. However, this common effort makes
sense only if the judicial interpreter is viewed as being free to
determine the outcome of his interpretation in accordance with
personal value preferences. In other words, by constructing interpretive constraints, each theory presumes that interpretation
is an activity in need of constraint because it is fundamentally
free and discretionary.
This presumption is evidenced in Dworkin's chain novel
analogy. Dworkin maintains that the contributor of a chapter to
the novel-in-progress must be seriously committed to continue
the work of his predecessor^;^^ indeed, he must be duty-bound to
"advance the enterprise in hand."46 In other words, an awareness on the part of the novelist and the judge of their responsibility to the corporate enterprise will supposedly check a temptation to strike out in some direction of their own. Only with a
sense of duty to the enterprise will the novelist and the judge
comport themselves as partners in the chain rather than as free
and independent agents. In short, the entire account depends on
the possibility of novelists and judges (both interpreters) comporting themselves in some fashion that is inconsistent with the
chain enterprise; i.e., in a free and discretionary fashion. The
question then becomes whether novelists and judges can comport themselves in a fashion inconsistent with the chain enterprise. If one assumes that the answer is yes, then one must see
that interpretation as free. If one assumes that the answer is no,
then one must see interpretation as something entirely different.
As will be argued in parts 11and I11 of this comment, interpretation is something different from that presumed by objective
interpretivists.
45. Dworkin, supra note 37, at 167 ("[IJnthis case the novelists are expected to take
their responsibilities seriously, and to recognize the duty to create, so far as they can, a
single unified novel rather than, for example, a series of independent short stories with
characters bearing the same names.").
46. Dworkin, supra note 1, at 543.
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Subjective Interpretiuism: The Uncontrollable Assertion
of Values

Objective interpretivism has not gone without critical response. In the early part of the twentieth century, a growing tendency towards objective formalism in legal e d ~ c a t i o n , ~legal
'
s c h o l a r ~ h i p , and
~ ~ judicial opinions49 sparked the vigorous
countermovement of legal realism.60 Legal realism had many dis47. In legal education, Christopher C. Langdell's case-method approach to the study
of law was gaining widespread acceptance in the law schools. Professor Rumble has suggested that this was the "signal event" in the emergence of legal realism. Rumble, supra
note 10, a t 996.
Langdell's case method presumed that the law consisted of certain principles and
rules that could be distilled out of selected cases because legal doctrines evolved slowly
and traceably in relatively few key cases. He argued that the number of legal principles
and rules is "much less than is commonly supposed; the many different guises in'which
the same doctrine is constantly making its appearance, and the great extent to which
legal treatises are a repetition of each other, being the cause of much misapprehension."
OF CASESON THE LAWOF CONTRACTS
viii-ix (2d ed. 1879).
C. LANGDELL.
A SELECTION
Consequently, "[tlhe vast majority [of cases] are useless, and worse than useless, for any
purpose of systematic study." Id. a t viii. In order to find the rules of law, a jurist need
only analyze the key cases in the evolution of a legal doctrine. Once in possession of
these rules, the "true lawyer" would apply them "with constant facility and certainty to
the ever-tangled skein of human affairs." Id.
48. In legal scholarship, the American Law Institute undertook its first attempt to
restate the law in order to clarify the fundamental principles behind the "swamp of decisions." Address of Elihu Root in Presenting the Report of the Committee, 1 A.L.I. PROC.
pt. 2, 48, 52 (1923). The ALI was established because of the growing recognition that the
law is uncertain. "[TJhe confusion, the uncertainty, [is] growing worse from year to
year. . . . [Wlhatever authority might be found for one view of the law upon any topic,
other authorities could be found for a different view . . . . [Tlhe law [is] becoming
guesswork." Id. a t 48-49.
Similarly, legal scholars such as Joseph Beale and Samuel Williston asserted that
the varied issues in their fields, conflicts of law and contracts respectively, were governed
ON THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS
by unified bodies of legal doctrine. See 1 J. BEALE,A TREATISE
92-94 (1935) (determination of domicile has certain automatic legal consequences that
T H ELAWOF CONTRACTS
apply regardless of circumstance). See generally S. WILLISTON,
(1920) (deriving the law of contracts from few general principles of universal applicability).
49. In federal and state judicial opinions, social legislation was invalidated partly on
the "logic" of general constitutional concepts such as liberty of contract and substantive
due process. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U S . 45 (1905); see also Allaire v. St.
Luke's Hosp., 184 111. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900).
(1978); G. GILMORE,
THE
50. See generally T. BENDITT.LAWAS RULEA N D PRINCIPLE
LAW 41-98 (1977); W. RUMBLE,AMERICAN
LEGALREALISM1-135
AGES OF AMERICAN
(1968); R. SUMMERS,
INSTRUMENTALISM
AND AMERICAN
LEGALTHEORY
(1982).
Langdell's case method approach was criticized for its exclusive focus on the operation of rules in judicial decisions. According to William 0.Douglas, such a focus
grossly oversimplifies and distorts the nature of law. After all, law is neither
more nor less than a prediction of what a governmental agency or other agency
of control will do under a given situation. A study of the legal literature exem-
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sonant voices; however, these voices achieved harmony in the belief that a legal text has any number of possible meanings, that
interpretation consists of choosing one of those meanings, and
that selecting a particular meaning forces the judge to express
his own values. In short, legal realism contended that interpretation is an uncontrollably subjective value-based activity. Legal
realism is thus the basic expression of subjective interpretivism
in Anglo-American jurisprudence.
Legal realism originates with distrust of "the theory that
traditional prescriptive rule-formulations are the heavily operative factor in producing court decision^."^' This "rule-skeptiplified by judicial opinions supplies part, but only part, of the material necessary to make such a prediction. The other psychological, political, economic,
business, social factors necessary to complete that prediction are innumerable.
The weakness of the old system was that all of these more general and imponderable factors were eliminated from consideration. I t was for that reason that
the nonconformists in legal education began to raise disconcerting notes.
AND FINANCE:
THEADDRESSES
AND
W. DOUGLAS,
Education for the Law, in DEMOCRACY
PUBLICSTATEMENTS
OF WILLIAM
0.DOUGLAS
AS MEMBER
AND CHAIRMAN
OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
278, 280 (1969).
Williston's scholarship in contracts was criticized, for example, for presupposing the
unity of the legal universe, a notion impossible to reconcile with the totality of judicial
decisions. The "legal universe," wrote Walter Wheeler Cook, "is far more complex than
that visualized by the more orthodox writers of whom Professor Williston is an example." Cook, Williston on Contracts, 33 ILL. L. REV.497, 514 (1939). Cook argued that a
unified body of legal doctrines could be maintained only if one completely ignored some
judicial decisions or failed to distinguish consistently between actual holdings and dicta.
According to Cook, Williston's treatise on contracts illustrated both these vices. Id. a t
499, 514. For a contemporary critique of recently perceived formalizations of law, see
Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN.L. REV.
387 (1981).
Oliver Wendell Holmes and Roscoe Pound were vigorous in their condemnation of
judges who decided cases solely in a formally deductive manner from legal generalizations. See Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM.L. REV.12, 16 (1910); Pound,
Liberty of Contract, 18 YALEL.J. 454,457, 478-80 (1909). Holmes, for instance, criticized
analysis that relied on the logical compulsion of legal generalizations t o reach particular
conclusions. "General propositions do not decide concrete cases." Lochner v. New York,
198 U S . 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Holmes insisted upon the role of unconscious factors in reaching decisions. "The decision will depend on a judgment or intuition
more subtle than any articulate major premise." Id. This skepticism towards general
rules as a means of compelling particular decisions and this insistence on the role of
unconscious factors in the adjudicatory process found resonance in the realist movement
as two of its central themes. See W. RUMBLE,
supra, a t 39-40.
51. K. LLEWELLYN.
JURISPRUDENCE:
REALISMIN THEORYAND PRACTICE
56 (1962).
"[Tlhe theory that rules decide cases seems for a century to have fooled not only libraryridden recluses, but judges. More, to have fooled even those skillful and hard-bitten firsthand observers of judicial work: the practitioners." Llewellyn, The Constitution a s a n
Institution, 34 COLUM.L. REV.1, 7 (1934).
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c i ~ m was
" ~ ~motivated by the interpretive malleability and normative ambiguity of legal materials. For example, Karl
Llewellyn observed two judicial techniques of case construction
that permit either an extremely narrow or an extremely wide ap~ ~ the "strict" or "orthodox" techplication of p r e ~ e d e n t .With
nique, a judge can, "through examination of the facts or of the
procedural issue, narrow the picture of what was actually before
the court and can hold that the ruling made requires it to be
understood as thus restricted."" In other words, a judge can, if
he desires, limit the authoritative value of an "unwelcome precedent" by so narrowly confining it to its particular facts that its
ruling could be made to apply only to "red-headed Walpoles in
pale magenta Buick cars."bb By contrast, the "loose view of precedent" holds that once "a court has decided . . . any point or all
points on which it chose to rest a case," then "[nlo matter how
broad the statement, no matter how unnecessary on the facts or
the procedural issues, if that was the rule the court laid down,
then that the court has held."" The judge can, if he chooses,
capitalize on "welcome precedents" for the purpose of authoritatively supporting any proposition he desire^.^' Essentially, the
same judicial techniques were thought to be available for statutory c o n s t r u ~ t i o n . ~ ~
This range of interpretive possibilities for case and statutory materials decreased their normative value for the realists.
52. This term appears to have been coined by Jerome Frank. See J . FRANK.
LAWAND
MODERN
MIND(1949). Professor Rumble treats this term as being descriptive of the
main currents of the realist movement. See W. RUMBLE,
supra note 50, a t 48-106. But for
a n argument distinguishing influential realist Karl Llewellyn's work from "rule-skeptiKARLLLEWELLYN
AND THE REALIST
MOVEMENT
408 n.22 (1973). In
cism," see W. TWINING.
any event, rule-skepticism for the realists did not mean that judges completely disregarded rules in adjudication but only that rules were one factor among many, including
social, moral and psychological factors, which influenced judicial decisions. W. RUMBLE,
supra note 50, a t 189-90.
53. K. LLEWELLYN,
THE BRAMBLE
BUSH66-68 (1960). In an earlier book, Llewellyn
explicated 64 techniques of precedential construction. K. LLEWELLYN,
THE COMMON
LAW
TRADITION].
TRADITION
77-91 (1960) [hereinafter cited as K. LLEWELLYN,
54. K. LLEWELLYN,
THE BRAMBLE
BUSH66 (1960).
55. Id. a t 67.
56. Id. a t 67-68.
57. Id. a t 68.
58. "[Algain and again . . . I have had to insist that the range of techniques correctly
available in dealing with statutes is roughly equivalent to the range correctly available in
TRADITION,
supra note 53, a t 371. Llewdealing with case law materials." K. LLEWELLYN,
ellyn listed 47 examples of contradictory, yet legally acceptable, canons of statutory construction, id. a t 522-35, to illustrate that "there are two opposing canons on almost every
point." Id. a t 521.
THE
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But the realists maintained that such normative ambiguity was
inconsequential in comparison to the equivocity resulting from
the plethora of squarely conflicting judicial decisions. For example, Benjamin Cardozo believed that every legal precedent could
be matched by another reaching an opposite conclusion.5s Consequently, a judge could find precedential authority for any proposition on nearly any issue.'O
The absence of consistent normative guidance from legal
materials had two important consequences for the realists' picture of judicial interpretation. First, the normative void necessitated judicial choice; it "disposes of all questions of 'control' or
dictation by pre~edent."~'With conflict among precedential authorities, a judge was compelled to choose from among them the
authority that best assisted him in resolving his case. The authority he chose to rely upon was solely within his control; he
possessed "sovereign prerogative of ~hoice."'~As Herman Oliphant pictured the necessity of judicial choice, every case considered by judge or student "rests at the center of a vast and
empty stadium. The angle and distance from which that case is
viewed involves the choice of a seat. Which shall be chosen?
Neither judge nor student can escape the fact that he can and

60. Belief in the plurality of judicial authority on any issue was virtually universal
among the realists. See, e.g., Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355
(1908) (Justice Holmes portrayed judicial decision as a balancing of opposed principles);
supra note 59, at 40 (one principle or precedent often is matched by another
B. CARDOZO,
supra note 52, a t 111 n.2 ("You will alpointing to an opposite conclusion); J. FRANK,
most always find plenty of cases to cite in your favor."); K. LLEWELLYN,
supra note 51, a t
339 ("Our whole body of authoritatively accepted ways of dealing with authorities . . . is
a body which allows the court to select among anywhere from two to ten 'correct' alternatives in something like eight or nine appealed cases out of ten."); Cohen, The
Problems of a Functional Jurisprudence, 1 MOD.L. REV.5, 11 (1937) (cases often present "a plaintiff principle and a defendant principle," each opposing the other); Corbin,
The Law and the Judges, 3 YALEREV.234, 246 (1914) (prior judicial decisions "are not
harmonious; in them can be found authority for both sides of almost any question");
Dickinson, The Law Behind Law: 11, 29 COLUM.
L. REV.285, 298 (1929) (broad general
principles of the law have a significant habit of traveling in pairs of opposites); Douglas,
Stare Decisis, in ESSAYSON JURISPRUDENCE
FROM THE COLUMBIA
LAWREVIEW18, 19
(1963) ("[Tlhere are usually plenty of precedents to go around; and with the accumulation of decisions, it is no great problem for the lawyer to find legal authority for most
propositions.").
61. K. LLEWELLYN,
TRADITION,
supra note 53, at 76.
62. O.W. HOLMES,
Law in Science and Science in Law, in COLLECTED
LEGALPAPERS
PREROGATIVE
xiii (1962).
210, 239 (1920), quoted in E. Ros~ow,THESOVEREIGN
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must choose."s3 In sum, judges, not rules, possessed the critical
function in case adjudication.
The second consequence of the normative void for the realists' picture of adjudication was that judicial choice could be
made and justified only on extralegal grounds. Llewellyn reasoned that if conflicting legal premises are available, then "there
is a choice in the case; a choice to be justified; a choice which
can be justified only as a question of policy-for the authoritative tradition speaks with a forked t~ngue."'~In other words,
without the authority of dispositive rules, judges could only resort to nonlegal values to resolve disputes. Some realists hoped
that the extralegal grounds the judge used to justify his decision
would be considerations of the social consequences of his intended decision as weighed against possible alternative decisions. In the balancing of possible social consequences resulting
from his decision, the judge became, for the realists, a kind of
social engineer, and the law became his instrument to facilitate
social progress and j~stice.'~
63. Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A. J . 71, 73 (1928).
supra note 51, a t 70. Felix Cohen made a similar statement:
64. K.'LLEWELLYN,
"[Nlo one of these rules [of prior cases] has any logical priority; courts and lawyers
choose among competing propositions on extra-logical grounds." F. COHEN,
ETHICAL
SYSTEMS A N D LEGALIDEALS.AN ESSAYON THE FOUNDATIONS
OF LEGALCRITICISM
35 n.47
(1959).
65. This instrumental aspect of legal realism was the result of the influence of William James's and John Dewey's philosophical pragmatism. See generally W. RUMBLE,
supra note 50, a t 22-35. The pragmatists were
supra note 50, a t 4-20, 72-78; R. SUMMERS,
antiformalist thinkers. William James stressed that theorists should turn "away from
abstraction . . . , from verbal solutions, from had a priori reasons, from fixed principles,
closed systems, and pretended absolutes and origins." W. JAMES,What Pragmatism
OF WILLIAM
JAMES
376, 379 (J. McDermott ed. 1968). Instead,
Means, in T H EWRITINGS
theorists should adopt a "pragmatic" orientation, by "looking away from first things,
principles, 'categories,' supposed necessities; and . . . looking towards last things, fruits,
consequences, facts." Id. a t 380 (emphasis omitted). This "pragmatic method," or resultorientation, was concerned with the "ways in which existing realities may be changed."
Id. Similarly, John Dewey argued that theoretical decision-making should be result-oriented. "The problem is not to draw a conclusion from given premises; that can best be
done by a piece of inanimate machinery by fingering a keyboard. T h e problem is t o find
statements of general principle and of particular fact which are worthy to serve as premAND CIVILIZATION
134 (1931). Thus, the "logic of rigid demises." J. DEWEY,PHILOSOPHY
onstration" must be replaced by a "logic of search and discovery," a "logic relative to
consequences rather than to antecedents," a "logic of inquiry into probable consequences." Id. a t 138-39; see also J . DEWEY,LOGIC: THE THEORY
OF INQUIRY
(1938); J.
LOGIC(1916).
DEWEY,
ESSAYSI N EXPERIMENTAL
This result-orientation was picked up by the realists. Llewellyn wrote that realistic
jurisprudence "fits into the pragmatic and instrumental developments in logic." K.
LLEWELLYN,
supra note 51, a t 28. With society in a constant state of flux, "and in flux
typically faster than the law, . . . the probability is always given that any portion of law
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But other realists believed that the justification of the judicial decision would not be socially instrumental, but subjectively
intuitive. Psychology teaches, wrote Jerome Frank, that "the
process of judging" does not begin at a premise and proceed to a
c o n c l u ~ i o n"Judging
.~~
begins rather t.he other way around-with
a conclusion more or less vaguely formed; a man ordinarily
starts with such a conclusion and afterwards tries to find premises which will substantiate it."67 Frank argued that the same
must apply to judges.
Now, since the judge is a human being and since no
human being in his normal thinking processes arrives a t decisions (except in dealing with a limited number of simple situations) by the route of . . . syllogistic reasoning, it is fair to assume that the judge, merely by putting on the judicial ermine,
will not acquire so artificial a method of reasoning. Judicial
judgments, like other judgments, doubtless, in most cases, are
worked out backward from conclusions tentatively formulated.68

Frank believed the formulation of the conclusion, whether done
vaguely, tentatively, or expressly was an expression of the "subjective sense of justice inherent in the
Other realists also believed that judicial intuitions about the
particular justice of a case motivated judges to resolve that case
in a particular way. Llewellyn wrote that the judicial mind is
driven by a sense of "Justice-for-All-of-Us."70
Benjamin Cardozo
argued that a judge's decision in choosing between alternative
standards is based on the "conviction in the judicial mind7' that
the standard selected leads to " j ~ s t i c e . " Finally,
~~
according to
Judge Frank Hutcheson, judicial decisions are reached by an inneeds reexamination to determine how far it fits the society it purports to serve." Id. a t
55. Thus, the realists advocated an examination of law to the end that it might be made
adaptable to man's own ends. "A good deal of fruitless controversy has arisen out of
attempts to show that [a] definition of law. . . is either true or false," wrote Felix Cohen.
"A definition of law is useful or useless. I t is not true or false, any more than a New
Year's resolution or an insurance policy." F. COHEN.Transcendental Nonsense and the
Functional Approach, in THE LEGALCONSCIENCE:
SELECTED
PAPERSOF FELIXS. COHEN
33, 62 (L. Cohen ed. 1970).
66. J. FRANK.
supra note 52, a t 100.
67. Id.
68. Id. a t 101 (citation omitted).
69. Id. a t 281 (citation and emphasis omitted).
70. K. LLEWELLYN,
supra note 51, a t 339.
71. B. CARDOZO,
supra note 59, a t 41.
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tuitive "hunch."72 "[Tlhe judge really decides by feeling, and not
by judgment; by 'hunching' and not by ratiocination . . . ."73 For
Judge Hutcheson, "the vital, motivating impulse for the Ijudicial] decision is an intuitive sense of what is right or wrong for
that cause."74
For some legal realists, judicial intuitionism was simply inHaving raised profound
adequate for a theory of adjudi~ation.'~
skepticism in the objective formalist model of adjudication,
some realists felt compelled to provide some hope for legal consistency and certainty. Oliver Wendell Holmes articulated the
principle of hope: predictionism.
People want to know under what circumstances and how far
they will run the risk of coming up against what is so much
stronger than themselves, and hence it becomes a business to
find out when this danger is to be feared. The object of our
study, then, is prediction, the prediction of the incidence of the
public force through the instrumentality of the courts.76
72. Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial
L.Q. 274 (1929); cf. Prott, Updating the Judicial "Hunch":
Decision, 14 CORNELL
Esserk Concept of Judicial Predisposition, 26 AM.J. COMP.L. 461 (1978) (inaccurately
comparing a German theorist's legal hermeneutic theory with Hutcheson's "hunch"
notion).
73. Hutcheson, supra note 72, a t 285.
74. Id. John Rawls has written the following in contrasting systematic theories of
justice with the intuitionist-pluralist perspective:
Intuitionist theories, then, have two features: first, they consist of a plurality of
first principles which may conflict to give contrary directives in particular
types of cases: and second, they include no explicit method, no priority rules,
for weighing these principles against one another: we are simply to strike a
balance by intuition, by what seems to us most nearly right.
A THEORY
OF JUSTICE
34 (1971). This is an apt description of the ground of
J . RAWLS,
legal realism's judicial intuitionism.
75. This inadequacy was observed from without the ranks of legal realism:
They have assured us of the immense range of irrational considerations entering into the judicial process, the subjectivity necessarily inherent in judicial
determinations, the dominating influence of prejudices, idiosyncrasies, and
preconceived social theories in the disposition of lawsuits . . . without presenting us with an embracive theory of the constructive elements necessary for the
building of a serviceable science of legal methodology.
Bodenheimer, Analytical Positivism, Legal Realism, and the Future of Legal Method,
44 VA.L. REV.365,376 (1958). One reason for this inadequacy may be that realists were
intent on destroying, rather than constructing, theory. See Rumble, The Paradox of
American Legal Realism, 75 ETHICS166, 173-76 (1965).
76. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV.L. REV.457 (1897); see also K. LLEWELLYN, THEBRAMBLE
BUSH13 (1960) ("[Tjhe main thing is seeing what officials do . . . and
seeing that there is a certain regularity in their doing-a regularity which makes possible
prediction of what they and other officials are about to do tomorrow.").
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However, realists who were committed to predictionism could
not agree on those factors from which accurate predictions could
be made.77The only agreement was that one had to look beyond
the "paper" rules, or the formal legal rules enunciated in judicial
decisions, and discover the "real" rules, or the psychological, political, economic, business, and social factors that accounted for
judicial behavior in a particular case.7s
77. Fred Rodell argued that one could look a t the "vast complex of personal factors-temperament,
background, education, economic status, pre-Court career" and
make predictions based on these factors "with a surprising degree of accuracy." Rodell,
For Every Justice, Judicial Deference is a Sometime Thing, 50 GEO. L J 700, 700-01
(1962). Llewellyn cited 14 "steadying factors" upon which predictions could be based. K.
LLEWELLYN.
TRADITION,
supra note 53, a t 19-51. Herman Oliphant argued that the predictable element in judicial decisions is the judges' "response to the stimuli of the facts
of the concrete cases before them . . . The response of their intuition of experience to
the stimulus of human situations is the subject-matter having the constancy and objectivity necessary for truly scientific study." Oliphant, supra note 63, a t 159.
78. In other words the "real" rules of the judicial process are the regularities of
judicial behavior. The paper-real rule distinction is found in both J. FRANK,
COURTSON
TRIAL:MYTHA N D REALITY
IN AMERICAN
JUSTICE336-37 (1949), and K. LLEWELLYN,
supra
note 51, a t 21-27.
This emphasis on studying and describing actual judicial behavior led some realists
to attempt to create a precise science of judicial behavior through empirical research.
This largely inspired the foundation of the Institute of Law a t the John Hopkins University in 1928. The aim of the school was "the development of the scientific study of law.
All else [was] incidental." Cook, Scientific Method and the Law, 13 A.B.A. J. 303, 309
(1927). Achievement of this objective required research of an empirical nature. Walter
Wheeler Cook emphasized that
the only way to find out what anything does is to observe it in action and not
to read supposedly authoritative books about it, or to attempt by reasoning to
deduce it from fundamental principles assumed to be fixed and given. The consequence of this assumption is that only a small part of the work of the staff of
the Institute will be with books in libraries; by far the larger part will be concerned with the difficult, time-consuming, and expensive task of gathering and
interpreting the facts concerning the operation of our legal system.
Cook, Scientific Study and the Administration of Justice, 34 MD. ST. B.A. REP. 148
(1929).
One interpretation of the realist movement is that it was not a critical reaction to
Langdellian and formalist model of law. See G. GILMORE,
supra note 50. Gilmore believes
that
the adepts of the new jurisprudence-Legal Realists or whatever they should
be called-no more proposed to abandon the basic tenets of Langdellian jurisprudence than the Protestant reformers of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries proposed to abandon the basic tenets of Christian theology. These were
the ideas that "law is a science" and that there is such a thing as "the one
True rule of law."
Id. a t 87. Gilmore therefore maintains that "[r]ealist jurisprudence proposed a change of
course, not a change of goal." Id. a t 100. Although this interpretation is defensible, it
does not represent the whole movement. Some realists doubted that a science of law was
possible a t all. See, e.g., Frank, What Courts Do in Fact, 26 ILL.L. REV.761, 773 (1932);
Llewellyn, The Theory of Legal "Science," 20 N.C.L. REV. 1, 10-22 (1941). For a good

.
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Jerome Frank rejected the search for "real" rules. In
Frank's estimation, "the major cause of legal uncertainty is factuncertainty-the unknowability, before the decision, of what the
trial court will 'find' as the facts, and the unknowability after
the decision of the way in which it 'found' those facts."79 Thus,
Frank concluded that "it is impossible, and will always be impossible, because of the elusiveness of the facts on which decisions turn, to predict future decisions in most (not all) lawsuits."80 Fact-uncertainty arises for two reasons. First, in
addition to possessing discretion in rule-applying, a judge possesses discretion in fact-finding. "When the oral testimony is in
conflict as to a pivotal fact-issue, the trial judge is a t liberty to
choose to believe one witness rather than an~ther."~'This discretionary fact-finding is "almost boundless" since appellate
courts rarely interfere with such determination^.^^ Second,
judges react to facts very subjectively. These judicial subjectivities include "unique, idiosyncratic, sub-threshold biases and
predilections" which are impossible to precisely define.83 Similarly, jurors reach their fact-determinations on "emotional responses to the lawyers and w i t n e s ~ e s . "Because
~~
of these unadiscussion o f t h e branch o f legal realism concerned with creating a "science o f law," see
Verdun-Jones, Cook, Oliphant & Yntema: T h e Scientific Wing of American Legal RealL.J. 3, 249 (1979); see also Schlegel, American Legal Realism
ism (pts. 1-2), 5 DALHOUSIE
and Empirical Social Science: T h e Singular Case of Underhill Moore, 29 BUFFALO
L.
REV. 195 (1980); Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: From
L. REV. 459 (1979).
t h e Yale Experience, 28 BUFFALO
79. J. FRANK,supra note 52, at xiv. Frank characterized his argument as "fact-skepticism." It marks one o f t h e major divisions in t h e realist movement. See generally W .
RUMBLE,
supra note 50, at 107-36. Frank classified t h e realists into two groups: ruleskeptics and fact-skeptics. Rule-skeptics, o f whom Llewellyn was "the outstanding representative," focus on appellate courts and strive for greater legal certainty. Fact-skeptics
focus on trial courts and deny t h e possibility o f accurate formulations o f real rules. J.
FRANK,supra note 78, at 73-75.
80. J. FRANK,supra note 78, at 74 ("the pursuit o f greatly increased legal certainty
is, for t h e most part, futile-and . . . its pursuit, indeed may well work injustice").
81. Id. at 57.
82. Id.
83. J. FRANK,supra note 52, at xxvi. " T h e reactions o f trial judges or juries t o t h e
testimony are shot through with subjectivity." J. FRANK,supra note 78, at 22. Elsewhere,
Frank called these subjectivities "prejudices o f judges . . . [that] have no 'large scale
social' character, and lack uniformity. T h e y are distinctly individual, unconscious, unget-at-able." T h e y are "concealed, publicly unscrutinized, uncommunicated . . . secret,
unconscious, private, idiosyncratic." Frank, "Short of Sickness and Death": A S t u d y of
Moral Responsibility i n Legal Criticism, 26 N.Y.U. L. REV.545, 573, 582 (1951).
84. J. FRANK.supra note 78, at 130. Frank continues, "they like or dislike, not any
legal rule, but they d o like an artful lawyer for t h e plaintiff, t h e poor widow, t h e brunette
with the soulful eyes, and they d o dislike the big corporation, t h e Italian with a thick,
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voidable subjectivities in the judicial process and the
impossibility of rationalizing them, Frank concluded that "real"
rules could never be formulated concerning the probable outcome of cases.86
Although the energy of legal realism was largely spent by
m i d c e n t ~ r y its
, ~ ~legacy remains. The critical legal studies movement is one example of the contemporary continuation of the
legal realist attack on objective legal analysis.s7 Critical legal
scholars agree with the realists' contention that legal analysis is
nothing more than a veneer covering deeper motives for judicial
decisions. But critical legal scholars depart from the realists by
providing a neo-Marxist, materialist explanation, rather than a
psychoanalytic account of judicial decision^.^^ They undertake
this explanation in two principal ways. First, they show legal
foreign accent." Id. Elsewhere, Frank contended that "adequate fact-finding . . . requires
devoted attention, skill in analysis, and, above all, high powers of resistance to a multitude of personal biases. But these qualities are obviously not possessed by juries. They
supra note 52, a t 192.
are notoriously gullible and impressionable." J. FRANK,
85. Any attempt to increase the capacity of "real" rules to scientifically accurate
predictions about judicial behavior, Frank believed, was impossible:
[Slince most persons consider that a true science makes predictions possible,
we ought to put an end to notions of a "legal science" or a "science of law,"
unless we so define "legal" or "law" as to exclude much of what must be included in the judicial administration of justice, because no formula for predicting most trial-court decisions can be devised which does not contain hopelessly
numerous variables that cannot be pinned down or correlated.
J. FRANK.
supra note 78, a t 190 (footnote omitted).
supra note 50, a t 238-39.
86. See generally W. RUMBLE.
87. Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies and Constitutional Law: An Essay in Deconstruction, 36 STAN.L. REV.623, 623-30 (1984) (critical legal studies is a "direct descendent" of legal realism); Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV.L. REV.
563, 564-73 (1983) (criticism of the formalist and objectivist traditions underlying modern legal thought as a characteristic theme of the movement); White, The Inevitability
of Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN.L. REV.649, 649-57 (1984) (critical legal studies' selfidentification with legal realism is an attempt to achieve legitimacy); Note, 'Round and
'Round the Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to Critical Legal Scholarship, 95 HARV.
L. REV.1669, 1677 (1982) (critical legal scholars have a "particularly close kinship" to
legal realist forebears, and the work of the former can be understood as a "maturation"
of the work of the latter).
For a critical assessment of the critical legal studies movement, see Hutchinson &
Monahan, Law, Politics, and The Critical Legal Scholars: The Unfolding Drnma of
American Legal Thought, 36 STAN.L. REV.199 (1984); Johnson, Do You Sincerely Want
to be Radical?, 36 STANL. REV.247 (1984); Schwartz, With Gun and Camera Through
Darkest CLS-Land, 36 STAN.L. REV.413 (1984); Sunstein, Politics and Adjudication, 94
ETHICS126 (1983); Levinson, Escaping Liberalism: Easier Said Than Done (Book Review), 96 HARV.L. REV.1466 (1983).
OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE
CRITIQUE
6
88. See Kairys, Introduction, in THEPOLITICS
n.* (D. Kairys ed. 1982) (critical legal scholars borrow heavily from the "Marxist tradition and current trends in Marxist thought").
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doctrines to be historically contingent by demonstrating their
change over time in response to judicial class biases and judicial
perceptions of the material needs of capitalist society.8e Second,
they show legal reasoning to be fundamentally incoherent by
elaborating the logical contradictions or "opposing principles"
underlying private law, particularly the law of the marketplace,
contract law.80Thus, they view legal analysis as ideological, nonrational argumentatione1 that is used to legitimate existing social
practice^.^^
89. See M. HORWITZ,
THETRANSFORMATION
OF AMERICAN
LAW(1977). Professor Horwitz argues that precapitalist, communitarian doctrines of private law made way for
nineteenth century capitalist-oriented doctrines because of the class sympathies of
judges and their historically limited perceptions of social needs. However, this account of
legal development is disputed. See, e.g., Simpson, The Horwitz Thesis and the History
of Contracts, 46 U. CHI. L. REV.533 (1979) (demonstrating that no such shift occurred in
contract law during the period Horwitz describes); White, The Intellectual Origins of
Torts in America, 86 YALEL.J. 671 (1977) (providing a fundamentally different account
of the development of tort theory).
For other examples of the critical legal studies argument for the development of
American law, see Gabel, Intention and Structure in Contractual Conditions: Outline
of a Method for Critical Legal Theory, 61 MINN.L. REV.601, 601, 604 (1977) (arguing
that law is composed of "interpretive activity, arising in concrete social situations" and
that legal structure encompasses a mode of interpretation "at the level of the implicit
legal consciousness moving within the whole of social discourse"); Tushnet, Perspectives
on the Development of American Law: A Critical Review of Friedman's "A History of
American Law," 1977 WIS. L. REV.81 (tracing the development of American law and
noting the impact on legal structure and social order from societal norms and "autonomous internal dynamics"); see also Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN.L. REV.57
(1984).
90. See Kennedy, Form and Substance, supra note 21. Professor Kennedy argues
that "there are two opposed rhetorical modes for dealing with substantive issues [found
in American private law opinions, articles, and treatises] which I call individualism and
altruism." Id. a t 1685; see also Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30
UCLA L. REV.829 (1983); Unger, supra note 87.
91. See Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33
STAN.L. REV.591 (1981). Professor Kelman depicts legal argument as involving "interpretive construction," or the conscious and unconscious reduction of factual situations to
substantive legal controversies, and "rational rhetoricism," or "the process of presenting
the legal conclusions that result when interpretive constructs are applied to the 'facts.' "
Id. a t 592. In Kelman's view, the necessary imposition of interpretive constructs prior to
the employment of rational rhetoricism radically undercuts the rationality of legal
argument:
[Ilnterpretive constructs. . . are . . . simply inexplicably unpatterned mediators
of experience, the inevitably nonrational filters we need to be able to perceive
or talk,at all. . . . When the unwarranted conceptualist garbage is cleared away,
dominant legal thought is nothing but some more or less plausible commonwisdom banalities, superficialities, and generalities, little more on close analysis
than a tiresome, repetitive assertion of complacency that "we do pretty well,
all considered, when you think of all the tough concerns we've got to balance."
Legal thought does have its rigorous moments, but these are largely grounded
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Other less organized remnants of legal realism can be found
in other contemporary writings. In his leading law school primer
on judicial reasoning,03 E. H. Levi portrays adjudication in terms
of organic growth in the law whereby the "concepts" that express the law change in response to changed conditions in society.04 His model implies that judicial "intuition" is the vehicle
by which a judge registers and implements into law the changed
"concepts" of s o ~ i e t yIn
Sanford Levinson, maintain. ~contrast,
~
ing that the unavailability of determinate meaning in literary interpretation applies equally to judicial interpretation, argues
that every judicial interpreter is radically impaired in his ability
to confidently express the meaning of the text or to reject the
meaning proposed by another.96 The "contingency of percep-

in weak and shifting sands. There is some substance, but we tend to run for
cover when it appears.
Id. a t 671-72; see also Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN.L. REV.293 (1984); Kairys, supra note
88, a t 3 ("There is no legal reasoning in the sense of legal methodology or process for
reaching particular, correct results." Law is "only a wide and conflicting variety of stylized rationalizations from which courts pick and choose."); Trubek, Complexity and
Contradiction in the Legal Order: Balbus and the Challenge of Critical Social Thought
About Law, 11 LAW& SOC'YREV.529, 561 (1977) ("I see the [legal] system as partially
open and flexible, and therefore as offering support for moral and political 'entrepreneurs' who can take advantage of the pressures of ideals and the legitimation needs of
the system to effect changes that can further genuine equality, individuality, and
community.").
92. See Gabel, supra note 89, a t 602 (traditional legal theory produces fictions by
hypostatizing phenomena into facts); Kennedy, Cost-Reduction Theory as Legitimation,
90 YALEL.J. 1275, 1276 (1981) (traditional legal scholarship contributes to legitimation
of oppressive social order); Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28
BUFFALO
L. REV.209 (1979) (the Commentaries legitimated existing social practices in
Blackstone's England through the creation of artificial legal categories that gradually
assumed an appearance of necessity).
TO LEGAL
REASONING
(1948).
93. E. LEVI,AN INTRODUCTION
94. Id. a t 6-9.
95. In Levi's model of reasoning, "concepts" (such as consideration and trespass),
not legal rules, are the main vehicles of the law. See Levi, The Natural Law, Precedent
and Thurman Arnold, 24 VA. L. REV.587, 604 (1938). His model follows Max Radin's
portrayal of judicial reasoning as a selection between "several categories [that] struggle
. . for the privilege of framing the situation before [the judges]." Radin, The Theory of
Judicial Decision: Or How Judges Think, 11 A.B.A. J. 357,359 (1925). Radin argues that
" 'principles' are not princip!es
a t all but aggregations of type transactions, schematized
to make them easier to carry in one's memory." Id. a t 360; see also K. LLEWELLYN,
TRADITION, supra note 53 (conceptions such as "type situation" and "situation-sense" are
basic to judicial reasoning). However, these pictures of judicial reasoning provide no normative guidance for weighing the "concepts" or "categories." See J. RAWLS,
supra note
74, a t 34.
96. Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEX.L. REV.373 (1982). For a criticism of this
position, see Fish, Interpretation and the Pluralist Vision, 60 TEX.L. REV.495 (1982).
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tion" results in "fractured and fragmented d i s c o u r ~ e , "leaving
~~
the interpreter with only a mere "hope that some future conjunction of author and reader will provide a common language of
Ijudicial] d i s c o u r ~ e . " ~ ~
In sum, legal realism and its heirs basically argue that judicial interpretation is an unavoidable expression of privately held
values because of the unavailability of effective interpretive constraints. They see normative guidance as being unavailable because it is not self-evident: a variety of meanings is attributable
to the same precedent or statute and contradictory meanings exist among different precedents and statutes. Therefore, judicial
interpreters are compelled to choose from among the available
meanings-a choice that can be made only on extralegal bases
that include the privately held values of the judicial interpreter.
Similarly, institutional demands that a judicial interpreter perform in a certain fashion are ineffective. The irrepressible subjective motivations of the judicial interpreter make it impossible
to ensure the judicial interpretation of a text within any objective constraint.

The Anglo-American jurisprudential traditions of objective
and subjective interpretivism both presume that judicial interpretation is a free and discretionary activity. The principal difference between these two traditions lies in the extent to which
they believe that the judicial interpreter can be controlled in exercising his freedom and discretion. On one hand, the objective
interpretivist tradition constructs normative and institutional
constraints that supposedly prevent the responsible judicial interpreter from freely resorting to personal, value-laden considerations. On the other hand, the subjective interpretivist tradition
denies the authority and efficacy of such constraints, concluding
that judicial interpretation is an activity motivated by nonrational subjective interests.
Unfortunately, both traditions have failed to examine critically their common presumption that interpretation is by nature
free and discretionary. Rather, each tradition has directed its efforts a t contesting the availability of interpretive constraints.
97. Levinson, supra note 96, at 402-03.
98. Id.
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The result has been the incapacity of both jurisprudential traditions to transcend their opposition. Thus, while objective interpretivism's preoccupation with constructing normative and institutional constraints has prevented it from investigating the
possible structure of interpretation, subjective interpretivism's
primary interest in deconstructing these constraints has diverted
its attention away from the need to explain the otherwise "mysterious" act of i n t e r p r e t a t i ~ n . ~ ~
The objective-subjective opposition can be transcended by
denying the common presumption about the nature of interpretation. In other words, if interpretation is shown not to be free
99. Professor Edgar Bodenheimer once argued that the divergent ideological commitments of analytical positivism and legal realism prevented them from providing "a
well-considered theory of the non-formal (i.e., non-positive) sources of the law."
Bodenheimer, supra note 75, at 375. Responding to H.L.A. Hart's "open texture" characterization of legal rules, Bodenheimer maintained that Hart's continuing commitment to
the analytical positivist ideal of judicial objectivity inhibited him (and would inhibit all
other analytical positivists) from investigating the possible structure of judicial discretion. On the other hand, the legal realists' continued assurance to jurists "of the immense range of irrational considerations entering into the judicial process, the subjectivity necessarily inherent in judicial determinations, [and] the dominating influence of
prejudices, idiosyncrasies, and preconceived social theories in the disposition of lawsuits"
diverted his focus from "presenting us with an embracive theory of the constructive elements necessary for the building of a serviceable science of legal methodology." Id. a t
376. In short, the ideological commitments of analytical positivism and legal realism were
"leading the science of law into a blind alley from which it can extricate itself only by an
extensive and serious re-investigation of the entire realm of legal methodology." Id. a t
375; see also R. UNGER.KNOWLEDGE
AND POLITICS
3, 104-42 (1975) (characterizing conceptions of reason intrinsic to Western thought in the sciences, humanities, and jurisprudence as dichotomous, which results in a "prison house" for thought from which escape
is possible only with a "total criticism" of the "deep structures" of our thought and a
transcendence of the dichotomies with a "holistic consciousness"); Gross, supra note 5
(outlining jurisprudential "patterns of evasion" of the rule-value dichotomy); Reynolds,
supra note 5 (following Bodenheimer's analysis).
Charles A. Miller's description of judicial interpretation is one example of the "blind
alley" or "prison house" effect flowing from objective-subjective dichotomous views of
adjudication:.
The three sources of decision-values, rules, and facts-combine to focus on
the mysterious "act of deciding." While the sources of decision are rationally
comprehensible, the act of deciding is not. But after that act, adjudication becomes understandable once more when the opinion of the court, the explanation of decision, is handed down.
C. MILLER,THESUPREME
COURTAND THE USESOF HISTORY11 (1969) (footnote omitted).
This description vacillates helplessly between objective and subjectiJe accounts without
hope of any synthesis. For this reason, the act of judicial interpretation remains mysterious. A similar vacillation is evident within legal realism between its scientific and intuitionist wings. See supra text accompanying notes 61-78. More recently, Professor Dworkin's position has been characterized as a vacillation between objectivity and
subjectivity. See Fish, supra note 5.
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and discretionary, then the disagreement between objective and
subjective interpretivism over the availability of effective contraints for interpretation disappears. No ground exists to support the disagreement. Jurisprudential discussion of adjudication is then necessarily transformed to reflect the new view of
interpretation.'OO
Philosophical hermeneutics rejects the notion that interpretation is free and discretionary.lO' Interpretation is a dialogical
100. Generally, advocates of the resolution of the objective-subjective opposition in
jurisprudence have sought to construct a method of reasoning that integrates the objective and subjective dimensions of human experience. For instance, see Roberto Unger's
argument, supra note 99. In Unger's estimation, an "order of mind" must be constructed
that exists "between" the particularity of events in human experience and the generality
of concepts and symbols constituting the content of human thought. Id. a t 107-11. Further, this "order of mind" must employ neither the subjective valuations associated with
the particularity of events nor the logic and causality associated with the generality of
thought, but rather a "symbolic interpretation" that merges these two. Id. Examples of
this interpretation are found in the aesthetic experience of finding universal meaning
and concrete particularity in a great work of art or the religious experience of finding
Christ as an embodiment of both the universal, infinite God and the particular, finite
man. Id. a t 144; see also Gross, supra note 5.
In contrast, Professor Noel Reynolds contended that the escape from Bodenheimer's
"blind alley" should begin with a complete reformulation of the classical ideal of legal
objectivity into a notion of objectivity that more fully "squares . . . with actual human
experience." Reynolds, supra note 5, a t 27. In his estimation, this could be achieved by
seeing legal generalizations as publicly corrigible; see also Fiss, supra note 1.
101. The term "hermeneutics" can be traced to the Greek noun, hermeneia, meansupra note 4, a t 12-32. The term hermeneia appears
ing interpretation. See R. PALMER.
to be derived from the name of the Greek god Hermes. Essentially, Hermes' task was to
translate, or bring into a form intellectually accessible to human understanding, the
transcendent knowledge of the gods. Analysis of Hermes' divine function of mediation
between the world of gods and the world of men reveals a three-fold dimensionality that
hermeneia, or interpretation, had for the early Greeks. First, Hermes was to reveal and
proclaim the will of the gods to men. Thus, interpretation connoted an announcing of
what was previously unrevealed. Id. a t 15-20. Second, Hermes was to elucidate what was
revealed by relating it to the listeners' own projects and intentions. Thus, interpretation
to the Greeks carried with it the implication of a context in which the receivers of the
message found themselves. The problem of interpretation was making clear the message
in terms of the receivers' anticipations of meaning. Id. a t 20-26. Third, Hermes was to
bring the unintelligible into intelligibility through the medium of the people's own language. He was a translator who sought to mediate man's own understanding with the
gods' understanding. For the Greeks, interpretation meant a mediation of world views, a
fusion of different understandings in which interpreter and object both operated. Id. a t
26-32.
Hermeneutics did not begin to assume the form of a theory of interpretation until
the Reformation. Arguing that the Bible could be understood independently and validly
without the dogmatic interpretation of the Catholic Church, the Reformers sought a theory of biblical exegesis that would allow their interpretation to stand on its own. See J.
BLEICHER,
supra note 4, a t 12-13; see also H. GADAMER,
TRUTHAND METHOD153-55
(1975). The Reformers argued that any textual passage, the sense of which is not clear,
could be understood through the reciprocal relationship between the whole text and its

354

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[I984

interaction between interpreter and text that occurs within an a
priori relationship that is mediated by their common history
and language. In this interaction, neither interpreter nor text determines textual meaning independently of the other; both interpreter and text contribute interdependently to the determination of textual meaning. In essence, philosophical
particular passages. While the whole scriptural text guided the interpretation of the particular passages, the meaning of the whole could be reached only through the cumulative
understanding of individual passages. From sacred texts, it was only a small step to apply the same insight to profane texts.
Until Friedrich Schleiermacher, "special" hermeneutics existed in the various disciplines, depending upon the kind of text involved and the theoretical problems peculiar
to the discipline. Schleiermacher sought to establish a "general" hermeneutic underlying
all specialized hermeneutics by trying to elucidate the foundational act of all hermeneutics-the
act of understanding itself. Arguing that understanding occurs primarily
through a comparing of the unintelligible to the already intelligible, he schematized the
act of understanding as a circle. Just as the unclear meaning of a particular textual passage is made clear by reference to the general meaning of the whole text, so is any particular experience made intelligible by reference to what has already been understood. But
what has already been understood is only the accumulation of the meaning of particular
experiences. This schema of understanding-the general informing the particular and
the particular informing the general-became known as the "hermeneutical circle." See
J . BLEICHER,
supra note 4, a t 13-16; H. GADAMER,
supra, a t 162-74; R. PALMER,
supra note
4, a t 75-97.
Following Schleiermacher's attempt to generalize hermeneutics, Wilhelm Dilthey
sought to make hermeneutics the foundation for all the human sciences by providing a
universally valid methodological basis for the interpretation of all human expressions.
Dilthey believed that employment of the hermeneutical circle could lead to a knowledge
of the human world resembling the natural sciences' knowledge of nature. Asserting that
the meaning of all human action lay in the subjective intention of the actor, Dilthey
reasoned that the task of understanding was to reconstruct the actor's original "lifeexperience" by way of the hermeneutical circle in order to understand the actor as he
supra note 4, a t 19-26; H. GADAMER,
supra, a t 192understood himself. See J . BLEICHER,
supra note 4, a t 98-123. In this respect, Dilthey presages Collingwood's
234; R PALMER.
objective reenactment theory of interpretation. See supra note 8.
Dilthey's notion of understanding marked a decisive turn in hermeneutic theory-a
turn that Hans-Georg Gadamer viewed as wrong. In Gadamer's view, Dilthey's hermeneutics impiied that the inquirer's present situation had a negative value. Understanding
the actor as he understood himself required "essentially a self-transposition or imaginative projection whereby the [inquirer] negates the temporal distance that separates him
from the object and becomes contemporaneous with it." Linge, Introduction to H.
GADAMER,
PHILOSOPHICAL
HERMENEUTICS,
a t xiv (1976). In other words, temporal distance
between the inquirer and the object of his inquiry is a source of prejudice that hinders
valid understanding and that must be transcended. T o the extent that Dilthey's notion
of understanding demands negation of the inquirer's present and extrication from his
immediate historical situation, Gadamer believed Dilthey's hermeneutic theory must be
rehabilitated. Gadamer argued that the interpreter can never extricate himself from the
entanglements of his history and the prejudices that come with those entanglements.
The interpreter's history is always constitutively involved in his process of understanding. Id.
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hermeneutics sees interpretation as an activity of mutual constraint between the interpreter and the text.

A.

The Historicality of Interpretation

Philosophical hermeneutics' rejection of the free and discretionary view of interpretation begins with an argument for the
fundamental historicality of interpretation. Philosophical hermeneutics contends that every interpreter is historically situated. To be historically situated means to be inextricably located
within a relational context that bears the stamp of the past.lo2
An interpreter's historical situatedness implies both that the interpreter cannot encounter the present without a direction to his
project and a perspective of his text that are dictated to him
from his past and, equally important, that there are parameters
to his project and boundaries to his perspective. In other words,
the interpreter's past not only provides certain possibilities for
seeing the present, it also limits what can possibly be seen.
Both the possibilities and the limitations of the interpreter's
present are a manifestation of the interpreter's "effective-history."lo3 The effective-history of an interpreter "determines in
advance both what seems to [him] worth enquiring about and
what will appear [to him] as an object of inve~tigation."'~~
Put
another way, it is the interpreter's "horizon," or "range of vision[,] that includes everything that can be seen from a particu102. See H. GADAMER,
supra note 101, a t 225-74. Gadamer is deeply indebted to
Martin Heidegger for this view of the interpreter. In his phenomenology of man, Heidegger contended that man's being is "Dasein" (There-Being). M. HEIDEGGER.
BEINGAND
TIME(1962). In other words, man is always located temporally and spatially. However,
man does not exist solipsistically; his being is "Being-in-the-world." Id. a t 78-90. By
"world," Heidegger means not just the natural environment of entities, but the relational
context in which man always finds himself immersed and in terms of which each entity is
pregrasped and preunderstood. Id. a t 91-145. The existential structures of "Being-in-theworld" are man's primordial "being-with" objects of experience, his "being-in" situations, and his "being-towards" (caring for) objects of experience. Id. a t 149-273. Each of
these structures presumes that man "grasps in advance" the objects of his experience
because of his primordial relation to them. Id. a t 188-95. Consequently, human understanding has a prestructure which comes into play in all interpretation. For this reason,
"[ilnterpretation is never a presuppositionless apprehending of something presented to
us" in advance. Id. a t 191-92. Gadamer seized upon these basic insights about man and
interpretation. "Heidegger's temporal analytics of human existence (Dasein) has, I think,
shown convincingly that understanding is not just one of the various possible behaviours
of the subject, but the mode of being of [man] itself." H. GADAMER.
supra note 101, a t
xviii; see also J. BLEICHER,
supra note 4, a t 98-103; R. PALMER,
supra note 4, a t 124-61.
supra note 101, a t 267-74.
103. H. GADAMER.
104. Id. a t 267-68.
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lar vantage point."lo5 Moreover, the effective-history of an interpreter infuses him with pre-judgments that he cannot possibly
dispossess himself. Because he sees the present only in terms of
judgments that he has drawn in the past, the interpreter's past
judgments predispose him to judge the present in the same way.
The interpreter always approaches the text with certain expectations that reflect his past experience.lo6
Not only is the interpreter historically situated, but so is his
text. The effective-history of the text is manifest in the manner
in which it has been previously understood. Its "horizon" is the
range of its prior interpretations; its pre-judgment is how it has
come to be judged by others.lo7 Importantly, it is the text's
grounding in history that makes its present interpretation possible. The interpreter's and the text's sharing of history allows the
interpreter to have access to the text, to find relation with it, or
to have a basis for understanding it at all. In other words, a
common history provides the medium for interpreting the text
and determining its meaning.
Given the historicality of both interpreter and text, philosophical hermeneutics maintains that interpretation and meaning are possible only because of the interpreter's historically
based pre-judgments of the text. This claim is illustrated by re105. Id. at 269.

106. H. GADAMER.
The Universality of the Herrneneutical Problem (1966), in PHILOHERMENEUTICS
9 (1976).
[Tlhe historicity of our existence entails that prejudices, in the literal sense of
the word, constitute the initial directedness of our whole ability to experience.
Prejudices are biases of our openness to the world. They are simply conditions
whereby we experience something-whereby what we encounter says something to us.
Id. Certainly, one of the most controversial aspects of philosophical hermeneutics is the
notion that pre-judgment has positive, rather than negative value for interpretation.
Gadamer attributes the negative connotation of pre-judgment to the Enlightenment. H.
GADAMER,
supra note 101, a t 239-45. The Enlightenment idealized reason as the autonomous determiner of judgments. Pre-judgments were seen as being remnants of an unenlightened mentality that impedes rational self-determination. Truth was obtained by rejecting pre-judgments and establishing an impartial system of rules and methodological
principles. Gadamer seeks to rehabilitate the concept of pre-judgment. Given man's historicality, pre-judgments are an ontological fact.
107. In the case of an interpreter's original reading of a text, the horizon of the text
is not so much evident in its historicality as it is in its linguisticality. In this case, the
text is intellectually accessible to the interpreter primarily because of their sharing of a
common language. As will be shown in section C, language has an horizon too; it is the
peculiar world view of the community that possesses the language. See infra text accompanying notes 134-41. For this reason, the interpreter will always have certain expectations of meaning from the language in which he is immersed.
SOPHICAL
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flecting on the common interpretation of any written text. When
an interpreter encounters a written text, he performs an act of
projection. He projects onto the text the meaning that he anticipates the text as a whole may have for him; his "effective-history" disposes him to pre-judge the possible meaning of the text.
However, in projecting the "fore-meaning"lo8 of the text, the interpreter may encounter passages that call into question its suitability and adequacy as an account. Most likely, the interpreter
will be "pulled up short by the text," signifying that the projected meaning of the text "does not yield any meaning or [the
text's] meaning is not compatible with what [the interpreter]
had expected."109 Consequently, the interpreter is compelled to
account for the unsettling passage in his understanding of the
text and to revise his fore-meaning accordingly. The revised
fore-meaning then becomes the newly projected meaning, and
the process of projection from fore-meaning to particular textual
passages and back to fore-meaning continues as before. "The
working out of this fore-project, which is constantly revised in
terms of what emerges as [the interpreter] penetrates into the
meaning, is understanding what is there.""O
In this illustration, the interpreter's pre-judgments "constitute the initial directedness of [his] whole ability to experience
[the text] at all."ll1 His pre-judgments direct him to the text as
an object worthy of inquiry; they are the ground for his initial
interest in reading the text. Moreover, his pre-judgments direct
him along a particular course of inquiry; they are the fore-meanings that he projects for the text as a whole and that are revised
as they become challenged by the text itself. Although the interpreter's pre-judgments constitute his initial direction, they do
not necessarily constitute solely his understanding of the text.
His pre-judgments may turn out to be legitimate, and thus pro108. H.GADAMER,
supra note 101, a t 237.
109. Id. For a brief discussion of what philosophical hermeneutics intends in the
word "meaning," see supra note 122 and authorities cited therein.
supra note 101, a t 236. The constant movement from the inter110. H. GADAMER,
preter's pre-judgment of the text to a particular passage of the text and back to prejudgment, with both informing each other, illustrates the basic epistemological model of
philosophical hermeneutics known as the "hermeneutical circle." See supra note 101.
The "hermeneutical circle" should not be understood to be viciously inescapable. For a
cogent clarification of this commonly misunderstood aspect of philosophical hermeneutic
theory, see D. HOY,supra note 4, a t 2-6.
111. H. GADAMER,
The Universality of the Herrneneutical Problem (1966), in PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS
9 (1976).
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ductive for understanding, if they are confirmed in being
"worked out" with the passages of the text. But his pre-judgments may also turn out to be illegitimate, and thus unproductive for understanding, if they "come to nothing in the working
out."l12 In either case, however, it is only in terms of the interpreter's pre-judgments that judgments of the text can be
reached. The crucial point is that pre-judgments become legitimate or illegitimate only if the interpreter allows them to be
challenged and questioned by the object of his inquiry. Otherwise, the interpreter's pre-judgments become definitive and prescribe how he will understand the text.
An interpreter prevents his pre-judgments from prescribing
his understanding of the text by being "effective-history cons c i o u ~ . "Such
~ ~ ~c ~ n ~ c i o u entails
~ n e ~ awareness
~
of his pre-judgments and suspension of the effects of his effective-history. Admittedly, suspension of effective-history is impossible in any
absolute sense. "The prejudices and fore-meanings in the mind
of the interpreter are not at his free disposal. He is not able to
separate in advance the productive prejudices that make understanding possible from the prejudices that hinder understanding
and lead to misunderstanding^.""^ But latent pre-judgments
can be teased into the foreground of awareness through an open
and direct confrontation with the text. In confronting the text,
the interpreter encounters its "otherness" which throws his prejudgments into contrasting relief and thereby casts them into
the foreground of awareness for his critical s c r ~ t i n y . " ~
Although the text is historically related to the interpreter, it
is nonetheless "an historically intended separate ~bject.""~In
other words, it is not only physically separate but also temporally distant in its creation from the interpreter's present. Im112. H. GADAMER.
supra note 101, a t 237.
113. Id. a t 268-71.
114. Id. a t 263.
115. Linge, supra note 101, a t xx-xxi. Linge illustrates this phenomenon in the history of cultures:
[I]t is in times of intense contact with other cultures (Greece with Persia or
Latin Europe with Islam) that a people becomes most acutely aware of the
limits and questionableness of its deepest assumptions. Collision with the
other's horizons makes us aware of assumptions so deep-seated that they
would otherwise remain unnoticed. This awareness of our own historicity and
finitude-our consciousness of effective history-brings with it an openness to
new possibilities that is the precondition of genliine understanding.
Id. a t xxi.
116. H. GADAMER,
supra note 101, a t 263.
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portantly, every interpreter, even the creator of the text, must
accomplish his interpretation across some temporal distance
that is never "a closed dimension, but is itself undergoing constant movement and extension."l17 This means that the interpreter always occupies a new present in relation to the text, giving him a new perspective (or pre-judgment) of the text that is
shaped by concerns and expectations inherited from his constantly extending past. For this reason, a text is always endowed
with a sense of "otherness," or st ran genes^."^^^ T o be sure, the
text retains its sense of "familiarity"110 as well, because of its
presence in the interpreter's history (and, as will be shown later,
language); this familiarity is manifest in the interpreter's capacity to pre-judge the text.
Thus, the interpreter's open and direct confrontation with
the text reveals a "polarity of familiarity and st ran genes^."'^^
This polarity creates a contrast between what the interpreter
presently expects to understand from the text and what the text
historically has to say.
If a person is trying to understand something, he will not be
able to rely from the start on his own chance previous ideas,
missing as logically and stubbornly as possible the actual
meaning of the text until the latter becomes so persistently audible that it breaks through the imagined understanding of it.
Rather, a person trying to understand a text is prepared for it
to tell him something. That is why a hermeneutically trained
mind must be, from the start, sensitive to the text's quality of
newness. But this kind of sensitivity involves neither 'neutrality' in the matter of the object not the extinction of one's self,
but the conscious assimilation of one's own foremeanings and
prejudices. The important thing is to be aware of one's own
bias, so that the text may present itself in all its newness and
thus be able to assert its own truth against one's own foremeanings.lZ1
In other words, if the interpreter is open to the text, meaning
that he is genuinely prepared to receive its message, then the
text may expose his pre-judgments by way of establishing a contrast between itself and those pre-judgments. In this way, the
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 266.
at 262.
at 262-63.
at 238.
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interpreter becomes aware of his pre-judgments and avoids the
prescriptive effect they would have on his understanding of the
text were they to remain latent in his consciousness.
This open confrontation between the interpreter's pre-judgments and the text is the process by which the true meaning of
the text emerges.122In allowing constantly emerging pre-judgments to be contrasted and tested against the text, the interpreter is in the position to discard pre-judgments that obscure
textual understanding and to retain pre-judgments that are confirmed by the text. In short, temporal distance between interpreter and text does not obstruct understanding, but actually
produces it. Temporal distance acts as a "filtering process;" it
"not only lets those prejudices that are of a particular and limited nature die away, but causes those that bring about genuine
understanding to emerge clearly as
For this reason, interpretation and the determination of meaning are never a completed task, but are "an infinite process."124
In sum, the view of interpretation that emerges from a dis122. In the parlance of philosophical hermeneutics, meaning is something that
neither inheres in an object nor attaches to it as an arbitrary projection of thought.
Meaning is contextual, occurring only in relationships with the interpreter. Meaning is
seen as always being "for us;" it is found in making the unintelligible intelligible in terms
of our present concerns and expectations, just as Hermes made the unintelligible world
of the gods intelligible to man through the medium of man's own language. See R.
PALMER,
supra note 4, a t 118-21, 184.
This determination of meaning is thus dependent on the interpreter making the text
"applicable" to him. Application is a crucial dimension of interpretation. See D. HOY,
supra note 4, a t 51-61. Gadamer believed that interpretation in theological and judicial
contexts is particularly exemplary of this dimension:
In both legal and theological hermeneutics there is the essential tension between the text set down-of the Law or of the proclamation-on the one hand
and, on the other, the sense arrived a t by its application in the particular moment of interpretation, either in judgment or in preaching. A law is not there
to be understood historically, but to be made concretely valid through being
interpreted. Similarly, a religious proclamation is not there to be understood as
a merely historical document, but to be taken in a way in which it exercises its
saving effect. This includes the fact that the text, whether law or gospel, if it is
to be understood properly, i.e., according to the claim it makes, must be understood a t every moment, in a particular situation, in a new and different way.
Understanding here is always application.
H. GADAMER,
supra note 101, a t 275, 289-305. Both judicial and theological interpretation
see the task as an effort to mediate the temporal distance between the historic text and
the present situation. Thus, interpretation is not the objective reconstruction of another
world in its own terms, nor the subjective determination of the world in terms of the
interpreter's own vision and thoughts.
123. H. GADAMER,
supra note 101, a t 265-66.
124. Id. a t 265.
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cussion of its historicality is fundamentally different from objective and subjective interpretivism. Interpretation is a dynamic
interaction, between the interpreter (his pre-judgments) and the
text (its historical meaning), from which meaning is determined.
The interpreter's pre-judgments contribute to the determination
of meaning by providing the basis on which the text is made
intelligible to the interpreter. But these pre-judgments do not
prescribe meaning. So long as the text is allowed to have expression and to challenge the interpreter's pre-judgments, the text
contributes to the determination of meaning by compelling revised understandings of it. As a result, interpretation is neither
free nor constrained, but is free and constrained. It is free in the
sense that the interpreter approaches the text in accordance
with his pre-judgments concerning it. But it is also constrained
in the sense that these pre-judgments, shared by both interpreter and text in their common historical medium, are subject
to modification and revision in the interaction between the interpreter and the text.

B.

The Dialogical Structure of Interpretation

As maintained in section A, interpretation requires openness to the text, meaning that the interpreter lays open the possibility that the text may have something to say different from
the interpreter's expectation of its meaning. But in so doing, the
interpreter assumes the risk that the suitability of his pre-judgments for understanding the text may be called into question by
the claims of the text itself. Indeed, the laying open of possibilities for other meanings of the text is the "essence of the question."l2Vor this reason, interpretation is said to have the struc~ ~ text asserts its claims, calling into
ture of q ~ e s t i 0 n i n g . lThe
question the interpreter's pre-judgments; the interpreter answers with revised judgments of the text that are drawn in terms
of his prior understandings and the message of the text, but
125. Id. at 266. Gadamer indicates elsewhere that the openness that is "questioning"
is not intermittent, but continuous and infinite.
Dialectic, as the art of asking questions, proves itself only because the person
who knows how to ask questions is able to persist in his questioning, which
involves being able to preserve his orientation towards openness. The art of
questioning is that of being able to go on asking questions, [i.e.,] the art of
thinking. It is called "dialectic", for it is the art of conducting a real
coversation.
Id. at 330.
126. Id. at 266.
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which may be called into question again by other textual
passages.
This question-answer-question structure suggests that the
interpretive interaction between the interpreter and the text is
dialogical. Indeed, dialogue is precisely the relationship the interpreter achieves with the text. The dialogues of Plato are paradigmatic of the character of the dialogue that occurs in interpretation.12? The purpose of the Platonic dialogues is for the
interlocutors to reach a transcendent understanding about an issue of common concern. Importantly, the individuality of each
interlocutor is not to be neutralized but is significant in achieving of this understanding. For instance, the confrontation between Socrates, the man of contemplation, and Callicles, the
~ ~ their peculiar pre-judgman of action, in the G o r g i a ~ lcasts
ments into contrasting relief for their mutual scrutiny. The result of their confrontation is thus more likely to be true understanding because it is accomplished in terms of each others' prejudgments and transcends each one's purely subjective
perspective.
The interlocutors of a Platonic dialogue move beyond their
subjective perspectives when they inquire into the subject matter of the dialogue. In other words, the more an interlocutor
opens himself to the subject matter, the more his personal opinions cease to prescribe his understanding. An interlocutor becomes engaged in an inquiry with the other interlocutors and
falls out of an interrogation of them.12@He gets "caught up" in
127. Id. a t 325-41.
DIALOGUES
OF PLATO299-307 (E. Hamilton and H. Cairns ed.
128. THECOLLECTED
1961).
129. The distinction is crucial. Genuine dialogue is a focus on some subject matter,
not on the particular interlocutors. To conduct a conversation "requires that one does
not try to out-argue the other person, but that one really considers the weight of the
supra note 101, a t 330. The effort to "out-argue" is an
other's opinion." H. GADAMER,
undertaking that presumes the validity of one's own position and focuses on changing
another person's views to conform with one's own. However, this kind of dialogue is inconsistent with the requirement of openness that leads to understanding because it is so
uninterested in the other. Genuine dialogue is openness to another person's views, which
changes the tenor of the undertaking into a common inquiry about some issue of common concern.
Just as there are legitimate and illegitimate pre-judgments, see supra text accompanying notes 111-12,so there are legitimate and illegitimate inquiries (or questionings).
Legitimate (or "true") questioning is an inquiry with the answers still undetermined.
Illegitimate (or "false") questioning is an inquiry with predetermined answers; it is concerned with hearing only what it has already decided is worthwhile to hear. This kind of
supra note 101,a t 326questioning is illegitimate because it is so one-sided. H. GADAMER,
27.
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the conversation; he becomes engaged or possessed by the backand-forth movement of the dialogue. At this point, the dialogue
takes on a life of its own that is filled with unanticipated developments that carry the interlocutor beyond his present perspective.130 Although we frequently say that one may "conduct" a
conversation, or dialogue, "the more fundamental a conversation
is, the less its conduct lies within the will of [the parties]. . . .
Philosophical hermeneutics rejects illegitimate questioning in all its forms, including
methods of prescribed inquiry. Methods are rejected as illegitimate because of their prescription of a correct answer to their inquiries:
Strictly speaking, method is incapable of revealing new truth; it only renders
explicit the kind of truth already implicit in the method. The discovery of the
method itself was not arrived a t through method but dialectically, that is,
through a questioning responsiveness to the matter being encountered. In
method the inquiring subject leads and controls and manipulates; in dialectic
the matter encountered poses the question to which he responds.
R. PALMER,
supra note 4, a t 165. The philosophical roots for the rejection of methods are
found in M. HEIDEGGER,
Question, supra note 5, a t 3; M. HEIDEGGER,
Age, supra note 5,
a t 115.
130. "What emerges in its truth is the logos, which is neither mine nor yours and
hence so far transcends the subjective opinion of the partners to the dialogue that even
the person leading the conversation is always ignorant." H. GADAMER.
supra note 101, a t
331. Later, Gadamer argues that the phenomenon of "hearing" illustrates the impossibil.
ity of subjectivity in genuine dialogue. Id. a t 419-21.
Unlike seeing, where one can look away, one cannot "hear away" but must
listen, unless the language is an alien one or is mere chatter. Even idle chatter
has a way of captivating the listener against his will. Hearing implies already
belonging together in such a manner that one is claimed by what is being said.
D. HOY,supra note 4, a t 66.
The notion of being carried by the dialogue is illuminated by a second phenomenon
used to support the hermeneutic view of interpretation-the phenomenon of a game (or
"playing"). H. GADAMER,
supra note 101, a t 91-114. The fundamental characteristic of
the phenomenon of playing is the total absorption of the player in the back-and-forth
movement of the game. In genuine playing, a player does not hold himself back in selfawareness, reflecting on the game as an object of definable procedures and rules. A
player who cannot lose himself in earnest in the playing is a "spoilsport"-one who cannot play. Id. a t 91-92. Similarly, playing "cannot be taken as an action of subjectivity. . .
.and self-possession. The real subject of playing is the game itself." Linge, supra note 101,
a t xxiii. The playing possesses the players; it has primacy over the players engaged in it.
Moreover,
[tlhe movement of playing has no goal in which it ceases but constantly renews
itself. That is, what is essential to the phenomenon of play is not so much the
particular goal it involves but the dynamic back-and-forth movement in which
the players are caught up-the movement that itself specifies how the goal will
be reached.
Id. In other words, playing has its own momentum and carries its players along with it.
The point is that interpretation involves the same kind of absorption of the interpreter
in the question-answer-question movement between himself and the text.
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[Tlhe people conversing are far less the leaders of it than the
led. No one knows what will 'come out' in a con~ersation."'~~
This phenomenon of dialogue illustrates the nature of the
relationship to be achieved between the interpreter and the text.
Like dialogue, interpretation is an inquiry into a subject matter
that concerns both the interpreter and the text. Like dialogue,
interpretation also requires an openness to the particular viewpoint of another, meaning "acknowledgment that [the interpreter] must accept some things that are against [him~elf]."'~~
Only in this way do both the interlocutor and the interpreter
permit themselves to be engaged by the dialogical interaction
and carried by it beyond their present perspectives. In short,
both [dialogue and interpretation] are concerned with an object that is placed before them. Just as one person seeks to
reach agreement with his partner concerning an object, so the
interpreter understands the object of which the text
speaks. . . .
. . . [In] the successful conversation they both come under
the influence of the truth of the object and are thus bound to
one another in a new community . . . [it is] a transformation
into a communion, in which we do not remain what we were.'33
Again, this dimension of the philosophical hermeneutic
characterization of interpretation differs fundamentally from the
presumption of objective and subjective interpretivism. Interpretation is not an essentially free and discretionary activity for
which the existence of constraints is in dispute. Because interpretation does not occur independently of the dialogical relation
between the interpreter and the text, it makes no sense to view
the interpreter as essentially free to construe the text according
to his subjective values. Interpretation is not a manipulative action of the interpreter's subjectivity, but is rather his placing of
himself in dialogue with the text so that both the interpreter
and the text move into a new understanding.

C.

The Linguisticality of Interpretation

In sections A and B, interpretation has been shown to be a
131. H GADAMER.
supra note 101, at 345.
132. Id at 324.
133. Id. at 341 (footnote omitted). The elevation of the interpreter's pre-judgments
and the claims of the text into a higher generality, or "communion," is what philosophical hermeneutics terms the "fusion of horizons." Id. at 273.
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transsubjective event. Both the interpreter and the text are absorbed in a dialogical interaction from which new understandings arise. But the peculiar perspective of neither the interpreter
nor the text is to be extinguished. The confrontation of these
perspectives initiates the dialogical movement towards understanding because of their contrast. In previous sections of this
comment, the medium in which the dialogical interaction of interpretation occurs has been referred to simply as the common
history of the interpreter and the text. However, this historical
relation is not to be construed as something vague and intangible; it has its concrete manifestation in language. For this reason, language is seen as being the "concretion of effective-historical ~ o n s ~ i o ~ s n e ~ s . " ~ ~ ~
The history of both the interpreter and the text makes itself
known in the present by way of language. Language is the concrete means by which the judgments and understandings of the
past are carried into the present. Thus, the interpreter's effective-history that provides his present pre-judgments exists in
the language he employs.
To say that the horizons of the present are not formed at all
without the past is to say that our language bears the stamp of
the past and is the life of the past in the present. Thus the
prejudices [that philosophical hermeneutics] identifies as more
constitutive of our being than our reflective judgments can now
be seen as embedded and passed on in the language we use.
Since our horizons are given to us prereflectively in our language, we always possess our world linguistically. Word and
subject matter, language and reality, are inseparable, and the
limits of our understanding coincide with the limits of our
common language.lS5
Thus, the mediation that occurs between an interpreter and the
text, as in the dialogue between interlocutors, can be seen as
"the full realisation of conversation, in which something is expressed that is not only [the interpreter's] or [his text's], but
The linguisticality of effective-history means that interpretation can occur neither prelinguistically nor extralinguistically.
Not only does the text appear to the interpreter in terms of lan134. Id. at 351.
135. Linge, supra note 101, at xxviii.
136. H. GADAMER.
supra note 101, at 350.
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guage, but the interpreter can approach the text only in terms of
language. There is no world outside language.I3'
[Tlhe linguistic quality of our experience of the world is prior,
as contrasted with everything that is recognised and addressed
as being. The fundamental relation of language and world does
not, then, mean that world becomes the object of language.
Rather, the object of knowledge and of statements is already
enclosed within the world horizon of language. The linguistic
nature of the human experience of the world does not include
making the world into an 0 b j e ~ t . l ~ ~

In other words, there is no world outside its presence as the subject matter of some language community. One cannot experience
language prior to experiencing the world, nor the world prior to
experiencing language. "We cannot see a linguistic world from
above in this way, for there is no point of view outside the experience of the world in language from which it could itself become
an
Consequently, language is not simply an optional function
that the interpreter engages in or does not engage in a t will.I4O
137. The idea of "world" has peculiar significance in philosophical hermeneutics.
The idea has its origins in Martin Heidegger's phenomenology of man. See supra note
102. World is not the environment, the sum total of all objects; i t is rather the entire
relational context in terms of which every object is pregrasped. Therefore, the world is
never separate from man; it is prior to any separation from the objects of the world. M.
HEIDEWER.supra note 102, a t 91-148. Philosophical hermeneutics carries forward
Heidegger's notion of world by making explicit that the human experience of world is
supra note 101, a t 397-414.
linguistic. H. GADAMER,
supra note 101, a t 408.
138. H. GADAMER.
139. Id. a t 410. T h e peculiar world of a language community is known to any person
who has mastered a foreign language. T h e language is a repository of cultural-historical
experience. Consequently, many of its words and phrases have a richness of meaning
that reflects that experience and, therefore, can be fully understood only by total immersion in the culture of the language community. Not surprisingly, translation of such
words and phrases requires much more than mechanical synonym finding; it requires
explanation of the foreign context of understanding. However, even with such an explanation there is always a sense of the loss of the dimensions of the language. See id. a t
345-51.
140. The fact that the world cannot be grasped prelinguistically or extralinguistically is illustrated by our complete possession by language in even thinking about
language:
[All1 thinking about language is already once again drawn back into language.
We can only think in a language . . . .
Language is not one of the means by which consciousness is mediated with
the world. . . . Language is by no means simply an instrument, a tool. For i t is
in the nature of the tool that we master its use, which is to say we take it in
hand and lay i t aside when it has done its service. T h a t is not the same as
when we take the words of a language, lying ready in the mouth, and with their
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Language is beyond the interpreter's manipulative control because it is between him and the text, making possible his very
relating to it. The interpreter cannot first have an extralinguistic
contact with the text and then put the text into the instrumentation of language. "Language is not just one of man's possessions in the world, but on it depends the fact that man has a
world at all."141Language is the very relational context in terms
of which any text is pregrasped. Indeed, because language is presupposed in every act of interpretation of any text, it is prior to
any separation of the interpreter and the text. Language is,
therefore, prior to all objectivity and subjectivity since both are
conceived within a schema that separates subject from object.

Philosophical hermeneutics is a theory of interpretation
that directly conflicts with the view of interpretation assumed in
Anglo-American jurisprudence. The assumption is that interpretation is free and discretionary, meaning that no common standards exist between the interpreter and the text to provide guidance for evaluating and judging the text. In a fundamental
sense, the interpreter and text are assumed to be independent of
each other. This assumption yields two approaches to adjudication. The objective interpretivist approach constructs preestablished norms for inquiry that reflect the characteristics of the
text itself so that the interpreter's judgment identifies with the
text. The subjective interpretivist approach insists that judg-

ments of the text will be drawn only in terms of the interpreter's
preconceptions of the text. In other words, while the objectivist
sees an independent text as determining understanding, the subjectivist sees an independent interpreter as determining
understanding.
The hermeneutic theory of interpretation, on the other
hand, views interpretation as a dialogical interaction of interuse let them sink back into the general store of words over which we dispose.
Such an analogy is false because we never find ourselves as consciousness over
against the world and, as it wore [sic], grasp after a tool of understanding in a
wordless condition. Rather, in all our knowledge of ourselves and in all knowledge of the world, we are always already encompassed by the language that is
our own.
H. GADAMER,
Man and Language (1966), in PHILOSOPHICAL
HERMENEUTICS
62 (1976).
141. H.GADAMER,
supra note 101, a t 401.
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preter and text that is mediated by their common history and
language. As a result, neither interpreter nor text is sufficiently
independent to be determinative of meaning. The text prevents
the interpreter from being the sole determiner of meaning by
providing a contrasting relief against which the interpreter's prejudgments are brought to awareness for critical scrutiny. Likewise, the interpreter prevents the text from being the sole determiner of meaning since the text is intelligible only in terms of
the interpreter's pre-judgments. In these fundamental ways, the
determination of meaning is beyond the control of either interpreter or text; indeed, both contribute to the determination of
meaning interdependently.
In contrast to Anglo-American jurisprudence, philosophical
hermeneutics concludes that interpretation is never an activity
in need of constraints because it is a structure of existential constraints. These existential constraints are the interrelations that
exist between the interpreter and the text prior t o interpretation. The interpreter's access to the text is made possible only
because of the a priori mediation provided by their shared historical and linguistic context. This contextual interrelatedness
provides both the possibilities and the limitations of the interthe interpreter and text stand in a dia~ r e t a t i 0 n . lMoreover,
~~
logical relation without which interpretation cannot possibly occur. The dialogical relation is prior to interpretation in the sense
142. A similar idea has been expressed by Professor Stanley Fish in a critical response to Dworkin's "chain novel" analogy for adjudication. Fish criticizes Dworkin for
presuming the interpretive freedom of the first author in the chain. See supra note 41.
[Tlhe first author has surrendered his freedom (although, as we shall see, surrender is exactly the wrong word) as soon as he commits himself to writing a
novel . . He must decide, for example, how to begin the novel, but the decision is not "free" because the very notion "beginning a novel" exists only in
the context of a set of practices that a t once enable and limit the act of beginning. One cannot think of beginning a novel without thinking within, as opposed to thinking "of," these established practices, and even if one "decides"
to "ignore" them or "violate" them or "set them aside," the actions of ignoring
and violating and setting aside will themselves have a shape that is constrained
by the preexisting shape of those practices. This does not mean that the decisions of the first author are whollv determined. but that the choices available
to him are "novel writing choices," choices that depend on a prior understanding of what it means to write a novel, even when he "chooses" to alter that
understanding. In short he is neither free nor constrained (if those words are
understood as referring to absolute states), but free and constrained. He is free
to begin whatever kind of novel he decides to write, but he is constrained by
the finite (although not unchanging) possibilities that are subsumed in the notions "kind of novel" and "beginning a novel."
Fish, supra note 5, a t 553.
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that interpretation cannot be undertaken without the open dialogical interaction of interpreter and text. Importantly, these interrelations are said to be existential because they constitute the
very manner of the interpreter's existence with the text.14=
Again, the implication is that interpretation is so fundamental
to the interpreter's means of knowing the text that the act of
interpretation cannot be manipulatively controlled by the
interpreter.
The view of interpretation provided by philosophical hermeneutics represents a direct theoretical challenge to AngloAmerican jurisprudence. Because Anglo-American jurisprudence
presumes that interpretation is an essentially unrestrained activity, the jurisprudential debate has focused on the availability of
constraints for interpretation. Unfortunately, this debate has
proceeded without a specific and systematic examination of the
nature of interpretation upon which the entire debate rests.
Philosophical hermeneutics is challenging because its examination of the nature of interpretation concludes that interpretation
is not what traditional Anglo-American jurisprudence has
blindly presupposed. Therefore, the ground upon which the objective and subjective interpretivist debate stands is gone.
This theoretical challenge deserves careful attention from
Anglo-Amerithe Anglo-American jurisprudential c~mmunity."~
143. The fundamental existentiality of these constraints in the act of interpretation
prompted one commentator to conclude as follows:
The task of philosophical hermeneutics, therefore, is ontological rather than
methodological. It seeks to throw light on the fundamental conditions that underlie the phenomenon of understanding in all its modes, scientific and nonscientific alike, and that constitute understanding as an event over which the
interpreting subject does not ultimately preside.
Linge, supra note 101, a t xi. Consequently, philosophical hermeneutics "pervades all
human relations to the world." H. GADAMER,
supra note 101, a t xi. Its issue is "not what
we do or what we ought to do, but what happens to us over and above our wanting and
supra note 102.
doing." Id. a t xvi. See generally M. HEIDEGGER,
144. The purpose of this comment is to direct Anglo-American jurisprudential attention to its unexamined assumption about the nature of interpretation and to the philosophical hermeneutic challenge to this assumption. The presentation of a philosophical
hermeneutic theory of law is beyond the scope of this comment. However, the present
avoidance of an articulation of this theory does not mean that philosophical hermeneutics offers little or nothing that is directly relevant to the judicial context. Several ideas
of jurisprudential relevance may be derived from the outline of philosophical hermeneutics provided herein.
First, the idea of the historical mediation of the past with the present is relevant. A
judicial interpreter can be easily characterized as situated in a historical present, facing
the present expectations of litigants that are based on prior judgments drawn by legislative writers or other judicial interpreters. The judicial interpreter's adjudicative task is
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can jurisprudence can only stand to benefit by directing its attention to the theory of interpretation provided by philosophical
hermeneutics. In the very least, attention to the hermeneutic
theory of interpretation, even if it were ultimately rejected,
could induce the critical and systematic jurisprudential study of
the nature of interpretation that has heretofore been assumed
but never studied. However, careful attention to the hermeneutic theory of interpretation will more than likely lead to an
abandonment of the prevailing jurisprudential assumption about
the nature of interpretation and a transcendence of the objective
and subjective interpretivist debate that preoccupies AngloAmerican jurisprudence.

James J. Hamula

to mediate these conflicting historically-based expectations, including his own pre-judgments that may come into play with the interests of the present case. See supra note
122.
Second, the idea that this mediation occurs in language is relevant to the judicial
context. Law is language-bound because all the materials of the law have their existence
in language. Any use of these materials in any context, including negotiation, litigation,
and adjudication, occurs in language as well. In a very important sense then, the judicial
interpreter is a necessarily obligated participant in language. The consequence of his
participation is that his resolution of the litigants' claims is regulated by the same terms
and conditions of language that regulated the linguistic articulation of those claims.
Third, and perhaps most important, the idea of the dialogical structure of interpretation is ,relevant to the judicial context. In the adjudicative process, the judicial interpreter is obligated to hear claims that he might not otherwise want to hear, to listen to
all persons who will be directly affected by his resolution of their claims, and to respond
specifically to these claims by resolving them and assuming responsibility for that resolution. In other words, the adjudicative process institutionally compels the judicial interpreter to confront openly and directly the interests and expectations of others. Philosophical hermeneutics indicates the significance of this confrontation for the judicial
interpreter. The judicial interpreter's pre-judgments are brought to awareness (for him
as well as for others) only when cast into contrasting relief against judgments that are
different from his own. Once his pre-judgments are illuminated, they are more easily
subject to critical evaluation (by him as well as -by others) for their suitability in the
resolution of the dispute. In sum, the judicial interpreter is restrained by the very nature
of his undertaking from interpreting in a free and discretionary manner.

The Right to Life of the Unborn-An
Assessment of the Eighth Amendment to the
Irish Constitution
The late President of Ireland and former Chief Justice of
the Irish Supreme Court, Cearbhall O'Dalaigh, once stated,
"Constitutional rights are declared not alone because of bitter
memories of the past but no less because of the improbable, but
not-to-be-overlooked, perils of the future."' This statement describes the rationale behind the eighth amendment to the Irish
Constitution. Viewed in popular terms as a prolife amendment,
its genesis lies in fear that the almost universal trend to liberalize abortion legislation may creep into Ireland. The amendment attempts to strike the appropriate balance between the
mother's constitutionally protected personal rights and the unborn's right to life. Although it was strongly supported by the
people, the amendment contains some technical problems, as
well as some broad language that may permit rather than prevent the introduction of abortion legislation in Ireland. However, in light of the strong public opinion against any liberalization of abortion laws, and the legislative and judicial
development of Irish family law, the more realistic view is that
the amendment is a powerful endorsement of Ireland's prolife
position.

In order to understand the legal and political atmosphere in
Ireland a t the time the amendment was passed, it is necessary to
understand (1) the historical development of the Irish Republic,
(2) the effects of foreign legislation on Irish law, and (3) the development of Irish abortion law.
Because English rule was imposed for several centuries, English common law directly applied -in Ireland.2 Abortion was
viewed by early English commentators as a serious crime. Blackstone stated:
1. McMahon v. Attorney Gen., 1972 Ir. R. 69, 111.
2. Henchy, Precedent in the Irish Supreme Court, 25 MOD.L. Rev. 544 (1962).
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Life is the immediate gift of God, a right inherent by nature in
every individual; and it begins in contemplation of law as soon
as an infant is able to stir in the mother's womb. For if a woman is quick with child, and by a potion or otherwise, killeth it
in her womb; or if anyone beat her, whereby the child dieth in
her body, and she is delivered of a dead child; this, though not
murder, was by the ancient law homicide or manslaughter. But
the modern law doth not look upon this offence in quite so
atrocious a light, but merely as a heinous mi~demeanor.~

Ireland was incorporated into the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Ireland in 1800 by the Union with Ireland Act.4 The
English Parliament became the sole legislator for both England
and Ireland and thereafter all enactments specifically stated
whether they were to apply to England, Ireland, or both.6
In the nineteenth century, the English Parliament codified
the law governing abortion in the Offences Against the Person
The Act specifically declared that it applied to Ireland.7
Sections 58 and 59 provided:
58.

Every Woman, being with Child, who with Intent to procure her own Miscarriage, shall unlawfully administer to
herself any Poison or other noxious Thing, or shall unlawfully use any Instrument or other Means whatsoever with
the like Intent, and whosoever, with Intent to procure the
Miscarriage of any Woman, whether she be or be not with
Child, shall unlawfully administer to her or cause to be
taken by her any Poison or other noxious Thing, or shall
unlawfully use any Instrument or other Means whatsoever with the like Intent, shall be guilty of Felony, and
being convicted thereof shall be liable, a t the Discretion
of the Court, to be kept in Penal Servitude for Life or for
any Term not less than Three Years, or to be imprisoned

3. 1 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES
129-30 (4th ed. 1771); see also E. COKE,THIRD
INSTITUTE
50 (1979) (1st ed. London 1628).
4. 39 & 40 Geo. 3, ch. 67 (1800), reprinted in 23 HALSBURY'S
STATUTES
OF ENGLAND
832 (A. Yonge 3d ed. 1970). The union was codified by an identical Irish act, the Act of
Union (Ireland) 1800. The Act abolished the separate Irish Parliament that had existed
since the thirteenth century. The Act received the Royal Assent on August 1, 1800.
5. For example, The Abortion Act, 1967, ch. 87, 5 7(3) specifically provides that it
does not apply to Northern Ireland.
6. 24 & 25 Vict., ch. 100 (1861).
7. Id. The preamble to the Act states, "Whereas it is expedient to consolidate and
amend the Statute Law of England and Ireland in relation to offences against the person
." (emphasis in original).
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for any Term not exceeding Two Years, with or without
Hard Labour, and with or without Solitary Confinement.
Whosoever shall unlawfully supply or procure any Poison
or other noxious Thing, or any Instrument or Thing
whatsoever, knowing that the same is intended to be unlawfully used or employed with Intent to procure the
Miscarriage of any Woman, whether she be or be not with
Child, shall be guilty of a Misdemeanor, and being convicted thereof shall be liable, a t the Discretion of the
Court, to be kept in Penal Servitude for the Term of
Three Years, or to be imprisoned for any Term not exceeding Two Years, with or without Hard Labour.

This Act continues to be the law concerning abortion in Ireland
today.8
In 1921 a treaty was signed between Ireland and England
forming the Irish Free State (Saorstat Eireann) out of twentysix of the thirty-two Irish counties.' Although it remained a
member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, the Irish Free
State ceased to be part of the United Kingdom. In 1922 an Irish
Constitution was established.1•‹ This constitution was amended
twenty-seven times in the next fifteen years" and was finally
superceded in 1937 when the present constitution was approved
by plebiscite. The eighth amendment discussed in this comment
has been incoporated into the 1937 con~titution.'~
The 1937 constitution virtually severed Ireland's ties to
Great Britain.13 However, it provided (as did the 1922 constitution) that all laws previously in force would continue to be of
full force and effect so long as they were consistent with the
1937 constitution, or until they were repealed or amended by the
Oireachtas (Irish Parliament).14 Thus, the "unlawful miscar8. Binchy, Abortion and the Law, in ABORTION
NOW69 (1983) (published by Life
Education and Research Network).
9. Codified in The Irish Free State (Agreement) Act, 1922, 12 & 13 Geo. 5, ch. 4,
OF ENGLAND
636 (A. Yonge 3d ed. 1968). The reSTATUTES
reprinted in 4 HALSBURY'S
maining six counties now constitute Northern Ireland and remain under English rule.
10. Codified in The Irish Free State (Saorstat Eireann) Constitution Act, 1922, 13
Geo. 5, ch. 1, reprinted in 4 HALSBURY'S
STATUTES
OF ENGLAND
641 (A. Yonge 3d ed.
1968).
11. 4 HALSBURY'S
STATUTES
OF ENGLAND
642 (A. Yonge 3d ed. 1968).
12. IRISHCONST.art. 40.3.3.
13. The final step occurred in 1948 when the Irish Free State left the British Commonwealth of Nations. I t is now internationally recognized as the Republic of Ireland.
See The Ireland Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, ch. 41, reprinted in 4 HALSBURY'S
STATUTES OF ENGLAND
670 (A. Yonge 3d ed. 1968).
14. IRISHCONST.art. 50.1.
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riages" provisions of the Offences Against the Person Act were
carried over into Irish law by the new constitution.
Although sections 58 and 59 of the Offences Against the
Person Act specifically prohibit abortion in Ireland, there have
been few prosecution^.'^ In 1945 William Henry Coleman was
charged with two counts of attempting to perform an abortion.I6
He was found guilty and sentenced to fifteen years of penal servitude on each count with the sentences to run concurrently.
The most infamous Irish abortionist was a woman known as
Nurse Cadden, who "was a well known figure . . . on the Dublin
scene for 20 years."17 Her medical services came to an end in
1956, when she was convicted of murder after the body of a woman, who died following an abortion, was found on the public
footpath outside her apartment.ls Nurse Cadden was sentenced
to death, but the sentence was commuted to life imprisonment.
In neither of these cases, nor in any other case to date, has
an Irish court analyzed the scope of sections 58 and 59." However, the English courts have analyzed these sections and an examination of their analysis is instructive because of its potentially persuasive influence on Irish law.
The most pertinent case is Rex v. Bourne.20 Dr. Aleck
Bourne, a respected obstetrician, performed an abortion on a
fourteen-year-old girl who had been violently raped. Dr. Bourne
stated that he felt he had a duty to perform the abortion after
deciding that continuance of the pregnancy would probably
cause her serious injury.21 Justice MacNaghten, in his instructions to the jury, stated that since sections 58 and 59 used the
word "unlawfully" in relation to procuring a miscarriage, it implied that procuring a miscarriage would not be "unlawful" in
certain circumstances. In defining these circumstances he borrowed language from the Infant Life (Preservation) Act of
15. P. JACKSON.
THEDEADLY
SOLUTION
TO AN IRISH
PROBLEM-BACKSTREET
ABORTION
2 (1983) (published by the Women's Right To Choose Campaign). Jackson suggested
that there have been 58 illegal abortion cases investigated or tried in Ireland between
1926 and 1974.
16. People v. Coleman, 1945 Ir. R. 237 (Crim. App. 1944) (the conviction was later
reversed on other grounds).
17. P. JACKSON,
supra note 15, at 4.
18. Id. at 5.
19. Binchy, Ethical Issues in Reproductive Medicine: A Legal Perspective, in ETHICAL ISSUESIN REPRODUCTIVE
MEDICINE
95, 102 (M. Reidy ed. 1982).
20. [I9391 1 K.B. 687.
21. Id. at 688.
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1929,22which provided that the killing of a child capable of being born alive was not an offense if the act was done "in good
faith for the purpose only of preserving the life of the mother."23
Though sections 58 and 59 of the Offences Against the Person
Act did not provide such an exception, Justice MacNaghten interpreted the Act as though it did. He added that this standard
ought to be given a reasonable interpretation:
[I]f the doctor is of opinion, on reasonable grounds and with
adequate knowledge, that the probable consequence of the continuance of the pregnancy will be to make the woman a physical or mental wreck, the jury are [sic] quite entitled to take the
view that the doctor who, under those circumstances and in
that honest belief, operates, is operating for the purpose of preserving the life of the mother.='

Based on this sweeping instruction, the jury acquitted Dr.
Bourne.26
The impact of Bourne on Irish law is unclear. It is not binding precedent and opinions vary about its persuasive value. William Binchy, a member of the Irish Law Reform Commission,
and an authority on Irish family law stated:
I t will be recalled that that decision [Bourne] held that necessity was a defence to a prosecution for abortion, and that an
abortion performed to save the life of the mother would thus
be permissible. It seems that this part of the judgment would
represent the law in this country. But where that judgment
went on to hold that an abortion would be lawful if designed to
save the mother from becoming a "physical or mental wreck",
this would surely not represent our law, since i t goes far beyond what the defence of necessity can e n c o m p a s ~ . ~ ~

On the other hand, Father Bernard Treacy, a staunch anti-abortion campaigner noted:
However, the judge did state that the words "for the purpose only of preserving the life of the mother" represented the
common law, and thus were implicit in the 1861 Act by virtue
of the word "unlawfully".
If these words do represent the pre-1861 common law, it
22. 19 & 20 Geo. 5, ch. 34, reprinted in 8 HALSBURY'S
STATUTES
OF ENGLAND
304 (A.
Yonge 3d ed. 1969).
23. Infant Life (Preservation) Act of 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, ch. 34, 5 l(1).
24. [I9391 1 K.B. at 694.
25. Id. at 696.
26. Binchy, supra note 19, at 103.
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could be argued that they thereby declare the position in Irish
law. If so, an Irish court could validly adopt the view that procuring a miscarriage would not be "unlawful" in regard to Section 58 of The Offences Against the Person Act if it were procured in good faith for the purpose only of preserving the life
of the mother. However, the doctrine in [sic] unclear; and,clarification would be welcome.27

However, it is clear that Bourne opened the door to the liberalization of abortion laws in England. In 1967, in response to
the
' English Parliathe thalidomide tragedy of the early 1 9 6 0 ~ , ~
ment, with the encouragement of the Abortion Law Reform Association, passed The Abortion Act.29The Act provided:
l(1) . . . [A] person shall not be guilty of an offence under the
law relating to abortion when a pregnancy is terminated
by a registered medical practitioner if two registered
medical practitioners are of the opinion, formed in good
faith(a) that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve
risk to the life of the pregnant woman, or of injury
to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman or any existing children of her family, greater
than if the pregnancy were terminated; or
(b) that there is a substantial risk that if the child were
born it would suffer from such physical or mental
abnormalities as to be seriously handi~apped.~'

The Abortion Act did not overrule sections 58 and 59 of the
Offences Against the Person Act; however, it significantly narrowed the definition of what an unlawful abortion entailed.31
Furthermore, although the Abortion Act, as an act of the British
Parliament, has no legally binding effect in Ireland, it has had a
significant impact in that an increasing number of Irish women
27. Treacy, The Constitution and Right to Life, in ABORTION
AND LAW74, 80 (A.
Flannery ed. 1983).
28. For a complete account of the Abortion Law Reform Association and the impact
of the thalidomide tragedy on the movement to reform abortion law in England, see K.
HINDELL
& M. SIMMS.
ABORTION
LAWREFORMED
108 (1971).
29. 1967, ch. 87.
30. Id. •˜ l(l)(a)-(b).
31. Effectively, abortion is now available on demand in England. Official statistics
indicate that in the last three months of 1983 there were 37,628 abortions performed.
OFFICE
OF POPULATION
CENSUSES
& SURVEYS,
OPCS MONITOR
(August 7, 1984).
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are now having safe, lawful, and relatively inexpensive abortions
in English clinics.32

A modern trend toward liberalization of abortion laws in
western democracieP caused conservative Irish lawyers and
doctors to be concerned that the Irish abortion laws might be
subject to change. Much of this concern was due to the fact that
the Irish Constitution provided no explicit protection for the unborn child. Article 40.3 provides:
(1)

(2)

The State guarantees in its laws to respect, and as far as
practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate the personal rights of the citizen.
The State shall, in particular, by its laws protect as best
it may from unjust attack and, in the case of injustice
done, vindicate the life, person, good name, and property
rights of every ~itizen.~'

However, these provisions only apply to "citizens." The constitution provides that citizenship is "determined in accordance
with law."s6 The law defining citizenship is contained in the
Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act and provides:
Every person born in Ireland is an Irish citizen from
birth.
(2) Every person is an Irish citizen if his father or mother
was an Irish citizen a t the time of that person's birth or
becomes an Irish citizen under subsection (1) or would be
an Irish c i t i z e n under that subsection if alive a t the passing of this
(1)

Although it is clear from this language that an unborn child is
not a citizen, the Irish Supreme Court in State (Nicolaou) u. An
Bord U ~ h t a l aleft
~ ~ open the possibility of affording constitutional protection for a noncitizen. Nicolaou, a British subject,
32. In 1968 fewer than 100 Irish women had abortions in English clinics, whereas by
the end of 1981, the number had risen to almost 4,000. MEDICO-SOCIAL
RESEARCH
BOARD,
TERMINATION
OF PREGNANCY,
ENGLAND
1983, WOMEN
FROMTHE REPUBLIC
OF IRELAND
9
(1984) (citing MEDICO-SOCIAL
RESEARCH
BOARD,
ANNUAL
REPORT
49 (1982)).
33. Abortion was legalized in England in 1967, the United States in 1973, France in
1975, Germany in 1976, Italy in 1978, and Holland in 1981. 340 DAILDEB.1585 (1983).
arts. 40.3.1 & 40.3.2.
34. IRISHCONST.
35. Id. art. 9.1.2.
36. PUB.GEN.ACTS,no. 26, 55 6(1) & (2) (1956).
37. 1966 1r. R. 567.
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sought a court order to prevent the adoption of his illegitimate
son. He claimed that the Adoption Act was unconstitutional because it violated his rights as a natural father. The court stated:
"This Court expressly reserves for another and more appropriate
case consideration of the effect of non-citzenship upon the interpretation of the Articles in question . . . ."38 Even if Article 40.3
were interpreted to apply to noncitizens, it would take quite a
liberal interpretation of the word "citizen" to encompass the unborn
The parameters of the constitutional rights of the unborn
became less clear following decisions of the Irish Supreme Court
that provided constitutional protection of individual personal
rights that were not explicitly granted in the constitution. This
trend began in 1963 with Ryan v. Attorney GeneraL40 Mrs.
Ryan sought to have the Health (Floridation of Water Supplies)
The supreme court afAct struck down as uncon~titutional.~~
firmed the high court's decision that, based on the facts, Mrs.
Ryan's suit could not succeed. However, the court confirmed
that the right to bodily integrity was included as part of the general constitutionally guaranteed personal rights.42 Quoting Justice Kenny of the high court, the supreme court held that "the
personal rights which may be invoked to invalidate legislation
are not confined to those specified in Article 40 but include all
38. Id. a t 645.
39. Heuston, Personal Rights under the Irish Constitution, 11 IRISHJURIST
205, 213
(1976), reprinted in 11 U. BRIT.COLUM.
L. REV.294, 304 (1977), stated in this regard:
The phrase "of the citizen" has given rise to difficulties here and elsewhere
throughout the fundamental rights Articles. At least two questions arise-first,
whether the constitutional guarantees extend to aliens and secondly, whether
they extend to artificial as distinct from natural persons. The Supreme Court
seems to be uncertain whether the constitutional guarantees protect aliens, although in one case on the matter (In Re Singer) [97 I.L.T.R. 130 (1960)l in
which the issue might have arisen, counsel for the State expressly disclaimed
any reliance on it. Clearly it would be very embarrassing for the Court, especially since the State has joined the European Economic Community, to be
obliged to hold that an alien was not entitled to the same degree of protection
as a citizen. On the other hand, simply as a matter of the interpretation of
words, it is very difficult to see how the word "citizen" can be held to mean
"any person whether a citizen or an alien."
40. 1965 Ir. R. 294.
41. The Health Act authorized the adding of flouride to public water in order to
protect against dental decay. Mrs. Ryan challenged the state action as an infringement
of (1) her parental rights to raise her children, and (2) her individual rights to personal
integrity. Id. a t 341.
42. Id. a t 295.
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those rights that flow from the Christian and democratic nature
of the State."43
The court soon recognized other personal
most notably the right of marital privacy recognized in the 1973
landmark decision of McGee u. Attorney General.45 In three
years Mrs. McGee bore four children, two of them twins. Mrs.
McGee had a long history of medical problems and each of her
pregnancies had been difficult; she nearly lost her life while
pregnant with her second child. Her doctor advised her that another pregnancy would endanger her life, so she was fitted with a
diaphragm to be used with an intrauterine contraceptive jelly.46
She brought this action after a supply of contraceptive jelly she
was attempting to import from England was seized by customs
officials pursuant to the Criminal Law Amendment Act.47
Strangely, the Act prohibited the importation and sale of contraceptives, but not their use.48 By a four-to-one majority, the
supreme court held that the importation restriction was a violation of the right to marital privacy provided by articles 40.3.1
and 41.1 of the Irish C o n s t i t u t i ~ n . ~ ~
Those opposed to abortion were not so much concerned by
the narrow holding of McGee as they were by the cases the court
cited as support for the decision. The court relied extensively on
two United States Supreme Court decisions, Griswold u. ConnecticutS0 and Eisenstadt u. B ~ i r d . ~Inl Griswold, the United
States Supreme Court held that the right of married persons to
use contraceptives was part of the constitutionally protected
Eisenstadt extended that right to the
right of marital
43. Id. a t 312.
44. See State (Healy) v. Donoghue, 1976 Ir. R. 325 (the right to justice and fair
procedure); Murtagh Properties v. Cleary, 1972 Ir. R. 330 (the right to work & earn a
livelihood); I n re Haughey, 1971 Ir. R. 217 (the right to defend one's name).
45. 1974 Ir. R. 284.
46. Id.
47. PUB.GEN.ACTS,no. 6 (1935).
48. Id. $ 17(1) provides, "It shall not be lawful for any person to sell, or expose,
offer, advertise, or keep for sale or to import or attempt to import into Saorstat Eireann
for sale, any contraceptive."
49. 1974 Ir. R. at 284-85. IRISHCONST.art. 40.3.1 states, "The State guarantees in its
laws to respect, and as far as practicable, by its law to defend and vindicate the personal
rights of the citizen." Article 41.1.1 states, "The state recognizes the family as the natural, primary and fundamental unit group of Society, and as a moral institution possessing inalienable and imprescriptible rights, antecedent and superior to all positive law."
50. 381 US. 479 (1965).
51. 405 US. 438 (1972).
52. 381 US. a t 484-86.
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unmarried,53and was the stepping-stone from Griswold to one of
the major United States abortion decisions, Roe v. Wade.54 In
Roe, the United States Supreme Court held that the word "person", as used in the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, did not include the unborn child.55 The United
States Supreme Court also held that the constitutionally protected right to privacy was "broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her p r e g n a n ~ y . " ~ ~
The American cases disturbed conservative Irish lawyers67
and doctors because of the similarity of the equal protection
clauses of the United States and Irish constitution^.^^ It was
feared that McGee would lead to the liberalization of abortion
laws in Ireland, particularly since the Irish Supreme Court looks
upon the decisions of the United States Supreme Court with the
greatest of respect.69
It is questionable whether these concerns were justified.
Justice Walsh, speaking for the court in McGee, addressed the
abortion issue in somewhat veiled terms: "[Alny action on the
53. 405 U.S. a t 453-54.
54. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). For an interesting look a t how Justice Brennan prompted
Justice Blackmun with a reference to Eisenstadt to assist him in bridging the gap from
& S. ARMSTRONG.
THEBRETHREN
175-76 (1979).
Griswold to Roe see B. WOODWARD
55. 410 U.S. a t 157.
56. Id. a t 153.
57. THEIRISHASSOCIATION
OF LAWYERS
FOR THE DEFENCE
OF THE UNBORN.
NEWSLETTER 2 (1983) stated, "The great abortion debate in America grew around the word 'person' and whether or not the word 'person' extended to include the unborn child. The
similarity to our own situtation is disturbing."
58. IRISHCONST.art. 40.1 provides, "All citizens shall, as human persons, be held
before the law. This shall not be held to mean that the state shall not in its enactments
have due regard to differences of capacity, physical and moral, and of social function."
59. In O'Brien v. Stoutt, No. 326413 (High Ct. May 5, 1982), Justice D'Arcy said that
"decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States will always be received by this
Court with the greatest of respect." See Binchy, The Need for a Constitutional Amend& LAW116, 121, n.16 (A. Flannery ed. 1983); see also State (Quinn) v.
ment, in ABORTION
Ryan, 1965 Ir. R. 70. Justice Walsh stated:
I reject the submission that because upon the foundation of the State our
Courts took over an English legal system and the common law that the Courts
must be deemed to have adopted and should now adopt an approach to Constitutional questions conditioned by English judicial methods and English legal
training which despite their undoubted excellence were not fashioned for interpreting written constitutions or reviewing the constitutionality of legislation.
In this state one would have expected that if the approach of any Court of final
appeal of another State was to have been held up as an example for this Court
to follow it would more appropriately have been the Supreme Court of the
United States rather than the House of Lords.
Id. a t 126.
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part of either husband and wife or of the State to limit family
sizes by endangering or destroying human life must necessarily
not only be an offence against the common good but also against
the guaranteed personal rights of that human life in q u e s t i ~ n . " ~ ~
McGee was decided eleven months after Roe, and Justice Walsh,
presumably aware of this major decisionY6'appeared to stress
that McGee was a narrow decision that selectively recognized
the right of married couples to use contraceptives and it was not
to be interpreted as anything more. Six years later, Justice
Walsh was even more explicit in G. u. An Bord U c h t a l ~ : ~ ~
[A child] has the right to life itself and the right to be guarded
against all threats directed to its existence whether before or
after birth. . . . The right to life necessarily implies the right to
be born, the right to preserve and defend (and to have preserved and defended) that life . . . .63

Despite these dicta the potential effect of McGee on Irish
abortion law remains open to debate.64Professor James Casey of
University College Dublin Law School stated, "Those who argue
that since the matrimonial privacy of Griswold u. Connecticut
60. 1974 Ir. R. a t 312.
61. Surprisingly, one leading commentator has suggested that the Irish Supreme
Court was unaware of the Roe decision. W. Binchy, Sexual Behavior and the Law in
Ireland 22 n.70 (1978) (unpublished manuscript). This seems inconsistent with the publicity surrounding Roe and the deference given by the Irish Supreme Court to United
States Supreme Court decisions. See supra note 59.
62. 1980 Ir. R. 32.
63. Id. a t 69.
64. Proponents of the prolife amendment have rejected the persuasive value of these
dicta:
Whilst these views expressed by the learned judge are encouraging they do not
in themselves, of course, afford any adequate legal Constitutional protection
for the unborn. The other judges in these decisions made it clear that they
were not expressing any view on this issue. Obiter dicta bind no judge in any
subsequent decision, not even the judge who made them originally. Mr. Justice
Walsh would be the first to acknowledge that his view could not bind the
Court in a future decision: as he pointed out in McGee's case, constitutional
interpretation is not rooted in the past but is a continuous process through
time.
THEIRISHASSOCIATION
OF LAWYERS
FOR THE DEFENCE
OF THE UNBORN,
NEWSLETTER
2
(1983). Professor Kelly, a constitutional law professor and member of the Irish Parliament, thinks otherwise.
Obiter dicta in cases of this importance are not lightly uttered, they are regarded as the next best thing to a binding authority and are freely cited in
court by counsel. They are treated for all practical purposes as though they
were authority, even though they do not have a status in the ordinary
heirarchy of binding precedent that we respect here.
339 DAILDEB.1399 (1983).
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led to the proabortion decision in Roe u. Wade, the same must
follow here from McGee u. A.G. are guilty of an absurdly
mechanical view of the judicial process."6s Professor James
O'Reilly, another professor of law at University College Dublin
Law School, was even more assertive in declaring, "One wonders
if the commentators who regard the finding of a right to abortion lurking behind McGee have actually read that decision and
noticed not only the small print but the implications of the
small print."" Referring to such people as "prophets of doom,"
he concluded, "Any commentator who seriously suggests that
one can expect the Irish Supreme Court to arrive at a situation
similar to Roe u. Wade or Doe u. Bolton simply has not read the
Irish Constitution, the judgment in McGee, nor understands all
the issues involved."67
Professor Binchy, a key figure in the movement for a prolife
amendment, saw it otherwise:
In my view, these commentators are guilty of too much vigour
in ridiculing the possible developments in this country. No one
seriously suggests that our Supreme Court would tomorrow
recognise a constitutional right to abortion. Equally clearly,
however, attitudes among the judiciary towards abortion may
change in the coming years. If this happens, the introduction
by McGee of the privacy concept into our jurisprudence may
well serve to assist the constitutional case for abortion. Without such a concept, the constitutional argument in favour of
abortion would be that much more difficult to e~tablish.~'

Additionally, there were concerns among staunch anti-abortionists that Ireland, as a signator and contracting party to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, might be obligated to modify its laws in relation to
abortion. This could happen if article two of the Convention,
which states that "[e]veryone's right to life shall be protected by
law,"6s were interpreted by the European Commission on
Human Rights as giving women a limited right to abortion.
65. Casey, The Development of Constitutional Law Under Chief Justice O'Dalaigh,
1978 DUBLIN
U.L.J. 3, 10.
8, 17 (1977).
66. O'Reilly, Marital Privacy & Family Law, 65 STUDIES
67. Id. at 22.
68. Binchy, supra note 19, at 104.
69. CONVENTION
FOR THE PROTECTION
OF HUMAN
RIGHTSAND PERSONAL
FREEDOMS,
art. 2(1) [hereinafter cited as CONVENTION],
reprinted in J. FAWCETT.
THEAPPLICATION
OF
THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION
ON HUMAN
RIGHTS29 (1969).
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Prolife supporters argued that Ireland would be required to
comply with such a finding, since article 53 of the Convention
provides, "The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by
the decision of the Court in any case to which they are
parties."'O
Fears that abortion might be legalized in Ireland were also
increased by statistics showing an increase in the number of
Irish women having abortions in England from 64 in 1968 to
more than 3,600 in 1981.'l Such figures lent credibility to fears
that Irish legislators might be more willing to adopt some form
of abortion legislation, particularly in light of references to therapeutic abortion made previously in Irish parliamentary
debates.'*
Proposals (1) to extend jurisdiction to allow criminal prosecution of Irish women who had abortions abroad, (2) to enjoin
women from leaving Ireland for abortions, and (3) to criminally
prosecute abortion referral agencies were dismissed as either unmanageable or ~ndesireable.'~Conservative lawyers considered
an amendment to the constitution as more effective in preserving the existing laws against ab~rtion.'~They argued that an
amendment would have the double effect of prohibiting the Oireachtas from introducing abortion legislation, while at the same
time preventing the Irish Supreme Court from holding that sections 58 and 59 of the Offences Against the Person Act were
unc~nstitutional.'~

In light of these developments, on April 27, 1981 "a group of
organisations acting with the full support of the Professors of
Obstetrics and Gynaecology in the Irish Univer~ities"'~launched
70. CONVENTION,
supra note 69, art. 53, reprinted in J. FAWCET~,
supra note 69, at
337.
NOW 69
71. O'Leary, The Management of Problem Pregnancies, in ABORTION
(1983). These figures only represent the number of Irish women having abortions at English clinics who used their Irish addresses.
72. See SEN.DEB.560-62 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1973). 354-56 (daily ed. Feb. 21, 1974).
73. Binchy, supra note 19, at 106-08; see generally Findlay, Criminal Liability for
Complicity in Abortions Committed Outside Ireland, 15 IRISHJURIST88 (1980).
74. Binchy, supra note 19, at 108.
75. THE IRISHASSOCIATION
OF LAWYERS
FOR THE DEFENCE
OF THE UNBORN,
THE
ABORTION
REFERENDUM
2 (1983).
76. SEN.DEB.554-55 (daily ed. May 4, 1983) (citing a news release entitled Campaign for Pro-Life Amendment to the Constitution, Apr. 27, 1981).
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the campaign for a constitutional amendment to protect the life
of the unborn. Under the Irish Constitution, an amendment
must be initiated as a bill in the Dail (house of representatives),
passed by both Houses of the Oireachtas, and submitted by referendum to the people.77 The amendment is considered approved if it receives a majority of the votes in the referend~m.'~
Because of these constitutional requirements, the Pro-life
Amendment Campaign (PLAC) sought the support of the leading political parties for an amendment to the constitution that
would provide for an "absolute right to life."79
The campaign was timed perfectly because a general election was called within six weeks of its inception. Opposition to
the amendment by any political party might have been interpreted by the electorate as a proabortion stance-a position no
party could afford in a country that is ninety-five percent Catholi~.~O
Three weeks after the campaign had been launched, the
Fianna Fail Government and the opposition Fine Gael Party
publicly stated that they were totally and unalterably opposed
to abortion and promised to introduce an amendment to the
c o n s t i t u t i ~ n The
. ~ ~ other major party, Labour, stated that it was
"unequivocally opposed to abortion and would give serious consideration" to the idea of an amendment.82
The Fine Gael Party achieved a narrow victory in the June
77. IRISHCONST.art. 46.2.
78. Id. art. 47.1.
79. SEN.DEB.555 (daily ed. May 4, 1983) (citing a news release entitled Campaign
for Pro-Life Amendment to the Constitution, Apr. 27, 1981). The statement provided:
While the precise wording of the actual amendment will be a matter for
others, in accordance with legal advice available to us it is proposed that it be
along the following lines:
"The State recognises the absolute right to life of every unborn child from
conception, and accordingly guarantees to respect and protect such rights by
law."
80. W. Binchy, supra note 61, a t 1 n.2.
81. The official Fianna Fail statement read:
The Government are [sic] totally opposed to abortion, and an appropriate constitutional amendment to give effect to the position will be brought forward as
soon as circumstances permit. The Government will also continue to take the
necessary steps to prevent abortion referral and seek to alleviate the causes
which may lead to abortion.
Pro-Life Amendment Campaign, Information Sheet No. 2 (June 1981). The Fine Gael
Party statement stated, "Fine Gael is unalterably opposed to the legalisation of abortion
and in Government will initiate a referendum to guarantee the right to life of the unborn
child. Fine Gael recognises that a pro-life policy places an obligation upon us to support
the single mother." Id.
82. Id.
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election. Once in power the new Taoiseach (prime minister),
Garret FitzGerald, confirmed his party's preelection commitment to the amendment,s3 but lacked the time to act because a
second general election restored power to the Fianna Fail party
in March 1982.s4 In November of the same year, the third general election in eighteen months was called.s5 The narrowly
elected governments and the successive election campaigns enabled the organizers of PLAC to exert pressure on deputies
(members of parliament) and aspiring deputies to support a constitutional amendment.
On November 2, 1982, during its final days in power, Fianna
Fail introduced a bills6 that proposed what eventually became
the wording of the amendment. It provided, "The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard
to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to
respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right."87
Within days, the Fine Gael Party issued a statement supporting the wording of the amendment,ss and FitzGerald stated
that the wording was "about as good a formula as you could
get."8B He later regretted this statement.
The third general election also failed to produce a clear winner. This caused Fine Gael and Labour to form a coalition government that continues in power today.B0By this time, liberal
members of Fine Gael and Labour were beginning to be concerned about the wording of the abortion referendum. It was
83. The Prime Minister stated: "The Government is unalterably opposed to the
legalisation of abortion and is committed to taking whatever steps are necessary to ensure that an appropriate amendment is brought forward. The Attorney General is now
examining the form such an amendment might take." Letter from Garret FitzGerald to
Dr. Julia Vaughan (Aug. 5, 1981), reprinted in SEN.DEB.557 (daily ed. May 4,1983) (Dr.
Julia Vaughan was chairman of PLAC).
84. N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1982, a t 3, col. 4.
85. Under the Irish system of government, a general election is called if the National
Parliament, by a simple majority, gives a vote of "no confidence" in the government.
86. Eighth Amendment to the Constitution Bill (1982).
87. Eighth Amendment of the Constitution Act, 1983, pt. 11.
88. 339 DAILDEB. 1374 (1983) (quoting a statement issued by Fine Gael Party on
Wednesday, Nov. 3, 1982). The statement declared, "The Fine Gael Party welcomes the
form of the Amendment to the Constitution proposed by the Government. The Amendment as proposed is worded in positive terms, designed to strengthen the Constitutional
protection of life, as proposed by the leader of Fine Gael . . . ."
89. SEN.DEB. 860 (daily ed. May 11, 1983) (quoting from a transcript of "Today
Tonight," Radio Telefis Eireann [Irish National Television], November 4, 1982).
90. N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1982, a t 14, col. 3.
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feared that the amendment might provide for an absolute, unequivocal right to life. There was also discomfort a t the growing
criticisms from protestant churches about the matter and apprehension that the amendment would not fit into the Prime Minister's plans for a pluralist, secular state.s1 As a result, the coalition government refused to support the amendment as it was
worded, arguing that it was sectarian and ambiguou~.'~This
spawned a national controversy described by one commentator
as "our moral civil war."s3
A major division soon emerged. The prolife groups consisted
of conservative members of the legal and medical profession.
Such groups were strongly supported by the Fianna Fail Party
and the Catholic
The anti-amendment groups were a
loose coalition of proclioice groups-feminists, trade unions, and
liberal politicians-and
somewhat more conservative groups
made up of politicians, concerned members of the legal and
medical professions, and most of the protestant churches and la91. Uniting the Catholic Right, in "THE ABORTION
REFERENDUM"-THECASE
AGAINST
13, 23 (M.Arnold & P. Kirby eds. 1983).
92. See 339 DAILDEB.1353-68 (1983).
Sept. 3, 1984, a t 39, 40 (quoting an
93. Rights for the Unborn, THE ECONOMIST,
editorial in The Irish Press, Aug. 29, 1983).
94. The Catholic Church enthusiastically encouraged its members to vote for the
amendment. In a letter read to all Catholic congregations in the Dublin diocese on Sunday, Apr. 10, 1983, Archbishop Ryan stated:
Attempts have been made to raise issues which have little or nothing to do
with the central point. Sectarianism has been mentioned, as if it were a question of deciding between the views of various churches. It is not. The question
is whether the people of Ireland want, or do not want, to give to the unborn
child a greater legal protection than it has a t present. This is not in any sense a
"Church" matter. It is rather a matter of the basic human right to life. It can
hardly be called "sectarian" to say that this right to life belongs to all, not just
to some.
Letter from Archbishop Ryan to all Catholic congregations in the Dublin diocese (Apr. 4,
1983).
A statement from the Irish Episcopal conference concluded: "A decisive 'Yes' to the
Amendment will, we believe, in the words of Pope John Paul I1 in Limerick, constitute a
'witness before Europe and before the whole world to the dignity and sacredness of all
human life, from conception until death.' " The Amendment-A Statement from the
Irish Episcopal Conference, (Veritas Publications Aug. 22, 1983).
Finally, a statement by the Archbishop of Dublin, Dr. Ryan, read a t all Catholic
churches three days before the national referendum concluded:
Over the last few weeks many people have been asking me for guidance. My
advice to them, and to all of you, is that a "Yes" vote on Wednesday will protect the right to life of the unborn child; it will not create a threat to expectant
mothers; it will block any attempt to legalise abortion in this country.
Letter from Archbishop Ryan to all Catholic congregations in the Dublin diocese (Sept.
1, 1983).
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ity, who, although opposed to the introduction of abortion legislation, either opposed the need for an amendment or objected to
its sectarian nature."
Allegations of sectarianism resulted from the similarities in
the proposed amendment to the Catholic doctrine of "double effect." This doctrine, which permits an operation to remove a woman's cancerous womb with the resultant inevitable death of the
fetus, is based on the rationale that the primary intention-the
removal of a diseased organ-justifies the secondary effect-the
death of the fetus.96 Right wing prolife supporters argued that
such actions are not abortions but are merely unfortunate consequences that result from such operations. Dr. Julia Vaughan,
Chairman of the Pro-Life Amendment Campaign explained:
Doctors who participate in these procedures are not performing
abortions. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that they are
not abortions in either medical or legal terms. In each case, the
removal of a pathological organ is carried out to save women's
life, not in order to kill the fetus. The pregnancy is not directly
attacked, even though its loss may be the inevitable consequence of treatment which has as its objective the "good" of
saving the life of the mother."

Prolife supporters argued that the rights of the unborn were absolute and unequivocal, and that no exceptions existed to a general prohibition on abortion.98 Protestants and prochoice supporters considered this a flagrant attempt by right wing prolife
supporters who, while claiming to be nonsectarian, were attempting to have the permissible parameters of Irish abortion
law defined in a very Roman Catholic way."
In contrast, Fine Gael's opposition was directed toward the
wording of the amendment. The Director of Public Prosecutions
and the Attorney General issued statements that mirrored these
concerns. The Director of Public Prosecution stated that while
he would have no difficulty prosecuting an unlawful abortion
under the 1861 Offences Against the Person Act, he would expe95. For a sizeable but not exhaustive list of statements, see Protestant Churches'
Statements, in "THE ABORTION
REFERENDUM"-THE
CASEAGAINST
61-65 (M. Arnold &
P. Kirby eds. 1983).
96. Uniting the Catholic Right, supra note 91.
97. J. Vaughan, Pro-Life Amendment Campaign-A Response to Prof. O'Mahony
(May 19, 1982).
REFERENDUM"-THECASE
98. O'Mahony, A Catholic View, in "THE ABORTION
AGAINST
35, 37 (M. Arnold & P. Kirby eds. 1983).
99. Id.
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rience "grave difficulty" in maintaining prosecutions in many
cases if the amendment passed.loO T h e Attorney General attacked the wording of the amendment.
[The] wording is ambiguous and unsatisfactory. It will lead inevitably to confusion and uncertainty, not merely amongst the
medical profession, to whom it has of course particular relevance, but also amongst lawyers and more specifically the
judges who will have to interpret it. Far from providing the
protection and certainty which is sought by many of those who
have advocated its adoption, it will have a contrary effect.
In particular it is not clear as to what life is being protected; as to whether "the unborn" is protected from the moment of fertilisation or alternatively is left unprotected until
an independently viable human being exists at 25 to 28 weeks.
Further, having regard to the equal rights of the unborn
and the mother, a doctor faced with the dilemma of saving the
life of the mother, knowing that to do so will terminate the life
of "the unborn," will be compelled by the wording to conclude
that he can do nothing. Whatever his intentions, he will have
to show equal regard for both lives, and his predominent intent
will not be a factor.
In those circumstances I cannot approve of the wording
proposed.'O1
Fianna Fail, the party that proposed the wording of the
amendment, and the members of PLAC maintained that the
wording was adequate to protect the rights of the unborn. They
argued t h a t there was no justification for the "needless anxiety"
t h a t had been generated concerning the consequences of the
amendment's adoption.lo2 T h e Irish Association of Lawyers for
the Defence of the Unborn stated bluntly, "We unequivocally
maintain that there is nothing in the original wording which
would oblige a n Irish Court t o make such a grotesque decision a s
that suggested by Mr. Sutherland [Attorney General]."lo3
On April 27, 1983, in response t o these concerns, Fine Gael
introduced a more simply worded version of the amendment
which stated, "Nothing in this Constitution shall be invoked to
invalidate, or to deprive of force or effect any provision of a law
100. 340 DAILDEB.474 (1983) (statement of the Director of Public Prosecutions).
101. SEN.DEB.520 (daily ed. May 4, 1983) (statement of Attorney General, Mr. Peter D. Sutherland, S.C., quoted from The Irish Times, Feb. 16, 1983).
102. SEN DEB 1265 (daily ed. May 26, 1983).
103. Id. (quoting statement of The Irish Association of Lawyers for the Defence of
the Unborn).
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on the ground that it prohibits abortion."lo4 Fine Gael argued
that this wording avoided the multiple interpretations of the Fianna Fail amendment and made it easier for the public to understand. At the same time, the proposal fulfilled Fine Gael's
commitment to introduce an amendment to the constitution
that would prohibit the introduction of abortion in Ireland.lo5
However, the wording proposed by Fine Gael proved unacceptable because it did not preclude future legislative repeal of the
1861 Act and provision for some form of legalized abortion. As a
result, the Fine Gael proposal was soundly defeated.lo6
Several other proposals to clarify the wording of the original
amendment were also presented in the Dail. These included: (I)
a proposal to delete the word "unborn" and substitute "unborn
human being,"lo7 (2) a proposal to delete "with due regard to the
equal right to life of the mother7' and substitute "subject to the
right of the mother to life and bodily integrity,"lo8 and (3) a proposal to insert after "practicable" the words "without interference with any existing right or lawful opportunity of any citizen."lo9 Each proposal was soundly defeated.l1•‹ Similar
proposals were made in the Senate (1)to modify the wording of
the amendment by inserting "which shall not include the fertilised ovum prior to the time a t which such fertilised ovum becomes implanted in the wall of the uterus" after the word "unborn"ll' and (2) to delete the word "equal" and substitute the
word "prior."l12 Each of these proposals was also defeated.
The amendment, as originally worded by Fianna Fail,
passed overwhelmingly in the Dail,l13 with Fine Gael abstaining
from the vote and Labour voting against it. Thereafter, Garret
FitzGerald, the Taoiseach, issued a statement expressing his regret that he had supported the idea of an amendment. FitzGerald asked the people to vote against the amendment because it
104. 341 DAILDEB.2001 (1983).
105. SEN.DEB 935 (daily ed. May 18, 1983).
106. 341 DAILDEB.2225-30 (1983).
107. Id. at 2229.
108. Id. at 2230.
109. Id. a t 2231.
110. Id. at 2233-38.
111. SEN.DEB 1092 (daily ed. May 25, 1983). The proposal was defeated by a vote of
18 to 10. Id. at 1149-50.
1.12. Id. at 1154. The proposal was defeated by a vote of 15 to 8, SEN.DEB.1281-82
(daily ed. May 26, 1983).
2235-38 (1983).
113. 341 DAILDEB.
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was "ambiguous and unclear"'14 and could lead to the death of
women "whose lives are now saved in all hospitals in accordance
with universal medical practi~e.""~Despite FitzGerald7splea, on
September 7, 1983, in one of the smallest voter turnouts in Irish
history, the electorate voted by a two-to-one majority to include
the amendment in the Irish Constit~tion."~
IV.

IMPLICATIONS
OF THE AMENDMENT

The eighth amendment to the Irish Constitution grew out of
the desire of prolife groups and concerned citizens to further
protect the rights of the unborn. The challenge faced by the
drafters was to produce an amendment that would legally protect the rights of the unborn, while at the same time not create
an absolute right that would supersede the already guaranteed
personal rights of the citizen."'
Despite the powerful endorsement the amendment received
at the polls, it poses several problems. The most serious challenge is likely to be directed at thelanguage of the amendment
itself. The amendment guarantees the "right to life of the unborn" but fails to indicate at what point that "unborn" life begins. Admittedly, this is not an easy question, but it is a fundamental question that must be answered. The United States
Supreme Court in Roe v. Wadells noted that due to the "wide
divergence of thinking" among philosophers, theologians and
physicians, it could not resolve the "difficult question of when
life begins."l19 Yet, the United States Supreme Court's failure to
resolve the question combined with their refusal to protect the
fetus until the time of viability (24-28 weeks) practically resulted in recognition that life does not exist prior to that time.
114. Keenan, A Verbal War of Morality, MACLEAN'S,
Sept. 19, 1983, a t 53.
115. Kirby, A Pyrrhic Victory-Disarray Over Abortion, COMMONWEAL,
Oct. 7, 1983,
a t 519, col. 1. As a result of this statement, the anti-amendment groups adopted the
slogan, "This amendment could kill women."
116. Id. a t 518. The turnout a t the polls was only 5470, extremely low compared to
the 70% plus that usually turn out to vote in Ireland. This may be a reflection of the
difficulty people had in deciding which way to vote. Significant, too, is that in Dublin the
vote was split almost evenly, with 48% for the amendment and 51% against, indicating
that the rural vote was mainly responsible for the passage of the amendment by the 2-1
margin.
AND LAW40,
117. O'Mahony, Medical Ethics in the Pluralistic State, in ABORTION
46 (A. Flannery ed. 1983).
118. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
119. Id. a t 159-60.
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This avoidance of the question of when life begins has been
sharply criticized by one Irish commentator:
This failure of either English or American law to resolve the
basic question of the humanity of the unborn child must be
criticised, whatever the true motives of the courts or legislature
may be. If, on the one hand, there is a genuine reluctance to
determine the issue, this may be criticised on the basis that the
question is so fundamental that it requires to be resolved
before any other subsidiary issues are determined. Moreover, a
Court which is too timid to resolve such a basic moral issue
could scarcely feel itself competent to determine other equally
important moral questions in the legal forum.
If, on the other hand, the apparent failure to determine
the issue amounts in reality to a decision that the unborn child
is not a human being, then the courts and legislature should
have the courage to say so clearly and be judged accordingly.
From the standpoint of the child, the failure to resolve the issue of his humanity amounts in result to a finding that he is
not a human being.lZ0
This criticism is particularly applicable t o the Irish legisla;ure because i t holds the exclusive constitutional power to make
laws for the state.121 This makes legislators responsible for vigorously debating the issues, considering all possible ramifications,
and coming up with the clearest language possible before
presenting to the people a proposed amendment of the constitution. This does not require legislators to determine the exact
moment when human life begins for all purposes. However, it
does require the election of a specific cognizable time a t which
the law is prepared t o protect the unborn's right to life.
T h e amendment's failure to define when the unborn is constitutionally protected means the judiciary will eventually have
t o formulate the definition; the very result the prolife campaigners sought t o avoid.122This has caused uncertainty about the effect of the amendment. T h e Attorney General has stated:
In the event that the Supreme Court is called upon to construe the proposal, it could come to a number of different conclusions as to the definition of the class which is afforded pro120. Binchy, supra note 19, a t 99 (emphasis in original).
121. IRISHCONST.art. 15.2.1 provides that "[tlhe sole and exclusive power of making
laws for the State is hereby vested in the Oireachtas: no other legislative authority has
power to make laws for the State."
122. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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tection. Undoubtedly a view which might commend itself to
the court is that all human beings fall within the ambit of the
amendment, and that a human being comes into existence
when the process of fertilisation is complete.
If, as would appear to be the case, it is correct to state that
certain contraceptives can operate after fertilisation, then these
would be abortifacient if human life commences on conception.
Thus the importation, dissemination and use of such contraceptives would be prohibited, and as an example, the use of the
"morning-after" pill in the treatment of rape victims will not
be permissable, nor will the use of such contraceptives in certain conditions of the health of a woman-e.g. valvular heart
disease or diabetes.

....
However, the point of time for which the most compelling
legal argument could be made, other than the time of fertilisation, as being the moment of commencement of protection,
could be said to be the time when the foetus becomes independently viable. I understand that this is probably at some time
between 25 and 28 weeks of pregnancy.
Such a construction could be supported by an argument
that "unborn" could be regarded as being applicable only to
something capable of being born. The word "unborn" used as a
noun must, as a matter of language, mean "unborn person",
"unborn child" or "unborn human being". It could be argued
that neither a fertilised ovum, a fertilised and implanted ovum,
an embryo or even a foetus prior to the time when it is independently viable, would come within this definition.
The consequences of such a finding could be that there
would be no constitutional prohibition on abortion prior to this
stage of pregnancy.lZ3

It is possible that a future Irish Supreme Court may choose
to interpret the amendment in a liberal manner, particularly if
Irish public opinion moves toward acceptance of some form of
abortion. This could place Ireland in a situation similar to that
of the United States where the generally proabortion courts
have thus far succeeded in liberalizing abortion legislation despite the contrary views of generally prolife legislatures. In reality, this is not likely to occur because of past developments in
123. SEN DEB 524-26 (daily ed May 4, 1983) (statement of Attorney General, Mr
Peter D. Sutherland, S.C., quoted from The Irish Times, Feb. 16, 1983)
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Irish family law and the happenings accompanying the movement to amend the constitution.
The justices cannot avoid being influenced by the strong
public stance against the introduction of abortion legislation in
Ireland. Even prior to passage of the amendment, the Irish Supreme Court intimated that the right to life of the unborn would
~~
dicta,12&these statements have not
be ~ r 0 t e c t e d . lAlthough
been challenged and cannot go unnoticed. Admittedly, the Irish
Supreme Court looks upon decisions of the United States Supreme Court with great respect,12'jand has even made extensive
use of American decisions in formulating the concept of marital
privacy in McGee.12' However, it does not necessarily follow that
the Irish Supreme Court will track the judicial trend developed
in the United States in relation to abortion. Past experience indicates the opposite may be true. In the decade since Roe, the
United States has become more liberal,lZ8while Ireland has become more conservative.
At most, the impact of McGee is limited to the 1979 passage
of the Health (Family Planning) Act,129which permits limited
access to contraceptives. In drafting the Health Act, the Irish
legislature clearly stated the Act was not to be used as a stepping-stone to some form of abortion legislation. Section 10 provides: "Nothing in this Act shall be construed as authorizing . . .
the procuring of abortion . . . ."130 The act is so restrictive toward abortion that it provides that the Censorship Board may
ban a book that "advocates or might reasonably be supposed to
advocate the procurement of abortion or miscarriage or any
124. See supra notes 60 & 63 and accompanying text.
125 See supra note 64.
126 See supra note 59.
127 See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
128 See City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 103 S. Ct. 2481
(1983) (an abortion performed after the first trimester need not be performed in a hospltal, state may not Impose a blanket provlslon requiring parental consent for an abortion
for an unmarried minor; state cannot require instructions by attending physician as to
fetal development and alternatives to abortion); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1978)
(struck down a statute that requ~redpostviability abort~onst o be by such method as to
give the fetus the best opportunity of surviving); Planned Parenthood v Danforth, 428
U S. 52 (1976) (a woman's decision to have an abortion cannot be made subject to parental or spousal consent).
129. PUB GEN ACTS,no. 20 (1979).
130. Id •˜ 10(a).
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method, treatment or appliance to be used for the purpose of
such pr~curement."'~~
Other operative acts also suggest that the unborn child is a
persona judicata. Section 58 of the Civil Liability
provides for recovery, by a child, of damages for injuries caused
before birth: "For the avoidance of doubt it is hereby declared
that the law relating to wrongs shall apply to an unborn child
for his protection in like manner as if the child were born, provided the child is subsequently born alive."133 Similarly, the
Succession
gives inheritance rights to a child en ventre sa
mere who is not illegitimate, provided the child is subsequently
born a 1 i ~ e . l ~ ~
More significantly, the parliamentary debates during the
campaign to amend the constitution were devoid of any suggestion that abortion in any form ought to be legalized. Each of the
major parliamentary parties also publicly stated that they opposed ab0rti0n.l~~
Similarly, nearly all of the churches that released statements indicated their opposition to the introduction
of abortion legislation, and their support of the right to life of
the unborn.13' Moreover, the Irish people approved the amendment by a two-to-one margin.138Indeed, just four months before
the amendment inevitably passed,138the Irish Supreme Court, in
Norris u. Attorney General,140 a case concerning the constitutionality of legislation against homosexuality, commented on the
abortion issue. Speaking for the court, Chief Justice O'Higgins
stated:
A right to privacy or, as it has been put, a right "to be let
alone," can never be absolute. There are many acts done in priI d •˜ 12(1).
PUB GEN ACTS,no. 41, •˜ 58 (1961).
Id.
PUB GEN ACTS,no. 27 (1965).
I d •˜ 3(2).
See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 94-95.
See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
The Women's Right to Choose Campaign, in a recent discuss~onof their admendment campaign, admitted, "The function of our organization was to present a rlght
to choose argument against the amendment's provisions. We were in existence as a point
of principle-we had no illusions about the likely effectiveness of our propaganda."
Fighting for Control-The Ongozng Struggle for Reproductive Rights 7, 16, in THEIRISH
FEMINIST
REVIEW(Womens Community Press 1984).
140. W BINCHY,
A CASEBOOK
ON IRISHFAMILY
LAW(1984) (Ir Sup Ct., Apr. 22,
1983, as yet unreported in Ir. R.).
-

-
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vate which the State is entitled to condemn, whether such be
done by an individual on his own or with another. The law has
always condemned abortion, incest, suicide attempts, suicide
pacts, euthanasia or ,mercy killing. These are prohibited simply
because they are morally wrong and regardless of the fact,
which may exist in some instances, that no harm or injury to
others is involved.'"'

Justice McCarthy was even more effusive. In a dissenting opinion, he stated:
I cannot delimit the area in which the State may constitutionally intervene so as to restrict the right to privacy, nor can
I overlook the present public debate concerning the criminal
law, arising from the statute of 1861, as to abortion-the killing of an unborn child. I t is not an issue that arises in the instant case, but it may be claimed that the right of privacy of a
pregnant woman would extend to a right in her to terminate
pregnancy, an act which would involve depriving the unborn
child of the most fundamental right of all-the right to life
itself.'"*

He then suggested that the right to life of the unborn was protected by the preamble to the constitution that acknowledges
Jesus Christ and the principles of Chri~tianity."~He concluded:
For myself, I am content to say that the provisions of the
Preamble which I have quoted earlier in this judgment would
appear to lean heavily against any view other than that the
right to life of the unborn is a sacred trust to which all organs
of government must lend their support.14"

Against this background, it is unlikely that any member of the
141. Id. a t 379.
142. Id. a t 387.
143. IRISHCONST.preamble. It states:

In the name of the Most Holy Trinity, from Whom is all authority and to
Whom, as our final end, all actions both of men and States must be referred,
We the People of Eire [Ireland], Humbly acknowledging all our obligations to
our divine Lord, Jesus Christ, Who sustained our fathers through centuries of
trial, Gratefully remembering their heroic and unremitting struggle to regain
the rightful independence of our Nation, And seeking to promote the common
good, with due observance of Prudence, Justice and Charity, so that the dignity and freedom of the individual may be assured, true social order attained,
the unity of our country restored, and concord established with other nations,
Do hereby adopt, enact, and give to ourselves, this Constitution.
144. W. BINCHY,
supra note 140, at 387.
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Irish Supreme Court would interpret the amendment in such a
manner as to defeat the right to life of the ~ n b 0 r n . l ~ ~
The language of the amendment is deliberately general, just
as is every other article of the constitution. The amendment was
not intended to outline every possible eventuality, but rather to
give adequate guidelines to the courts to enable them to make
reasonable decisions.146The amendment is modelled after and
uses language nearly identical to that found in the constitutional
provision that protects the rights of the citizen. That provision
states: "The State guarantees in its laws to respect, and as far as
practicable by its laws to defend and vindicate the personal
rights of the citizen."147Because this wording has provided adequate protection for the rights of Irish citizens since 1937, it is
not surprising that similar wording was used to protect the
rights of the unborn.
Opponents of the amendment have also been critical of the
phrase "with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother."
The Attorney General elaborated:
The meaning of "with due regard to" is entirely unclear. These
words are generally perceived to allow for, at least, termination
of the life of the foetus in the cases of ectopic pregnancy or
cancer of the uterus. The words "with due regard to" have
been understood by many to suggest that the right to life enjoyed by the unborn was to be confined in some way. That interpretation is in my opinion incorrect. (The word
"comhcheart" in the Irish text is literally "the same right.")
The right to life of both the unborn and the mother is stated in
the proposed text to be equal, and in these circumstances I
cannot see how it could be possible knowingly to terminate the
existence of the unborn even if such termination were the secondary effect of an operation for another purpose.

....

If a doctor were to be faced with the choice as to saving
the life of one, and thereby terminating the life of the other,
then I believe that the only lawful conclusion to this dilemma
would be that he could do nothing, absolutely nothing, which
145. Similarly, criticism of the amendment because it may effectively ban contraceptives that are considered abortifacient is misguided since such contraceptives are already prohibited by the Health (Family Planning) Act. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
146. Society for the Protection of Unborn Children, The Pro-Life AmendmentQuestions and Answers, Fact Sheet No. 3 (1983).
art. 40.3.1.
147. IRISHCONST.
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infringed on either right. It is only where there is no possibility
of the foetus surviving, even without the doctor's intervention,
that no difficulty will a r i ~ e . " ~

While this argument is superficially appealing, the only alternative is to resolve the equality issue between the mother and
the unborn by giving one or the other greater rights. This
presents even greater difficulties. Affording greater rights to the
mother would cater to the prochoice lobby, which views the
rights of the mother as always superior to those of the unborn.
This is not in keeping with the purpose of the amendment to
further protect the right to life of the unborn. Conversely, affording greater rights to the unborn would cater to the right
wing prolife lobby, which views the rights of the unborn as absolute and unequivocal, with no exceptions save those covered by
the Catholic doctrine of double effect. This position is also unacceptable because there really is no such thing as an absolute
right to life. The common law, based on the biblical command,
"Thou shall not kill"14@admits to exceptions such as self-defense. The right to life of the unborn is subject to exceptions as
well. Even some staunch prolife supporters recognize this. Father Haring, a noted Catholic theologian, has stated:
I consider probable the opinion of those who justify the removal of a foetus that surely cannot survive, when the action is
taken in order to prevent grave damage to the mother. For instance, an anencephalic foetus not only cannot develop into a
conscious human life but cannot survive. To remove it in order
to spare great damage to the mother is truly therapeutic, while
no injustice is done to the life of the foetus already doomed to
death.lS0

Under these circumstances, the only logical solution was to
give both mother and unborn an equal statutory right to life,
allowing the judiciary to decide each case on the facts. The fact
that both mother and unborn have equal rights does not prevent
any action from being taken in cases of conflict as suggested by
the Attorney General. Such a conclusion defies common sense,
suggesting that if two patients needed a life support system to
148. SEN.DEB.540 (daily ed. May 4, 1983) (statement of Attorney General, Mr. Peter D. Sutherland, S.C., quoted from The Irish Times, Feb. 16, 1983).
149. Exodus 20:13 (King James).
REFERENDUM"-THE
CASE
150. O'Mahony, A Catholic View, in "THE ABORTION
AGAINST
35, 38 (M.Arnold & P. Kirby eds. 1983).

398

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[I984

stay alive, but only one was available, the doctor could not utilize the system for either patient since it would interfere with the
equal right to life of the other.
In addition, the amendment merely states that the equal
rights of the mother and the unborn will be defended and vindicated by Irish laws only "as far as practicable." The Irish translation, recognized by the constitution as the prevailing language
in cases of conflict,161reads: "sa mheid gur feidir e," which literally translated means "as far as possible." This phrase also appears as part of the article of the constitution into which the
~~
amendment was i n c ~ r p o r a t e d . ' Under
either translation, the
language makes allowance for situations that may arise where it
is not "practicable" or even "possible" to protect the right to life
of the unborn.
The equal rights provision of the Irish Constitution, included in the same article as the prolife amendment, also recognizes this. It states: "All citizens shall, as human persons, be
held equal before the law. This shall not be held to mean that
the State shall not in its enactments have due regard to differences of capacity, physical and moral, and of social function."153
In 1972, in O'Brien v. Keogh,154the Irish Supreme Court suggested that "equal" may not mean a mathematical equality.
Chief Justice OyDalaighstated that, "Article 40 does not require
identical treatment of all persons without recognition of differences in relevant circumstances. It only forbids invidious
discriminati~n."'~~
Justice Walsh previously commented in State v. An Bord
Uchtala:166
In the opinion of the Court section 1 of Article 40 is not to be
read as a guarantee or undertaking that all citizens shall be
treated by the law as equal for all purposes, but rather as an
acknowledgment of the human equality of all citizens and that
such equality will be recognised in the laws of the State. The
section itself in its provision, "this shall not be held to mean
that the State shall not in its enactments have due regard to
151. IRISHCONST.art. 25.4.6. This article provides: "In case of conflict between the
texts of a law enrolled under this section in both the official languages, the text in the
national language shall prevail."
152. Id. art. 40.3.1.
153. Id. art. 40.1.
154. 1972 Ir. R. 144.
155. Id. at 156.
156. 1966 Ir. R. 567.
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differences of capacity, physical and moral, and of social function," is a recognition that inequality may or must result from
some special abilities or from some deficiency or from some
special need and it is clear that the Article does not either envisage or guarantee equal measure in all things to all citizens.
To do so regardless of the factors mentioned would be
ineq~ality.'~~
More realistically, the weakness of the constitutional right
to life for the unborn is that the unborn, by its nature, cannot
assert that right. Therefore, this right must be capable of being
asserted by a third party. Those opposed to the amendment
feared that individuals concerned about the rights of the unborn, might be able to obtain injunctions to prevent Irish women
from going abroad to have abortions. Technically this appears
possible. The Irish Supreme Court stated in Cahill u. S u t t ~ n , ' ~ ~
that, while the general rule of standing is that "the challenger
must adduce circumstances showing that the impugned provision is operating, or is poised to operate, in such a way as to
deprive him personally of the benefit of a particular constitutional right,"159 third parties, in "exceptional cases, hopefully
rare," may also be heard on behalf of persons who cannot assert
their own rights.leOThe pertinent question is the likelihood that
third parties will stalk women they suspect may go abroad to
have an abortion. In all probability, it can be expected that such
injunctive actions, if they are permitted by the Irish courts,
would generally be brought by the father. If such a situation
were to arise, the judiciary would have to resolve the matter
with due regard for the rights of all parties.
Lastly, Ireland is a signator of the European Convention on
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.lel Therefore, the
validity of the Irish constitutional amendment may be challenged in the European courts. The European Commission,
charged with ensuring compliance with the provisions of the
Convention, could find Ireland in violation of one of the articles
of the convention. However, this is unlikely in view of previous
abortion decisions by the Commission, which demonstrate its reluctance to interfere with abortion legislation in individual
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at 639.
1980 Ir. R. 269.
Id. at 282.
Id. at 277.
See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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member countries.ls2 Even if the amendment was determined to
162. The first abortion case before the Commission was brought in the 1960s by a
Norwegian man challenging a Norwegian abortion law as violative of the rights of the
unborn. He claimed the unborn was protected under the language of article two of the
Convention which provided, "Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law." The
Commission found the petition was inadmissible on the grounds that "only a victim of
an alleged violation of the convention may bring an application" and that the Norwegian
petitioner, who declared that he acted in the interest of third persons, "could not claim
to be himself the victim of a violation of the Convention." Gorby, The West German
Abortion Decision before the European Commission on Human Rights, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN
ABORTION
264 (1981) (quoting Application No. 86760, Collection of
Decisions 6, a t 34).
The first abortion case actually decided by the Commission was Bruggerinann &
Scheuten v. Federal Republic of Germany, 1978 Y.B. EUR.CONV.ON HUMAN
RIGHTS638
(Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights). Two West German women claimed that (1) a decision
of the West German Constitutional Court that invalidated part of a 1974 abortion law
permitting abortions in the first trimester with approval of a doctor and the mother, and
(2) a subsequent law that prohibited abortion a t any time absent exceptional circumstances, violated Article 8(1) and other Articles of the Convention. Article 8(1) provides,
"[Elverybody has the right to respect for his private or family life, his home and his
correspondence." The Commission held that neither the German abortion legislation nor
the Federal Constitutional Court's decision violated any Convention right.
This decision has raised questions about whether the Commission will interfere with
the abortion laws of individual member States. One commentator suggested that in view
of the wide divergence of abortion laws among member nations "a decision in Bruggemann and Scheuten's favor would have had the effect of declaring the law on abortion
in most of the member States incompatible with the European Convention on Human
Rights-a decision which would hardly inspire confidence in the Commission on Human
Rights. Gorby, supra, a t 274. He postulated that the decision "reflects the caution of a n
international legal body whose powers of enforcement are minimal." Id.
The most recent case to come before the Commission, Paton v. United Kingdom, 3
EUR.HUM.RTS. REP 408 (1980). seems to provide support for this theory. Paton applied
to the English courts for a n injunction to prevent his wife from getting a n abortion. The
English courts refused to grant the injunction, holding that the father had no right to
stop the mother from having an abortion, even if he was her husband. Id. a t 410. Paton
appealed the decision to the Commission, which concluded:
The Commission . . . does not find that the husband's and potential father's
right to respect for his private and family life can be interpreted so widely as
to embrace such procedural rights as claimed by the applicant, i.e. a right to be
consulted, or a right to make applications, about a n abortion which his wife
intends to have performed on her.
Id. a t 417. Before deciding that the application was inadmissible, the Commission considered whether article two, while not providing any express limitation concerning the
fetus, is to be interpreted (1) as not covering the fetus a t all, (2) as recognizing a right to
life with certain limitations, or (3) as recognizing a n absolute right to life. Id. a t 415. The
Commission readily dismissed the idea that the fetus had an absolute right to life, noting
that almost all signators a t the time of the signing of the Convention permitted some
form of abortion legislation. Id. However, the Commission circumvented the more difficult questions by concluding:
T h e Commission considers that i t is not in these circumstances called upon to
decide whether Article 2 does not cover the foetus a t all or whether it
recognises a "right to life" of the foetus with implied limitations. I t finds that
the authorisation, by the United Kingdom authorities, of the abortion com-
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violate the Convention, the Commission has no power to order
changes in the domestic laws of Ireland; Ireland has previously
ignored decisions of the Commission without any detrimental
con~equences.~~~

The Irish prolife amendment grew out of fears that the
nearly universal trend to liberalize abortion legislation might
plained of is compatible with Article 2(1), first sentence because, if one assumes that this provision applies a t the initial stage of the pregnancy, the
abortion is covered by an implied limitation, protecting the life and health of
the woman a t that stage, of the "right to life" of the foetus.
Id. a t 416.
163. The Commission is not a traditional court of appeal. It may find that a particular piece of legislation violates one of the articles of the Convention, but it has no power
to overrule any domestic law of a member state. Telephone interview with Professor
John Gorby (Nov. 8, 1984). Admittedly, article 53 does provide, "The High Contracting
Parties undertake to abide by the decision of the Court in any case to which they are
parties." This means that, while the Convention, as a treaty, is binding on all states that
have ratified it, the Commission's decisions are still not enforceable until the Convention
has been adopted into the domestic law of the state. Ireland has not done this.
The Irish Constitution provides, "No international agreement shall be part of the
domestic law of the State save as may be determined by the Oireachtas." IRISHCONST.
art. 29.6. I t further states, "The sole and exclusive power of making laws for the State is
hereby vested in the Oireachtas: no other legislative authority has power to make laws
for the State." Id. art. 15.2.1. In 1960, the Irish Supreme Court indicated its refusal to
apply the provisions of the Convention in In re O'Laighleis, 1960 Ir. R. 93. The Court
stated:
The Oireachtas has not determined that the Convention of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms is to be part of the domestic law of the State, and
accordingly this Court cannot give effect to the Convention if it be contrary to
domestic law or purports to grant rights or impose obligations additional to
those of domestic law.
Id. a t 125. The situation remains the same today. One commentator recently concluded,
"Nearly thirty years after ratifying the European Convention on Human Rights, Ireland
has still failed to incorporate it into domestic law. As a consequence the Irish Courts
have, for the most part, refused to take cognisance of the provisions of the Convention in
domestic cases." Comment, The Application of the European Convention on Human
Rights before the Irish Courts, 31 INT'L& COMP.L.Q. 856, 860-61 (1982).
No action has been taken against Ireland for failing to incorporate the Convention
into domestic law. It is possible that Ireland could be asked to withdraw or even be
expelled from the Commission if it were determined that Irish abortion laws violated one
of the articles of the Convention, and Ireland refused to modify its stance on abortion.
However, this is highly unlikely in view of what appears to be a clear reluctance on the
part of the Commission to interfere with abortion legislation in member countries. In the
35 year existence of the Commission only one country, Greece, has been asked to withdraw. and that was for flagrant violations of numerous articles. For a discussion of the
relationship between the Convention and the domestic law of the signatories generally,
and Ireland specifically, see Buergenthal, The Domestic Status of the European ConvenL. REV.354 (1964).
tion on Human Rights, 13 BUFFALO

-
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eventually reach Ireland. The amendment attempts to constitutionally establish the ultimate balance between the mother's
rights and the unborn's right to life. Viewed against the longstanding Irish legislative, judicial, and public policy of protecting the life of the unborn, it appears that the real motivation for
the amendment was not that the prior law did not adequately
prevent abortion. Rather, the amendment stemmed from a political and social fear that a clear and dramatic rejection of abortion was necessary to prevent the country from drifting into a
slow acceptance of abortion over time, as has happened in most
other western nations. Once the amendment had been proposed,
it was also critical that it or some equally strong anti-abortion
amendment be passed, because a defeat could have been interpreted as a signal that Ireland was ready for some form of abortion legislati~n.'~~
Interestingly enough, the broad language of the amendment
may permit rather than prevent the introduction of abortion legislation in Ireland. However, in spite of the potential problems,
passage of the amendment by such a large margin can be expected to lend a powerful endorsement to the existing prohibition of abortion in Ireland.ls6

John A. Quinlan

164. This is consistent with a statement made by the Women's Right to Choose
Group (a separate organization from the Women's Right to Choose Campaign) that concluded, "[Tlhe current political objective is the defeat of the amendment, the pro-abortion lobby comes later." Address by Professor Cornelius O'Leary, Vice-chairman of the
Pro-Life Amendment Campaign (Aug. 16, 1983) (quoting sunday Tribune, May 15,
1983).
165. The Women's Right to Choose Campaign has even accepted this conclusion.
They recently stated:
By winning the referendum PLAC [Pro-Life Amendment Campaign] have
[sic] indeed made it impossible for abortion to become legal without another
referendum on the issue. That does make our long-term task more difficult-but only marginally so, because there had been no prospect of achieving
any liberalisation of the law in the foreseeable future anyway.

....

Apart from the Post-Referendum Solidarity March in July 1984 which
highlighted SPUC's [Society for the Protection of Unborn Children] pickets on
Open Line [an abortion referral agency in Dublin] and a right to choose
counter-picket a t SPUC's referendum anniversary vigil on September 7th this
year, next to nothing was heard publicly of a pro-abortion nature in 1984. To
some extent this may be due to sheer weariness, but it also suggests a certain
level of dismay among right to choose supporters.
Fighting for Control-the Ongoing Struggle for Reproductive Rights, in THEIRISHFEMINIST REVIEW
7, 23-24 (Women's Community Press 1984)."

In Search of the Role of the Private Producer in
the Argentine Petroleum Industry
Nowhere can the vicissitudes of business life be experienced
more acutely than in the private sector of the petroleum industry of the Argentine Republic. The discovery of oil in Argentina
in 1907 precipitated an internal economic and political struggle
to develop a national oil policy that has continued to this day.'
On one side are the extreme economic nationalists who assert
that state ownership of all minerals and state monopoly of the
petroleum sector are fundamental to Argentina's industrial development and economic self-sufficiency. On the other side are
the aristocratic economic liberalists who thrive on an exportbased economy, support high importation levels, and encourage
local foreign investment. Playing the middle of the field are the
less radical economic nationalists who maintain that the state
should be involved in energy production, but that private investment and enterprise, under close scrutiny, should be allowed to
supplement government effort^.^ Historically, changes in governmental control among these forces have resulted in dramatic petroleum policy changes, usually in the form of executive decrees.
federal intervenors, or new legi~lation.~
For the present time, it is clear the Yacimientos Petroliferos
Fiscales (YPF), the official Argentinian state petroleum enter1. C SOLBERG,
OIL AND NATIONALISM
I N ARGENTINA-AHISTORY
9 (1979); South
America Cash Troubles Cloud Preurous Projections-Argentrna, WORLDOIL, Aug. 15,
1982, at 124 (major revisions in Argentina's petroleum legislation are probable) [hereinafter cited as WORLDOIL].
supra note 1, a t 1-7, 13-14, 34-37, 82-86, 116-29, 176-79; UNITED
2. See C SOLBERG,
RESOURCES,
ENERGY,
AND TRANSPORTATION,
STATEPETRONATIONS
CENTREFOR NATURAL
LEUM ENTERPR~SES
I N DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES
12 (1980) [hereinafter cited as CNRET].
3. See, e.g , Decree No. 744163, Buenos Aires, Argen., Nov. 15, 1963 (annulling oil
production controls), reprrnted in PETROLEUM
LEGISLATION
CO, SOUTHAMERICA-BASIC
CONTRACTS
(ORIGINAL
TEXTS)A-1 (Supp. IV 1964). The basic
OIL LAWSAND CONCESSION
hydrocarbons laws now in effect were instituted in 1967 under President Ongania. See
Memorandum from Minister Krieger Vassena and Secretary Gottelli to President Ongania (June 23, 1967) (submitting Hydrocarbons Law 17,319), repr~ntedIn PETROLEUM
CONTRACTS
{ORIGILEGISLATION
CO, SOUTHAMERICA-BASIC
OIL LAWSAND CONCESSION
NAL TEXTS)B-1, B-24 (Supp. XV 1967) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum of June 23,
OF AMERICAN
STATES,GENERAL
SECRETARIAT,
MININGAFD PETRO19671; ORGANIZATION
LEUM LEGISLATION
IN LATINAMERICA
AND THE CARIBBEAN
19 (1980). President Ongania
assumed his executive role in 1966.
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prise, is not, by itself, capable of satisfying Argentina's drive for
Although YPF has served as a forerunenergy self-suffi~iency.~
ner and model for state petroleum enterprises in Latin America,
labor problems, capital goods shortages, and financial struggles
in 1922,
.~
have plagued the company since its i n c e p t i ~ n Formed
YPF was not clothed with significant official public authority
until 195€L6The role of the company has constantly varied based
on the prevailing political climate. Further, YPF has never matured to the point of being able to fulfill the country's petroleum
needs without assistance from private investors and producers.'
Currently, YPF is heavily in debt and is not receiving adequate
prices for its production. In addition, government taxes are
stripping the company of much of its revenue^.^ Thus, based on
YPFYshistory and present status, Argentina will likely have a
strong appetite for private petroleum investment and private
hydrocarbon-seeking activities for the foreseeable f u t ~ r e . ~
This comment explores the role of the private producer in
the Argentine oil and gas industry. This comment does not focus
on the political and economic turmoil in Argentina, but rather
centers on the key legal arrangements under which a private entity can enter the country and engage in exploration and production activities. In addition, the philosophy and principles underlying the country's petroleum legislation are examined, with
special emphasis on the implications for a private petroleum
producer considering entering the country to conduct business
operations. By examining these two areas of consideration, a private producer can better understand how to conduct hydrocarbon-seeking and -producing activities in Argentina, and will
have a framework for anticipating and protecting himself against
Argentina's volatile political and economic trends.
4. C. SOLBERG,
supra note 1, at 173-75 (charts showing historical production
records); WORLD
OIL,supra note 1.
5. C. SOLBERC,
supra note 1, at 40-45, 66-69, 98-99, 158-59, 164-65, 172; CNRET,
supra note 2, at 161; Parker, Argentina Eyes More Private Oil Work, OIL& GASJ., Dec.
6, 1982, at 121; WORLD
OIL,supra note 1.
6. [I9581 Law No. 14,773 (Argen.) (nationalization of fields of hydrocarbons), reLEGISLATION
Co., SOUTHAMERICA-BASIC
OILLAWSAND CONCESprinted in PETROLEUM
SION CONTRACTS
(ORIGINAL
TEXTS)F-1 (SUPP.XIV 1967).
supra note 1, at 173-75 (production charts); WORLD
OIL,supra note
7. C. SOLBERC,
1.
8. WORLDOIL,supra note 1; see also C. SOLBERG,
supra note 1, at 172-73.
9. See CNRET, supra note 2, at 45; Parker, supra note 5; WORLD
OIL,supra note 1.
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Argentina's basic petroleum law is Hydrocarbons Law
17,319 of 1967, as amended by Law 21,778 of 1978." Under the
provisions of these laws, private companies can participate in exploration and development of hydrocarbons in three distinct
ways:
(1) Through "work or service contracts;""
(2) Through a concession-type approach;'* or

(3) Through "risk contracts" with state enterprises.I3

This comment focuses on the viability of the second and third
types of arrangements. The first type of arrangement has been
employed in various forms over the years and can be highly lucrative for private companies.14 However, service contract transactions did not prove successful, from Argentina's point of view,
in promoting sufficient exploration and development activities.'"
Argentina's response to this shortcoming of service contracts has
10. H. GREEN,
ENERGY
LAWGUIDE-WORLDPETROLEUM
POLICY
REPORT3 13, a t C-87
(1981).
11. [I9671 Hydrocarbons Law No. 17,319, arts. 11, 95 (Argen.), reprinted in PETROLEUM LEGISLATION
CO., SOUTHAMERICA-BASIC
OIL LAWSAND CONCESSION
CONTRACTS
(ORIGINAL
TEXTS)A-4, A-31 (Supp. XIV 1967) [hereinafter cited as Law 17,3191.
12. Memorandum of June 23, 1967, supra note 3, a t 5, 9-10.
13. Decree 2658, Buenos Aires, Argen., Nov. 6, 1978 (Regulations to Risk Contracts,
LEGISLATION
CO., SOUTH
Law 21,778, cl. 1, Apr. 14, 1978), reprinted in PETROLEUM
OIL LAWSAND CONCESSION
AMERICA-BASIC
CONTRACTS
(ORIGINAL
TEXTS)1 (Supp. LIII
1978) [hereinafter cited as Regulations]; Memorandum to the President of Argentina
from Ministers of Justice, Economy & Interior (explaining Law No. 21,778 of Apr. 14,
1978), reprinted in PETROLEUM
LEGISLATION
CO, SOUTHAMERICA-BASICOIL LAWAND
C o ~ c E s s l oCONTRACTS
~
(ORIGINAL
TEXTS)12 (Supp. LIII 1978) [hereinafter cited as
Memorandum of Apr. 14, 19781. For examples of actual risk contracts, see Contract Resulting from the Bid (Licitacion No. 14-035/79) for the Development and Exploitation of
Hydrocarbons of the "Comodoro Rivadavia Coastal Belt" Area-San Jorge Gulf BaLEGISLATION
CO. SOUTHAMERICA-BASIC
sin-Argentine Sea, reprinted in PETROLEUM
CONTRACTS
(ORIGINAL
TEXTS)1 (Supp. LXV 1981) [hereinafOIL LAWSAND CONCESSION
ter cited as Contract for the "Comodoro Rivadavia Coastal Belt" Area]; Contract Resulting from Bid No. 14-029179 for the Exploration, Development and Exploitation of Hydrocarbons (Law No. 21,778) in "Llancanelo" Area-Neuquen Basin-Province of
LEGISLATION
CO., SOUTHAMERICA-BASIC
OIL LAWS
Mendoza, reprinted in PETROLEUM
AND CONCESSION
CONTRACTS
(ORIGINAL
TEXTS)1 (Supp. LXVII 1981) [hereinafter cited
as Contract for the "Llancanelo" Area]; Contract Resulting from the Bid (Licitacion No.
14-023/79) for the Exploration, Development and Exploitation of Hydrocarbons (Law
No. 21,778) of the "Malargue Sur" Area-Meuquina Basin-Mendoza Province, reLEGISLATION
CO., SOUTHAMERICA-BASIC
OIL LAWSAND CONCESprinted in PETROLEUM
SION CONTRACTS
(ORIGINAL
TEXTS)1 (Supp. LXIII 1980) [hereinafter cited as Contract
for the "Malargue Sur" Area].
supra note 1, a t 168.
14. CNRET, supra note 2, a t 31; see also C. SOLBERG,
15. Memarandum of June 23, 1967, supra note 3, a t B-5.
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been the enactment of its current laws. While these laws still
allow for service contract transactions,le they emphasize involvement, through risk contracts or concession arrangements, in a
three-tier structure consisting of surface prospecting, exploration, and exploitation activities. Each of these phases furnishes
the private operator with unique rights and opportunities.

A. Surface Prospecting
Any civilly competent party, including universities and
other research organizations, may conduct surface prospecting
for the existence of hydrocarbons without being encumbered by
the rigidity and burdens of the country's general exploration
systems." By obtaining consent from surface owners and a permit from the government prescribing the scope and conditions of
the reconnaissance, such a party may engage in "any . . .
method appropriate for petroleum exploration."18 The prospecting can occur both onshore and offshore but it cannot infringe
upon areas where exploration and exploitation permits have
been awarded, most areas reserved for state enterprises, or areas
that have been expressly banned from such activity by the Na+
tional Executive Power.'" Although this last restriction gives the
state great discretion, the state does have important incentives
for agreeing to such studies. First, the exercise of these rights
does not generate any legal claim in the prospector to conduct
~~
the prospector must demore extensive e x p l ~ r a t i o n .Second,
liver "the primary data" of his surface inspection to the state.21
Although the state cannot reveal the data for two years without
the gatherer's permission, this restriction on divulgence is
greatly weakened by an exception that provides for the release
of the data in the event that a permit or concession is awarded
in the area
Consequently, if the state (which has the right to process
16. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-4, A-31 (arts. 11,95); Memorandum of June 23,
1967, supra note 3, at B-9, B-23.
17. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-4, A-5 (arts. 14-15); Memorandum of June 23,
1967, supra note 3, at B-12.
18. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-4, A-5 (arts. 14-15). Some methods will necessi-

tate obtaining approval from the state. The state can also inspect and control all of the
works involved. Id.
19. Id. at A-4, A-5 (art. 14).
20. Id.
21. Id. at A-5 (art. 15).
22. Id.
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the information, by itself or through the use of third persons,
and to use the information for its own purposes) concludes that
the property has hydrocarbon potential, it can put out a tender
for bids on the property and then release the prospecting information to the party whose bid is selected.23 Also, the law does
not indicate whether the prospecting information is available to
state petroleum companies during this two-year period of confid e n t i a l i t ~ The
. ~ ~ result is that the state gains a lot and gives up
very little. On the other hand, the prospective producer could
gain some very valuable information, but it is of no significant
exploratory value to him unless he is prepared to compete for
additional rights through a public bid.

B. Exploration
Under Laws 17,319 and 21,778, the most aggressive and potentially profitable petroleum activities are classified into two
types: exploration and e x p l o i t a t i ~ n Any
. ~ ~ given project may involve one or both of these types of activities, but it is not likely
to intentionally include only an exploration phase. After all, the
exploration phase is simply used to discover commercial deposits
of hydrocarbons that justify commencing the exploitation stage.
Under Law 17,319, and probably under Law 21,778, exploration
rights are awarded only for "possible" zones.26 These are zones
in which the presence of hydrocarbons in commercial quantities
has yet to be proven.27Properties containing proven reserves of
commercially exploitable hydrocarbons are classified as
proven," and only exploitation rights are awarded in such are a ~ Consequently,
. ~ ~
a program on "possible" lands involves
66

23. Id. a t A-14 (art. 45). Awards of permits and concessions under Law 17,319 are
based on the bid which is "most conducive to the interest of the Nation." Id. at A-15
(art. 48).
24. The National Executive Power can enlarge the areas reserved to the state companies. Id. at A-4 (art. 11).
25. [I9781 Hydrocarbons Law No. 21,778, art. 25 (Argen.), reprinted in PETROLEUM
LEGISLATION
CO., SOUTHAMERICA-BASIC
OIL LAWSAND CONCESSION
CONTRACTS
(ORIGINAL TEXTS)1, 11 (Supp. LIII 1978) [hereinafter cited as Law 21,7781; Law 17,319, supra
note 11, at A-5, A-9 (arts. 16, 27).
26. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-8 (art. 24). Law 21,778 operations are governed
17,319 in any matter that was not modified or specifically provided for under
by ~ a w
Law 21,778. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 11 (art. 26). For a definition of "possible
zones," see Law 17,319, supra note 11, a t A-4 (art. 10).
27. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-4 (art. 10).
28. See id. (arts. 24, 29); Contract for the "Comodoro Rivadavia Coastal Belt" Area,
supra note 13, a t 2 (art. 1).
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more risk and entails both an exploration phase and, if hydrocarbons are discovered in commercial quantities, an exploitation
phase. A plan to develop a proven area presents less risk and
only involves an exploitation phase.29
The purpose of the exploration phase is to both require and
authorize the private operator to search for commercial deposits
within the bid area. This is a weeding out period for the state
because a t the end of the exploration period, any property that
has not been explored or proven worthy of exploitation is relinquished to the state.30 Activities during this period are conducted pursuant to work and investment commitments made in
the bid.31
Under Law 17,319 an exploration permit confers exclusive
rights to search for hydrocarbons within the permit area during
the period s p e ~ i f i e dAn
. ~ ~exploration permit also authorizes the
holder to undertake all works "conducive to the discovery of hydrocarbons," including surface prospection, exploratory drilling,
and construction of transportation, communication, and other
necessary f a ~ i l i t i e s .Inherent
~~
in each exploration permit is an
exclusive concession of the exploitation of any and all hydrocarbon deposits found within the permit area.34 Within indicated
time periods and under threat of specified penalties, a permit
holder that discovers hydrocarbons must announce (1) the discovery of the hydrocarbons, (2) if the discovered deposit is commercially exploitable, and (3) his intentions concerning ob29. See, e.g., Law 17,319, supra note 11, a t A-9 (art. 29, concessions on proven
lands); Contract for the "Comodoro Rivadavia Coastal Belt" Area, supra note 13, a t 2
(art. 1) (purpose of the contract is development and exploitation with no exploration
phase included).
30. Law 17,319, supra note 11, a t A-8, A-9 (art. 26); Regulations, supra note 13, a t
14-15 (cls. 10.1, 10.4). As an additional incentive to encourage prompt exploration, the
exploration period is divided into smaller periods of time and, at the end of each small
period, a minimum of 50% of all lands not converted to exploitation parcels or previously relinquished are returned to the state. Law 17,319, supra note 11, a t A-8, A-9 (art.
6); Regulations, supra note 13, a t 2, 14 (cls. 2.9, 10.1).
31. Law 21,778, supra note 25, a t 3-5 (art. 9); Law 17,319, supra note 11, a t A-6, A7, A-15 (arts. 20, 47, 48).
32. Law 17,319, supra note 11, a t A-5 (art. 16). The basic unit of an exploration
permit is 100 square kilometers and a single permit cannot exceed an aggregate of 100
units for an onshore permit or 150 units for an offshore permit. Id. a t A-8 (arts. 24, 25).
33. Law 17,319, supra note 11, a t A-6 (art. 19); Memorandum of June 23, 1967,
supra note 3, a t B-13.
34. Law 17,319, supra note 11, a t A-6 (art. 17); Memorandum of June 23, 1967,
supra note 3, a t B-13.
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taining a concession and e x p l ~ i t a t i o n .Thus,
~ ~ the conclusion
that commercially exploitable hydrocarbons have been discovered moves the Law 17,319 operator into the exploitation phase
for that particular deposit. The awarding of an exploitation concession, however, does not terminate the permit holder's exploration rights for remaining lands not converted to a concession.
As these residual lands are explored, they can enter the concession phase or be relinquished to the state. At the end of the exploration phase, all lands within the permit area that have not
been converted into an exploitation concession must be given
up=
.'
The exploration procedure under Law 21,778 closely resembles that of Law 17,319. The regulations to Law 21,778 provide
that contracted works shall be carried out in two stages, one for
exploration and the other for development and p r o d ~ c t i o n . ~ ~
The 1980 Unionoil International Exploration Company, Ltd./Inalruco S.A. Petrolera Risk Contract explains that during the exploration phase, the "Contractor must determine and notify . . .
Y.P.F. whether . . . the . . . field . . . is considered commer~ ~ regulations also define (for investment
cially e ~ p l o i t a b l e . "The
and work commitment purposes) an exploration well as one
drilled where no productive well has been previously drilled, or
where a stratigraphic trap is sought, or, in some cases, where the
purpose of drilling a well or wells is to delineate a field. In addition to drilling wells, a Law 21,778 contractor is obligated to
carry out a program of "exploration works" that will generate
locations for drilling exploratory wells.39 A Law 21,778 contractor who makes a discovery must present YPF with a plan for
determining if the "deposit is commercial or not or if it can beThis
come one when exploited along with other disco~eries."~~
moves the contractor into the exploitation phase for that
deposit.
Unlike Law 17,319, Law 21,778 does not set out stringent
penalties for failure to announce a discovery or for concealment
35. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-7, A-8 (arts. 21-22); Memorandum of June 23,
1967, supra note 3, at B-14.
36. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-7 to A-9 (arts. 22-23,26); Memorandum of June
23, 1967, supra note 3, at B-14.
37. Regulations, supra note 13, at 4 (cl. 3).
38. Contract for the "Llancanelo" Area, supra note 13.
39. Regulations, supra note 13, at 3-4 (cls. 2.13, 11.4).
40. Id. at 5-6 (cl. 3.2.1); see also Contract for the "Malargue Sur" Area, supra note
13, at 6-7 (art. 3.2.1) (maximum term for such a program is twenty-four months).
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of a commercially exploitable field. I t is possible that the provisions of Law 17,319 which pr-ovide for penalties also apply to
Law 21,778. However, another explanation for the lack of specified penalties in Law 21,778 may be the fact that a Law 21,778
producer must sell all of his production, and provide extensive
information, to state oil companies. Consequently, the state is
In contrast,
more likely to know about a Law 21,778 disc~very.~'
a Law 17,319 operator has free marketing opportunities and thus
more opportunities and incentives to conceal his disc~veries.'~
The Law 21,778 exploration period terminates, like the Law
17,319 exploration period, with the relinquishment of lands not
committed to exploitation lots and the cessation of the right to
drill additional exploration wells.43

C . Exploitation
The exploitation phase is designed to allow the private operator to reap the benefits of his exploration discoveries. Pursuant to work plans submitted to the state, the operator tries to
realize the full potential of the deposits discovered, hopefully
within the time period allotted. A Law 17,319 exploitation concession confers an exclusive right to exploit any hydrocarbon
fields existing within the area specified by the concession during
the established time period." Law 17,319 obligates the concessionaire to seek for and produce the maximum production that
is consistent with economic and conservation concepts. Also, the
operator must strive to develop the entire concession acreagesd6
To assist the Law 17,319 producer in doing this, the statute
gives the concessionaire the right to obtain a nonexclusive transportation concession, and various other ancillary privileges such
as the right to build treating and refining plants, communication
systems, and building^.'^
Under Law 21,778, the basic unit for production and devel41. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 1, 5 (art. 4, 9(h)); Regulations, supra note 13, at
20-22 (cls. 1.0, 15.0); see also Contract for the "Malargue Sur" Area, supra note 13, at
15-16, 51-54 (art. 9, Annex IV).
42. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-2, A-3 (art. 6); Memorandum of June 23, 1967,
supra note 3, at B-5, B-10, B-11.
43. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 4 (art. 9(d)); Regulations, supra note 13, at 14-15
(CIS.10.1, 10.2, 10.4).
44. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-9, A-11 (arts. 27, 33-34).
45. Id. at A-10 (art. 31).
46. Id. at A-9, A-10 (arts. 28, 30); Memorandum of June 23, 1967, supra note 3, at
B-15.
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opment is the "exploitation lot." These lots are defined as "the
fraction within the area [originally] being bidded on in which
the commercially exploitable hydrocarbons are l~calized."~'The
Law 21,778 contractor agrees to promptly delineate the boundaries of the field'18 and to employ the most "reasonable and efficient techniques" in an effort to "obtain [the] maximum production of hydrocarbons compatible with the appropriate
exploitation of same."4n
1. Direct exploitation activities

Under both Law 17,319 and Law 21,778, there are two paths
that lead to exploitation projects. The first is by way of an
agreement to enter directly into exploitation activities without a
preliminary exploration period.50 In this situation, a private
party is concerned with (1) the land available to him, (2) the
time limitations on his rights, (3) the work and investment commitments he is obligated to undertake, and (4) the fiscal regime
he is subject to during the life of his concession.
The state determines both the locations and the size of the
properties that are available under Law 17,319 and Law 21,778.51
Although only Law 17,319 specifies maximum acreages for an exploitation concession, it does not appear that the size of an exploitation parcel is a negotiable matter, especially when the original agreement is to perform exploitation operations only. A
private entity interested in a particular area may submit a proposal concerning that area. If the state decides that such a recommendation should, in the best interests of the nation, be followed, then a tender for bids will be put out on that area. The
author of the proposal will be given preference only if his bid
offer is equal to the best of all the offers made.s2
In addition to land constraints, the rights of private petroleum producers are of limited duration under the Argentine
47. Regulations, supra note 13, at 2, 5 (cls. 2.8, 3.2).
48. Id. at 19 (cl. 13.10) (six month period allotted).
49. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 2 (art. 6(a)). Law 21,778 does not mention ancillary privileges so Law 17,319 rights should apply. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 11 (art.
26) (matters not modified or expressly provided for in Law 21,778 are covered by Law
17,319).
50. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-9 (art. 29); Memorandum of June 23, 1967,
supra note 3, at A-14.
51. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 3-5 (art. 9); Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-3 (art.
9).
52. Law 17,319, supra note 11, a t A-14, A-15 (art. 46).
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laws.63 When these lands revert to the state, operating equipment, fixed installations, and, in some cases, mobile accouterments are also transferred free of encumbrance to the state.64 A
private operator must assure himself that, within the time frame
allotted, the economics will be favorable to him based on how
many wells will be drilled, expected production rates and productive lives of wells, and projected percentages of wells that
will be dry.
The operator will also be required to make work and investment commitments for achieving his exploitation goals. Law
17,319 provides that a concessionaire shall be "bound to make
such investments as may be necessary, within reasonable periods
of time, for the execution of the works required for the development of the entire acreage comprised in the area of his concession . . . ."nn Law 21,778 requires a contractor to submit his
timetable and investment plans to YPF.6BExcept where force
majeure, acts of God, or certain technical difficulties intervene,
failure to meet Law 17,319 or Law 21,778 commitments can result in penalization of the private entity including damages or
cancellation of the agreementsn7
Law 17,319 and Law 21,778 each have their own fiscal regime (i.e., taxes, rents, royalties) governing operations conducted
under their provisions. The Law 17,319 fiscal regime tries to aid
a private entity in preparing for a permit or concession and in
realizing those plans. Law 17,319 does this by identifying in advance, by type and amount, all of the financial obligations that a
permit holder or concessionaire is liable for during the term of
the agreement." These obligations include payment of:
(1) All provincial and municipal taxes extant on the date of
the award. Governing bodies cannot levy new taxes or increase preexisting taxes except when the changed rates represent a defrayment of costs of services rendered or
53. Memorandum of Apr. 14, 1978, supra note 13, at 14; Memorandum of June 23,
1967, supra note 3, a t B-10.
54. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 4 (art. 9(e)); Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-11,
A-12, A-29 (arts. 37,85); Regulations, supra note 13, at 17 (cl. 12); Memorandum of June
23, 1967, supra note 3, at B-22; see also Contract for the "Comodoro Rivadavia Coastal
Belt" Area, supra note 13, a t 8 (art. 5).
55. Law 17,319, supra note 11, a t A-10 (art. 31).
56. Regulations, supra note 13, a t 21 (cl. 15.3).
57. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 4-5 (art. 9(g)); Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-27
to A-30 (arts. 80, 87-88).
58. Memorandum of June 23, 1967, supra note 3, a t B-17.
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when the tax change constitutes a contribution toward
improvements or a general increase of taxesbg
All national tributes assessed on imported items, exchange surcharges, and capital gains taxes. Aside from
these, and the other taxes set forth below, the operator is
exempt from all other national taxation (as to activities
related t o his permit or concession) except for adjustments which defray costs of services provided or contributed toward improvements or where the entity has assumed responsibility for a third party's tax liability.60
A special income tax of 55% of the operator's net profits.
The statute prescribes a formula for computing net
profit^.^'

A progressive annual surface tax during the exploration
period.62
An annual surface tax during the exploitation period of
20,000 pesos per square kilometer or fraction thereof.6s
A 12% royalty on liquid hydrocarbons and natural gas
that the National Executive Power can reduce by 5% if
production conditions merit such a decrea~e.~'
Any special benefits (e-g., bonuses, deferred or cumulative
payments) that the private party committed to in the bidding proces~.'~
Additionally, any hydrocarbons lost through the fault or
negligence of the operator shall be included as production
in making these c a l c ~ l a t i o n s . ~ ~

This scheme is a benevolent effort by Argentina to be fair to
private entities. The exceptions provided for in (1)and (2), however, seem to open wide gaps t h a t minimize t h e restrictions laid
on new or increased taxes; and, unfortunately, the guaranty of a
stable tax regime does not encompass a guaranty of a stable
economy to operate in.
Law 21,778 approaches the tax treatment of its contractors
from a different angle than does Law 17,319. Rather than prescribing an intentionally stagnant fiscal regime, Law 21,778 per59. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-17 (art. 56(a)).
60. Id. at A-17, A-18 (art. 56(b)). Shareholders and direct pecuniary beneficiaries
also come under this tax umbrella. Id. at A-20, A-21 (art. 56(d)).
61. Id. at A-18 (art. 56(c)).
62. Id. at A-21 (art. 57(a)).
63. Id. (art. 58).
64. Id. at A-21, A-22 (arts. 59, 62).
65. Id. at A-15, A-23 (arts. 47, 64).
66. Id. at A-23 (art. 65).
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mits the use of price escalator clauses in risk contracts to adjust
prices paid to operators for their production in response to "the
precise incidence" of tax fluctuation^.'^ However, similar to the
provisions of Law 17,319, "service rates and betterment taxes"
are excluded.6s Law 21,778 contractors must abide by Argen~ ~ two optina's "tax regulations of general a p p l i ~ a b i l i t y "with
tions concerning a modified depreciation rule and an option to
update tax losses based on the general level of the wholesalers
price index.?O The nation's stamp tax assessment is based on the
contractor's investment commitment in the risk contract and is
payable over a term that commences on the date the contractor
is notified of the decree approving the risk contract.?'
An annual surface fee (per square kilometer or fraction
thereof) is set in the call for bids. The amount of the fee relates
to the characteristics of the particular bid area.72A special 100%
deduction is granted for certain investments that underwrite the
stock of Argentine companies engaged in risk c o n t r a ~ t i n g . ~ ~
Goods, special tools, parts, components, and some spares and accessories are exempted from import duties upon entry into the
country and from export duties upon leaving Argentina when
the contract expires.74 Investments made by contractors are not
subject to certain foreign investment regulations and YPF is liable for the 12% royalty on production that is payable to the
state.76 Obviously, a more thorough knowledge of the country's
general tax structure is needed before potential risk contractors
should attempt interpreting these provisions.
67. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 7 (art. 15); Regulations, supra note 13, a t 24-25
(cl. 17.2).
68. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 7 (art. 15); Regulations, supra note 13, at 24-25
(cl. 17.2).
69. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 6-7, 10 (arts. 14, 20).
70. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 6-7 (arts. 14(a), 14(b)); Regulations, supra note 13,
a t 24 (cls. 17.1, 17.l(a), 17.l(b)). For an example of tax regimes in actual risk contracts,
see Contract for the "Comodoro Rivadavia Coastal Belt" Area, supra note 13, at 27 (art.
13).
71. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 7 (art. 16).
72. Id. (art. 17); Regulations, supra note 13, at 25 (cl. 17.4).
73. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 8-9 (art. 18); Memorandum of Apr. 14,1978, supra
note 13, at 14-15.
74. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 9-10 (art. 19) (compensation for services is expected from this.exemption; there are limitations on the sale and movement of these
imported goods); Memorandum of Apr. 14, 1978, supra note 13, at 15.
75. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 10 (art. 23); Regulations, supra note 13, a t 25 (cl.
17.3); Memorandum of Apr. 14, 1978, supra note 13, at 15-16.
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2. Exploitation following exploration activities
The second way a private producer can enter into an exploitation phase is through exploratory discoveries that precipitate conversions of exploration lands into exploitation lands.76
For a Law 17,319 exploration permit holder, this is triggered
when "the permit holder through the application of approved
technical criteria shall have determined the existence of commercially exploitable hydrocarbon^."^^ When this vague standard has been met, the permit holder must declare his plans
. ~ ~ a concession will
concerning an exploitation c o n c e ~ s i o nThen,
be awarded and the new concessionaire must submit his work
and investment commitments for the exploitation phase for approval by the state.78 A Law 17,319 concessionaire has a duty to
delimit the productive area (which the concession boundaries
will conform to) as promptly as possible.80 This is likely to be a
natural goal of the concessionaire anyway owing to the impermanent nature of his rights.
The Law 21,778 approach to exploitation ensuing from exploration shows more oilfield sense than the Law 17,319 provisions do for such a conversion by laying out a more extensive
and practical procedure for the changeover. When a Law 21,778
contractor discovers a deposit of hydrocarbons, he begins the
transition into exploitation by announcing to YPF his plans for
determining if the accumulation has, by itself or in combination
with other discoveries, commercial p ~ t e n t i a l The
. ~ ~ pursuance of
such a program will then result in one of three conclusions concerning the investigated hydrocarbon traps: it is commercial, it
is not commercial, or its commerciality is still unclear.
If a deposit is labelled noncommercial, the contractor must
immediately release all areas coinciding with the trap that was
tested.82 However, if the operator is hesitant to label a property
76. Law 17,319, supra note 11, a t A-6, A-9 (arts. 17, 29).
77. Id. a t A-7, A-8 (art. 22).
78. Id. Indeed, an exploration permit holder who makes a discovery cannot proceed
with field exploitation until he has committed to opt for an exploitation concession. Id.
a t A-7 (art. 21).
79. Id. a t A-10 (art. 32).
80. Id. a t A-10, A-11 (art. 33).
81. Regulations, supra note 13, a t 5-6 (cl. 3.2.1); see also Contract for the "Llancanelo" Area, supra note 13, at 7-8 (art. 3.2.1) (contractor has up to twenty-four months
to carry out its program for determining commerciality).
82. Regulations, supra note 13, a t 6 (cl. 3.2.3); see also Contract for the "Malargue
Sur" Area, supra note 13, a t 7 (art. 3.2.3).
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noncommercial and, at the same time, is not convinced of the
prospect's commerciality (e.g., it could be commercial if exploited with other discoveries or if prices were to increase
slightly), the contractor is permitted to postpone the declaration
of his conclusion. The maximum permissible length of this postponement will be set out in a "document of particular conditions," but in no event shall it extend beyond the end of the
exploitation stage time period.83
If a deposit is determined to be commercial, then the contractor must submit all of his geologic and engineering informa~~
tion to YPF along with a plan for full e ~ p l o i t a t i o n .Law
21,778's enactment was specifically aimed a t encouraging the
discovery and development of Argentina's offshore reserve^.^^
Accordingly, Law 21,778 has a unique provision. When an offshore gas field is discovered, the exploitation period may be suspended for up to ten years to await the development of a market
and transportation facilities for the gas.86
An operator who commences exploitation as a result of conversion from exploration must still concern himself with the applicable fiscal regime, time periods limiting his rights, and work
and investment commitments as described above. The quantity
of land available to him will be based largely on the initiative he
takes and his success in finding exploitable fields. Both Law
17,319 and Law 21,778, therefore, provide a legal mechanism for
converting new discoveries into production and development
programs, but the Law 21,778 system is clearer and better calculated to conform to oilfield practices.

This section analyzes the underlying principles of Argentina's petroleum laws and the impact those principles have on
private producers. Two of these principles, state dominance of
the petroleum industry and Argentina's need for private activity
in the petroleum industry, are in constant tension. The dynamics of the conflict between these principles help to explain
changes in the country's petroleum policy. Another one of the
83. Regulations, supra note 13, at 6 (cl. 3.2.4).
84. Regulations, supra note 13, at 6, 21 (cls. 3.2.2, 15.3); see also Contract for the
"Malargue Sur" Area, supra note 13, at 7, 16 (arts. 3.2.2, 9.3).
85. Memorandum of Apr. 14, 1978, supra note 13, at 13, 16.
86. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 4 (art. 9(e)).
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fundamental principles, private responsibility for the mining
risks of exploration and exploitation, does not present a new
concept for private producing entities. The final principle deals
with ownership of the hydrocarbons that are produced and the
consequences of ownership or nonownership to a private entity.
After studying these essential principles, a private producer will
recognize and understand the general concerns he should have
about the Argentine petroleum industry.

A. State Dominance us. Dependence on Private Investment
and Activity
"[I]ndespensable [sic] . . . control of the state over all asthe exploration, exploitation, transportation,
pects involved inwB7
and marketing of hydrocarbons characterizes Argentina's petro~~
this philosophy of state domileum l e g i s l a t i ~ n .Undergirding
nance is Law 17,319's pronouncements that the nation's hydrocarbons are "inalienable and imprescriptible assets" of the
state.8s The National Executive Power controls the legal mechanisms of the petroleum industry by making major policy decisions under Law 17,319 and by approving all risk contracts
under Law 21,778." The Secretary of Energy assists the National Executive Power by applying and executing these laws.81
"State companies" are the "essential agents" for the state in its
petroleum activities and these companies play a dominant role
in the accomplishment of the national objective^.^^ Strategic
proven and prospective hydrocarbon lands are reserved for the
sole dominion of the state companies to aid them in fulfilling
their assigned function^.^^
The National Executive Power sets its policies in accordance with the express national objective of meeting the coun87. Memorandum of June 23, 1967, supra note 3, at B-1.
88. Memorandum of Apr. 14, 1978, supra note 13, at 13; Memorandum of June 23,
1967, supra note 3, at B-4.
89. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-1 (art. 1). This approach solves a multiplicity of
jurisdictions problem that has plagued the development of a national policy, but it also
raises constitutional issues concerning ownership and procedural jurisdiction over hydrocarbon reserves. These issues have been hotly debated for many years. See id. at A-4
(art. 12) (provinces to participate equally with the national government in provincial
production).
90. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 5-6 (arts. 12,13); Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A1, A-32 (arts. 3, 98).
91. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-26, A-32 (arts. 75, 97).
92. Id. at A-4, A-30 (arts. 11, 91).
93. Id.
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try's petroleum needs from indigenous produ~tion.'~
Law 17,319
was directed toward accomplishing this goal through the granting of exploitation concessions. When it became evident that
Law 17,319 alone would not meet this
Law 21,778 was
enacted to stimulate further activity by allowing the state companies to enter into risk contracts with private en ti tie^."^ These
nonpublic entities were to assist state companies in developing
those lands reserved to them, especially offshore prospect^.'^
Another basic theme, partially expressed and partially implied, of Argentina's petroleum laws is the country's great need
for the economic and technical assistance that private investment and other private involvement provide. In the petroleum
sector itself, private entities can supply the tremendous financial
resources required for petroleum exploration, particularly in offshore projects." Private companies also have technical abilities
that the state need^.'^ Both Law 17,319 and Law 21,778'0•‹ require private operators that want to participate in Argentina's
petroleum industry to possess the technical competence and financial resources necessary to perform the works that will be required of them. By surpassing the "dubious efficiency (resulting
from) . . . subordinating the extraction of hydrocarbons to the
technical and economic resources of the state,"'O1 a petroleum
industry buoyed up by private money and ingenuity gives desperately needed support to the country's quest for "economic
expansion on reasonable technical and economic bases."'02 Aside
from boosting the petroleum industry, private participation is
expected to stimulate local industry and increase employment.'03
Despite "the acknowledged competence of Argentine technical
94. Id. at A-1 (art. 2); Memorandum of June 23, 1967, supra note 3, at B-8 to B-10.
95. CNRET, supra note 2, at 45.
96. Regulations, supra note 13, at 1 (cl. 1); Memorandum of Apr. 14, 1978, supra
note 13, at 12.
97. Memorandum of Apr. 14, 1978, supra note 13, at 12-13, 16; WORLD
OIL,supra
note 1, at 125-32.
98. Memorandum of Apr. 14, 1978, supra note 13, at 13; Memorandum of June 23,
1967, supra note 3, at B-4; CNRET, supra note 2, at 45.
99. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 1 (art. 2).
100. Id.; Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-1, A-2 (art. 5 ) ; Regulations, supra note 13,
at 1, 8-9 (cls. 1, 5.2); Memorandum of June 23, 1967, supra note 3, at B-13.
101. Memorandum of June 23, 1967, supra note 3, at B-2.
102. Id. at B-1.
103. Memorandum of Apr. 14, 1978, supra note 13, at 16; Memorandum of June 23,
1967, supra note 3, at B-4.
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personnel and labourer^,"'^^ a private producer is required
under both Law 17,319 and Law 21,778 to employ a high percentage of Argentinians.lo5
Even though the Argentine petroleum legislation is founded
on the principle of state control, this principle is in constant tension with and must be balanced against Argentina's genuine
need for private involvement in accomplishing its petroleum and
economic goals. Unfortunately, Argentina's administration of its
hydrocarbon laws sometimes does not reflect the country's substantial need for private involvement and, when this happens,
both Argentina and the private operators suffer.lo6
The exact impact this struggle between state dominance of
natural resource development and reliance upon private investment and technology will have on the private operator is difficult to anticipate. Some general observations would be more appropriate. A private producer planning to operate in Argentina
for the entire duration of a risk contract or concession agreement should expect to experience all ranges of the spectrum of
government dominance.'07 An initial indicator of the tenor of the
Argentine government at a particular time is the political ideology of the governing authorities. Economic nationalist leaders
favor energy self-sufficiency spawned by active government involvement. Government involvement can range from tariff protection and an infrastructure base designed to stimulate private
Argentine exploration and production efforts, to complete state
dominance of the petroleum industry. Economic liberalist leaders, on the other hand, welcome foreign investment and involvement in petroleum-seeking and -producing activities. Economic
liberalism in Argentina is export based and is founded on cordial
foreign relations and interchange.
These philosophical labels are of limited value, however, because Argentine politicians do not always remain loyal, a t least
in practice, to their ideological classifications. Still, even though
theoretical bases are of limited value in predicting how Argen104. Memorandum of June 23, 1967, supra note 3, at B-21.
105. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-25 (art. 4); Regulations, supra note 13, at 19-20
(cl. 13.12).
106. Parker, supra note 5; WORLDOIL,supra note 1.
107. This is exemplified by the varying treatment afforded to Standard Oil Comsupra note 1. See
pany of New Jersey and its subsidiaries. See generally C. SOLBERG,
J. BEHRMAN,
P. CHURCH.
G. EDWARDS,
H. GOMEZ,
W. HARalso R. MIKESELL,
W. BARTSCH,
RIS, M. MAMALAKIS,
D. WELLS,M. WIONCZEK
& J. ZINSER,
FOREIGN
INVESTMENT
IN THE
PETROLEUM
AND MINERAL
INDUSTRIES
157-88 (1971).
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tine rulers will direct the petroleum industry, it is important to
monitor the country's political development as effectively as
possible because political developments may prove to be the single most critical factor in the progress or lack of progress of Argentina's petroleum i n d ~ s t r y . ' ~ ~
In many ways, the Argentine conflict between state control
of and private contribution to the oil and gas industry typifies
the petroleum technology transfer battle that developing countries have waged with private oil cornpanie~.'~~
Hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation activities are markedly enhanced by
technological abilities and advancements. Historically, private
multinational corporations have provided the technology required for worldwide petroleum operations. Naturally, sovereign
countries want to control the use and depletion of their indigenous natural resources. Hence, as in Argentina, an ensuing
struggle sets the governments of developing countries (that .want
to regulate the development of their own energy resources)
against the private oil companies (that are seeking to fulfill their
own ends) possessing the technology needed for resource utilization. Initially, this confrontation produced concession arrangements giving wide latitude to the oil companies and providing
limited financial benefits but no technological benefits to the
host countries."O Such concession arrangements were present
under early Argentine oil laws.''' Gradually, developing countries began using petroleum contracts and other means to develop petroleum technology among their own industries and labor market^."^
Provisions under Law 17,319 and Law 21,778 that require
the hiring and training of Argentine nationals, the delivery of
oilfield information to the state, and the reversion of production
equipment and facilities to the state are examples of Argentine
efforts to acquire te~hnology."~Additionally, Argentina has a
108. At least one business advisor feels that energy progress is closely related t o
politics. See Wanniski, Energy In Abundance, LANDMAN,
Jan. 1983, at 7-12.
109. See generally Zakariya, Transfer of Technology Under Petroleum Deuelopment Contracts, 16 J. WORLDTRADEL. 207 (1982).
110. See CNRET,supra note 2, at 109-10, 152; Zakariya, supra note 109, at 211.
111. See Memorandum of June 23, 1967, supra note 3, at B-1, B-2; C. SOLBERC,
supra note 1, at 14-15.
112. See Zakariya, supra note 109, at 210-22.
113. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 4, 5 (arts. 9(e), 9(h)); Law 17,319, supra note 11,
at A-11, A-12, A-24, A-25 (arts. 15, 37, 70, 71); see also Zakariya, supra note 109, at 21115.
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petroleum technology training institute and belongs to ARPEL,
a Latin American association of state petroleum enterprises.l14 A
complete transfer of technology
lies in the ability of the developing country to purchase or hire
directly the most advanced technical means of petroleum exploration and development, if and when it so wishes, at a reasonable price. It also lies above all, in developing the mental
skills of its citizens to utilize these technical means effectively,
alone if they choose to do so."'
However, a full technology transfer is closely tied to economic
and industrial development in the developing country.l16 Argentina's shortcomings in these areas make it probable that a complete technological transfer is a distant dream for Argentina, but
it is likely that private operators in the country will be faced
with demands from the government to assist this transfer of
technology.
Finally, in understanding the state dominance versus private participation conflict, the concepts of political ideology and
technology transfer must be set afloat on the underlying sea of
social, economic, and political problems that plague Argentina.
As a developing country, Argentina seems like a child that is dissatisfied with what it has and yet does not know what it wants.
For the oil industry, the result of Argentina's uneasiness is a
constantly changing oil p01icy."~ The country would like to pay
fair oil prices to producers, yet economic problems make this
difficult. Socially and politically, some forces in Argentina would
like to achieve energy self-sufficiency, but the country lacks the
financial and technological ability to do so."8 The consequences
to the private operator are uncertainty and instability in the petroleum industry.

B. Risk and Ownership
Under both Law 17,319 and Law 21,778, the private opera114. See CNRET, supra note 2, at 82-91; see also Zakariya, supra note 109, at 208,
220.
115. Zakariya, supra note 109, at 219.
116. Id. at 222.
supra note 1, at 156-76. Law 21,778 was enacted in 1978 and,
117. See C. SOLBERG,
by 1982, the country was considering new major changes in its oil legislation. See generOIL,supra note 1.
ally WORLD
118. See Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-1 (art. 3); Memorandum of June 23, 1967,
supra note 3, at A-8; C. SOLBERG,
supra note 1, at 172-77; CNRET, supra note 2, at 45.
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tor assumes all "hazards defined as mining r i ~ k . " " ~Producers
operating under Law 17,319 own the hydrocarbons they produce,
including the right to transport, refine, and market their production.120 This system is designed to provide "substantial incentives" by opening up the vistas of vertical integration (e.g., marketing, exportation) to nonpublic entities.lZ1 The exercise of
nonproduction rights, however, is subject to regulation by the
National Executive Power. Some initial regulations are set forth
in Law 17,319. For example, liquid hydrocarbons can be sold
only in domestic markets until the objective of petroleum selfsufficiency is met.lZ2In addition, all natural gas produced in Argentina is subject to a first purchase option granted to the
"State-owned enterprise responsible for the public service of gas
distrib~tion."'~~
In contrast to Law 17,319, companies contracting under
Law 21,778 receive no legal rights under applicable mining laws,
"nor will they have ownership of the hydrocarbons so obtained."lZ4 However, if domestic needs are satisfied from indigenous production and an adequate supply of reserves has been
accumulated, the contractor may receive payment in kind.lZ6AS
a limitation on this practice, however, YPF can restrict payment
in kind to crudes so that even when national requirements are
met, natural and liquified gas may not be available in kind.lZ6
In the simplest sense, the procedures under Law 17,319 and
Law 21,778 are very similar and, from a producer's viewpoint,
the ownership distinctions between the laws are not crucial.
Both laws prescribe a system mandating delivery of a specified
119. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 1 (art. 2); Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-1, A-2
(art. 5).
120. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-2, A-3 (art. 6); Memorandum of June 23, 1967,
supra note 3, at B-5, B-10, B-11.
121. Memorandum of June 23, 1967, supra note 3, at B-5, B-15.
122. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at B-2, B-3 (art. 6). This limitation is subject to
exceptions justified on technical grounds. Id.; Memorandum of June 23, 1967, supra note
3, at B-10. The Executive Power may prescribe rules which assure an equitable and rational participation by all companies in the domestic market. Law 17,319, supra note 11,
at B-2, B-3 (art. 6).
123. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-3, B-2 (art. 6); Memorandum of June 23, 1967,
supra note 3, at B-11 (operators can consume hydrocarbons as needed for their
operations).
124. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 1 (art. 3); Memorandum of Apr. 14, 1978, supra
note 13, at 13.
125. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 1 (art. 4); Regulations, supra note 13, at 1, 23
(cls. 1, 16.2.3); Memorandum of Apr. 14, 1978, supra note 13, at 13, 14.
126. Regulations, supra note 13, at 23 (cl. 16.2.3).
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amount of production into internal markets, after which the producer may dispose of any excess output as he chooses.127Within
these basic procedural frameworks, however, differences between
the Law 21,778 operator and the Law 17,319 concessionaire do
emerge. These disparities, which are largely rooted in ownership
rights, can be recognized and managed by the producer by studying the price the producer can receive for his production and
the likelihood that the producer will have an available market
for all of this production. Additionally, the producer must consider the quantity of his production over which he will have exportation rights. These factors, and not ownership differences,
become critical in the producer's analysis of his opportunities for
profitable operations in Argentina.
In evaluating the prices available for his production, a producer interested in exploring in Argentina should ascertain the
relative prices obtainable under Law 17,319 and Law 21,778
transactions. Also, since the producer is committed to serving
local markets until domestic needs are met, the producer must
compare prices available in Argentina to world oil prices.128For
liquid hydrocarbons, Law 17,319 concessionaires have more price
latitude than Law 21,778 contractors because concessionaires
have transportation and marketing rights to their p r o d u c t i ~ n . ' ~ ~
Law 21,778 operators are obligated, until payment in kind is allowed, to sell their output to "the state company,"130 whereas
the only significant restriction put on crude prices by Law
17,319 is that the National Executive Power might set prices.131
However, the statute tries to temper this possibility by assuring
that "reasonable profits" will be attainable and that even if
prices are set by the National Executive Power, they will be
equal to those established for the state oil company and will not
be lower than those prevailing for imported crudes of similar
127. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at B-2, B-3 (arc. 6) (operator must obtain a commercially reasonable price for exported crude).
128. See Argentine Contract Talks Hit Snags, OIL & GASJ., Jan. 10, 1983, at 44.
Sagging prices have proven to be a major flaw in the Argentine oil industry and, combined with soaring inflation and political instability, have resulted in a downward production trend in the country. Enright, World Oil Flow, Refining Capacity Down
Sharply; Reserves Increase, OIL & GASJ., Dec. 27, 1982, at 75,77,79; Parker, supra note
OIL, supra note 1.
5; WORLD
129. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-2, A-3 (art. 6); Memorandum o f June 23, 1967,
supra note 3, a t B-5.
130. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 1 (art. 4); Regulations, supra note 13, at 1 (cl. 1).
131. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-2, A-3 (art. 6).
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quality and under similar condition^.'^^ This latter provision
should serve to keep Law 17,319 prices a t the world market
level.
Law 21,778 crude producers are subject to a more nebulous
price structure, with the payment in cash being based on "the
unit of measurement corresponding to the type of hydrocarbon
obtained and delivered . . .
Since these price standards are
set by the state and a risk contractor can sell crude only to the
state until payment in kind is made, the Law 21,778 risk contractor has no control over the price he receives for his domestically marketed crude. He will be paid according to the state's
established price structure.
For gas, Law 17,319 provides that gas prices shall be set by
agreement and that the prices "shall assure the operator an eqThis proviuitable return on the corresponding inve~trnent."'~~
sion, combined with the state company's preemptive right to
purchase a concessionaire's gas output, puts the Law 17,319 gasproducing concessionaire in much the same position as the Law
21,778 gas-producing contractor that must sell under contract to
the state company based on the same price framework that Law
21,778 crude contractors are subject to.13' The similarity is further enhanced by Law 21,778's authorization allowing YPF to
prevent payment in kind for natural and liquid gas (i.e., YPF
can limit payment in kind to crude p e t r ~ l e u m ) , 'which,
~~
in effect, gives the state a first option to purchase on all of a Law
21,778 risk contractor's gas production.
Before a petroleum producer commences an exploration
program, the producer wants to be assured that he will be able
132. Id. a t A-2, A-31 (art. 6); Memorandum of June 23, 1967, supra note 3, a t B-11.
It appears that this last guarantee has not been abided by. A. IGLESIA,
POLITICA
PETROLERA ARGENTINE
263 (1980). Perhaps this failure to meet world prices can be explained by the sudden upturn in the world price in recent years and by the Law 17,319
exception which provides that "[s]hould the prices of imported crudes be substantially
increased due to exceptional circumstances, such prices shall not be taken into consideration for establishing the domestic marketing prices . . . ." Law 17,319, supra note 11,
a t A-2 (art. 6).
133. Law 21,778, supra note 25, a t 1 (art. 4); see also Regulations, supra note 13, a t
1 (cl. 1). For an example of crude price formulas in risk contracts, see Contract for the
"Comodoro Rivadavia Coastal Belt" Area, supra note 13, at 22-23 (art. 11.1).
134. Law 17,319, supra note 11, a t A-3 (art. 6).
135. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 1 (art. 4); Regulations, supra note 13, a t 1 (cl. 1);
Memorandum of Apr. 14, 1978, supra note 13, a t 13. For an example of risk contract gas
formulas, see Contract for the "Comodoro Rivadavia Coastal Belt" Area, supra note 13,
a t 23-24 (arts. 11.2, 11.3).
136. Regulations, supra note 13, a t 23 (cl. 16.2.3).
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to market his product commercially. This should not present a
major problem for a Law 17,319 producer. The free market access allowed to such a producer provides him with the opportunity to solve any major marketing obstacles during both
nonexportation and exportation periods. Even though a Law
17,319 gas producer must first offer his gas to the state company,
such option to purchase must be exercised by the state within
"reasonable time limits" and the producer can, with appropriate
approval and subject to prescribed regulations, decide on the
disposition of any gas not purchased by the state.13'
The Law 21,778 producer, on the other hand, has only one
buyer prior to payment in kind-the state.'38 Such a contractor
could find himself in a difficult position if the state company is
unwilling (e.g., because the quality of the crude is not suited to
the state company's refining facilities) or unable (e.g., lack of
storage capacity) to take the contractor's product while, a t the
same time, domestic production has not satisfied domestic needs
so that the payment in kind alternative is also not available to
the contractor. The Law 21,778 operator must contractually anticipate these eventualities and obtain either guarantees of receipt of his production in reasonable geographic locations with
penalties against the state for failure to comply, or the right to
dispose freely of any excess production not taken by the state
company. Additionally, provisions should be made stipulating
who bears the costs when additional storage or transportation
facilities are required to sustain receipt of the private operator's
production by the state company. Various provisions along this
line have been used by risk contractors including:
(1) A guarantee of reception of a specified volume of crude oil
by YPF with options for the contractor to dispose of any

excess.
(2) Specification of the reception standards that the hydro-

carbons must meet (e.g., water content, salinity levels).
Agreements
on when the contractor will not be obliged to
(3)
make certain production related investments.
(4) Provisions for reinjection or commercial disposal (with a
137. Law 17,319, supra note 11, A-2, A-3 (art. 6); Memorandum of June 23, 1967,
supra note 3, at B-11, B-12.
138. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 1 (art. 4); Regulations, supra note 13, at 1 (cl. 1).
For an example of actual production, delivery, and transportation clauses in risk contracts, see Contract for the "Llancanelo"Area, supra note 13, at 21-30 (art. 10, Annex V,
Annex VI).
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partial payment to YPF) of gas that YPF cannot receive
or for which transportation facilities are not available.
Allowance of construction and operation by the private
contractor of equipment for obtaining liquified gas.
Assessment of penalties against YPF for failure to comply
with its reception requirements for any causes other than
force majeure or fortuitous case.
Provision for who bears the cost of storage and treatment
facilities.
Provision, as part of two thermal stimulation pilot
projects, that the contractor and YPF shall agree on the
conditions under which the contractor may dispose of
crude oil not disposed of by YPF.
Provisions concerning transportation to YPF's point of
reception.lsg

Obviously, a private operator can make only limited demands when dealing with a foreign sovereign in a competitive
bidding situation. Nevertheless, the contracting company must
protect itself by assuring reception of its production on the most
favorable terms possible.
A final important concern of a private operator working in
Argentina is the quantity of his production that will be available
for exportation. In a country such as Argentina that has severe
economic problems and chronic political instability, an operator
wants t o have free rein, including the right t o export as much of
his production as is possible. The ability to export provides an
opportunity to circumvent unfavorable market conditions within
the country. Nevertheless, Argentine production must satisfy
Argentine petroleum needs before any private operator may
truly claim freedom to dispose of his production, especially the
~~
the restricfreedom to export that p r o d u c t i ~ n . 'Additionally,
tions on export rights to natural gas are more stringent than
those for crude petroleum.141 A Law 17,319 producer of 'liquid
hydrocarbons has to be authorized by the National Executive
139. For examples, see Contract for the "Comodoro Rivadavia Coastal Belt" Area,
supra note 13, at 14-15, 18-19, 20 (arts. 10.1, 10.2.2, 10.3); Contract for the "Llancanelo"
Area, supra note 13, at 23-26 (arts. 10.1, 10.2.2, 10.3); Contract for the "Malargue Sur"
Area, supra note 13, at 17-19, 21 (arts. 10.1, 10.2.2, 10.3).
140. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 1 (art. 4); Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-2, A-3
(art. 6); Regulations, supra note 13, at 1 (cl. 1); Memorandum of Apr. 14, 1978, supra
note 13, at 1-14; Memorandum of June 23, 1967, supra note 3, at B-10, B-11.
141. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 1 (art. 4); Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-2, A-3
(art. 6); Regulations, supra note 13, at 1, 23 (cls. 1, 16.2.3).
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Power to export crude supplies that are "in excess of the normal
needs of the internal market."lq2
Aside from meeting domestic production goals, the only
statutory restrictions placed on the right to export are that the
prices received for the exported production be commercially reasonable in 'light of the international market and that the operator submit to any promulgated rules designed to accomplish equitable participation in the internal market by all producers
within the
Similar in nature, but slightly more restrictive, is the Law 21,778 proviso that a contracting company
may receive payment in kind when domestic production meets
domestic demand and an "adequate margin of reserves [as decreed by the National Executive Power] has been establi~hed.""~
One further drawback that a contractor might experience is
that if crude risk contract prices in Argentina are low and payment in kind is made based on the cash price, the operator may
be disappointed at the quantity of crude received as payment in
kind. However, both the 1980 Unionoil International Explora'~~
tion Company, Ltd./Inalruco S.A. Petrolera Risk C o n t r a ~ t and
the 1979 Occidental De Argentina Inc./Bridas/Union Texas1
Compania Quimica Risk Contractlq6provide that once the contractor has invoiced YPF for crude for which payment is due in
kind, the contractor may "dispose of said Crude Oil immediately."lq7 So the Law 21,778 crude oil threshold point for export
rights is higher than the Law 17,319 threshold level, but once a
Law 21,778 contractor that has contracted to receive payment in
kind reaches the payment in kind stage for crude, he has unrestricted rights of disposition.
For natural gas exportation rights, a private operator must
overcome more legal obstacles than for crude exportation rights.
142. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-2, A-3 (art. 6); Memorandum of June 23, 1967,
supra note 3, at B-10, B-11.
143. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-2, A-3 (art. 6); Memorandum of June 23, 1967,
supra note 3, at B-10, B-11.
144. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 1 (art. 4); see also Regulations, supra note 13, at
1 (cl. 1). Payment in kind is available only if "clauses contemplating such possibility and
the basis for pricing the hydrocarbons delivered in payment have bcen incorporated to
the corresponding contract." Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 1 (art. 4).
145. Contract for the "Llancanelo" Area, supra note 13.
146. Contract for the "Malargue Sur" Area, supra note 13.
147. Contract for the "Llancanelo" Area, supra note 13, at 37 (art. 11.4); Contract
for the "Malargue Sur" Area, supra note 13, at 28 (art. 11.5).
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Under Law 17,319, a concessionaire may, upon obtaining appropriate consent, decide upon the disposal and utilization of any
natural gas not purchased by the state company. There is no
limit, though, on how much of his production the state company
can purchase,148 making uncertain the availability of export
rights. Even more restrictive is the Law 21,778 reservation by
the state of the right to refuse any payment in kind on any "natural and liquid gas produced."149 Thus, a Law 21,778 gas producer may not receive payment in kind even after domestic demand is met and an adequate reserve is established.
Some risk contracts provide that when gathering and transportation facilities are lacking, a contractor may, in some instances, commercially market (and export) the gas produced and
pay YPF 25% of the price the contractor would have received if
the gas had been delivered to the state.150 Underlying these nuances for Law 21,778 natural gas disposition is the same basic
Law 21,778 standard-satisfaction of domestic demand and an
adequate supply of reserves-that applies to crudes.161 In summary, the essence of the exportation right is that a producer's
right to export revolves around the whims of the state and the
achievement of national production goals.

The private sector of the Argentine petroleum industry does
present exploration and production opportunities for entities
that possess sufficient technical and financial competence. This
industry, however, is highly regulated by the state and should
not be entered without a thorough investigation of the prevailing
political and economic climates within the country. In addition,
whenever legally possible the private company must insist on intelligent contractual safeguards anticipated to protect its interests. In the private company's favor, and balanced against the
state's desire to control its resources, is the fact that Argentina
148. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-2, A-3 (art. 6); Memorandum of June 23, 1967,
supra note 3, at B-11, B-12.
149. Regulations, supra note 13, at 1, 23 (cls. 1, 16.2.3); see also Contract for the
"Llancanelo" Area, supra note 13, at 36-37 (art. 11.3); Contract for the "Malargue Sur"
Area, supra note 13, at 27-28 (art. 11.4).
150. Contract for the "Comodoro Rivadavia Coastal Belt" Area, supra note 13, at 10
(arts. 10.2.1, 10.2.3).
151. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 1 (art. 4); Regulations, supra note 13, at 1 (cl. 1);
Memorandum of Apr. 14, 1978, supra note 13, at 13-14.
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cannot rely on its state-owned companies to satisfy the country's
petroleum production goals. As a consequence, Argentina has a
definite need for private investment and participation in this vital industry.
The private operator looking at potential involvement in
Argentina's oil and gas industry has three avenues to consider:
service contracts, risk contracts, or concession arrangements.
This comment analyzed the latter two alternatives from an exploration and production perspective. Both the risk contract and
the concession agreement provide exploitation rights and, as required, exploration rights tailored to meet a specific prospect's
requirements. Both, however, come burdened with work and investment commitments and fiscal regimes that require an operator to accurately and continuously plan and evaluate his activities. In all, the demands of keeping up with all of these
commitments, combined with the economic and political instability of Argentina, furnish the private operator with an interesting and challenging legal and business venture.

Stephen L. Snow

A Comparative Look at the Reporter's Privilege
in Criminal Cases: United States, Federal
Republic of Germany, and Switzerland
The reporter's privilege allows journalists to withhold the
identity of news sources during investigatory proceedings.' This
controversial privilege has received considerable attention from
legislative bodies, courts and scholars in the United States, the
Federal Republic of germ an^,^ and Switzerland. Unique national ideas of the press and its role have caused each of these
countries to reach different conclusions about granting a reporter's privilege.
The major developments involving the reporter's privilege
in the United States, West Germany, and Switzerland occurred
approximately ten years ago. However, questions about the existence and scope of the privilege have continued to trouble the
lower courts and scholars of each country. This comment compares the availability of the reporter's privilege in criminal actions in the three countries and examines the structural and ideological developments leading to the enactment of their present
laws.3

A reporter in the United States has little protection against
judicially compelled disclosure of the identity of his sources in a
criminal prosecution because there is no federal statutory or ju1. The terms reporter's privilege and Zeugnisverweigerungsrecht (the German term)
are used in civil, administrative, and criminal proceedings. However, this comment discusses only the criminal procedure aspect. The reporter's privilege is not limited to reporters. The term is used here to refer to all those working in the news media who are
accorded privileges by statutes and judicial decisions. (Translations of all German materials are the author's.)
2. The Federal Republic of Germany will hereinafter be referred to as West
Germany.
3. Much of the discussion about the present state of the law will center around
landmark judicial decisions. The use of judicial decisions to explain the approaches of
the various countries is not intended to emphasize the importance of the judiciary in
formulating the reporter's privilege. The role of the judiciary has varied in the different
countries, but the court opinions can serve as official statements about the reporter's
privilege in the various legal systems.
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dicially recognized reporter's pri~ilege.~
Congress has considered
reporter's privilege' legislation several times, but has never
adopted a federal reporter's privilege ~ t a t u t e The
. ~ judiciary has
been hindered in developing a common law reporter's privilege
by Branzburg u. ha ye^,^ a 1972 Supreme Court decision holding
that there is no constitutional basis for a reporter's privilege.
Branzburg u. Hayes is the only Supreme Court decision that
In Branzburg, the Court condiscusses the reporter's pri~ilege.~
sidered the appeals of three journalists who had been subpoenaed by grand juries to answer questions concerning the journalists' reports on certain criminal activities. On three occasions the
journalists refused to appear before the grand juries. On two
other occasions the journalists appeared, but refused to answer
questions relating to the identity of their sources after claiming
a reporter's privilege under the first amendment.s The Court rejected the journalists' argument and held that requiring journalists to appear and testify before state or federal grand juries
does not abridge the freedom of speech and press guaranteed by
the first amendment.9
4. See generally Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 MICH.L
REV. 229 (1971); D'Alemberte, Journalists Under the Axe: Protection of Confidential
Sources of Information, 6 HARV.J . ON LEGIS.307 (1969); Eckhardt & McKey, Reporter's
Privilege: An Update, 12 CONN.L. REV.435 (1980); Edelstein & LoBue, Journalist's
L. REV.913 (1979); Guest & StanPriuilege and the Criminal Defendant, 47 FORDHAM
zler, The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen Concealing Their Sources, 64 Nw.U.L.
REV. 18 (1969); Murasky, The Journalist's Privilege: Branzburg and Its Aftermath, 52
TEX.L. REV.829 (1974); Nelson, The Newsmen's Privilege Against Disclosure of Confidential Sources and Information, 24 VAND.L. REV.667 (1971); Note, Reporter's and
Their Sources: The Constitutional Right to a Confidential Relationship, 80 YALEL.J.
317 (1970).
5. See, e g . , Newsmen's Privilege: Hearings on S. 36, S. 158, S. 318, S. 451, S. 637, S.
750, S. 870, S. 917, S. 1128 and S.J. Res. 8 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional
Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); Newsmen's
Privilege; Hearing on H.R. 717 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). See also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 689
n.28 (1972).
6. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
7. The only other time the entire Court has considered similar issues was in Zurcher
v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978), which involved the search and seizure of newsroom materials.~Individualjustices have, on occasion, stated opinions on reporter's privilege. See, e g . , In re Roche, 448 U.S. 1312 (1980) (Brennan, J., opinion in chambers).
8. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 667-78. This was not the first time a first amendment
claim had been made. However, such claims have generally been unsuccessful. See, e.g.,
Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958); In re Goodfader, 45 Hawaii 317,367 P.2d 472 (1961); State v. Buchanan, 250 Or. 244,436 P.2d 729,
cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968); In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963).
9. Branzburg, 408 U.S. a t 667.
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Justice White's plurality opinion noted that "[tlhe heart of
the claim is that the burden on news gathering resulting from
compelling reporters to disclose confidential information outweighs any public interest in obtaining the information."1•‹ The
Court weighed the importance of "the right to every man's evidence,"" especially in criminal grand jury proceedings, against
the possible harm to a journalist's ability to gather news, and
found the evidentiary interest more compelling.'* Although
newsgathering does qualify for first amendment protection, the
Court held that journalists are afforded no greater protection
than the average citizen.13 The Court particularly emphasized
that "[flrom the beginning of our country the press has operated
without constitutional protection for press informants, and the
press has flourished. The existing constitutional rules have not
been a serious obstacle to either the development or retention of
confidential news sources by the press."14
The Court did not grant journalists a conditional first
amendment privilege because of the difficulty in (1) defining the
terms and scope of the privilege, (2) distinguishing between different crimes, and (3) providing journalists with a reliable rule.15
According to the Court, the Constitution offers protection only
when grand jury investigations are undertaken in bad faith to
harass and "disrupt a reporter's relationship with his news
s~urces."~~
Justice Powell's pivotal concurring opinion articulated a less
rigorous standard that has been applied by many courts to limit
the impact of Branzburg. Justice Powell stated the rule:
The asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts by
the striking of a proper balance between freedom of the press
and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony
with respect to criminal conduct. The balance of these vital
constitutional and societal interests on a case-by-case basis ac10. Id. at 681.
11. Id. at 688 (quoting 8 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE
5 2192 (rev. ed. 1961)).
12. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 690. In considering the possible negative effects of compelled disclosure of the source's identity, the Court looked at articles by Blasi and Guest
& Stanzler that contained surveys and empirical studies of the use of confidential information by journalists. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 694 nn.32 & 33. Some commentators feel
the Court misread the data in favor of its finding. See, e.g., Murasky, supra note 4.
13. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681-85.
14. Id. at 698-99.
15. Id. at 702-04.
16. Id. at 707-08.
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cords with the tried and traditional way of adjudicating such
questions."
Courts have used the Powell approach to limit Branzburg to its
facts. However, no common law reporter's privilege has been
granted in criminal proceedings unless the investigation was undertaken in bad faith to harass the reporter or state statutory
provisions specifically granted the privilege.ls
Although the Branzburg decision has been uniformly criticized, neither the Court nor Congress has been persuaded to
grant a reporter's privilege in criminal cases.lS However, the
Court in Branzburg did recognize that state statutes may provide for a reporter's privilege.20At the time Branzburg was decided nineteen states accorded some form of statutory reporter's
p r i ~ i l e g e Today
. ~ ~ twenty-five states have reporter privilege statutes that grant varying degrees of privilege.22However, despite
17. Id. at 710 (emphasis added).
RIGHTSAND LIABILITIES
OF PUBLISHERS,
BROADCASTERS
AND RE18. See S. METCALF,
PORTERS •˜ 3.09 (1982).
19. The principles of the Branzburg decision appear to have been reinforced by
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978). Nonetheless, Justice Brennan stated in
In re Roche, 448 U.S. 1312, 1315 (1980) (Brennan, J., opinion in chambers), that he did
"not believe that the Court has foreclosed news reporters from resisting a subpoena on
First Amendment grounds."
20. 408 US. at 688-89.
21. See Comment, The Fallacy of Farber: Failure to Acknowledge the Constitu299,304-08
tional Newsman's Privilege in Criminal Cases, 70 J. CRIM.L. & CRIMINOLOGY
(1979).
22. ALA. CODE•˜ 12-21-142 (1977) (absolute privilege as to identity of source);
ALASKA
STAT.•˜•˜ 09.25.150-.220 (1983) (qualified privilege); ARIZ.REV.STAT.ANN. 122237 (1982) (absolute privilege as to identity of source); ARK.STAT.ANN.3 43-917 (1977)
(must be an initial showing of publication with malice to require disclosure); CAL.EVID.
CODE3 1070(a) (West Supp. 1984) (only protects newsmen from contempt); DEL. CODE
ANN.tit. 10, •˜•˜ 4320-4326 (1974) (qualified privilege); IND.CODEANN. 34-3-5-1 (Burns
Supp. 1983) (limited to identity of source); KY.REV.STAT.ANN3 421.100 (Bobbs-Merrill
1970) (directed only to identity of source of published information); LA.REV.STAT.ANN.
45:1451-1454 (West 1982) (qualified privilege); MD. CTS.& JUD.PROC.CODEANN. 9112 (1984) (absolute privilege as to the identity of sources); MICH.COMP.LAWSANN.•˜
767.5a (West 1982) (absolute privilege); MINN.STAT.ANN $3 595.021-.025 (West Supp.
1984) (qualified privilege); MONT.CODEANN.$3 26-1-901 to -903 (1983) (absolute privilege); NEB. REV.STAT.•˜•˜ 20-144 to -147 (1977) (absolute privilege); NEV.REV.STAT.$
49.275 (1981) (absolute privilege); N.J. STAT.ANN.•˜ 2A:84A-21, -21a, -21.1 to -21.9 (West
Supp. 1983-84) (qualified privilege); N.M. STAT.ANN.•˜ 38-6-7 (Supp. 1983) (privilege
does not apply to judicial proceedings: Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 89
N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354 (1976)); N.Y. CIV.RIGHTSLAW•˜ 79-h (McKinney Supp. 198384) (absolute privilege); N.D. CENT.CODE$ 31-01-06.2 (1976) (qualified privilege); OHIO
REV.CODEANN. 2739.04, .12 (Page 1981 & Supp. 1984) (protects only identity of
source: State v. Geis, 2 Ohio App. 3d 258, 441 N.E.2d 803 (1981)); OKLA.STAT.ANN.tit.
12, 2506 (West 1980) (limited privilege); OR. REV.STAT.$8 44.510-.540 (1981) (limited
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the existence of numerous state reporter's privilege statutes, the
judiciary has continued to restrict the privilege in criminal
Thus, a reporter in the United States has little protection
against being compelled to disclose the identity of sources. The
Supreme Court's decision in Branzburg, which held that there is
no constitutional basis for a reporter's privilege, has limited judicial development of the reporter's privilege to a case by case
balancing of law enforcement interests against
the function of
the press. Law enforcement interests have predominated. Therefore, Congress's failure to enact a federal reporter's privilege
statute has left reporters dependent on state laws that often do
not provide adequate protection in criminal cases.

The reporter's privilege has also been the subject of considerable discussion in West Germany26 because of legislation
privilege); 42 PA. CONS.STAT.ANN.3 5942 (Purdon 1982) (broad protection); R.I. GEN.
LAWS$8 9-19.1-1 to -3 (Supp. 1983) (qualified privilege); TENN.CODEANN.5 24-1-208
(1980) (qualified privilege). A characterization of the statutes is found in S. METCALF,
supra note 18, a t 3 3.02.
23. See, eg., H. NELSON& D. TEETER,
LAWOF MASSCOMMUNICATIONS:
FREEDOM
AND
CONTROL
OF PRINTAND BROADCAST
MEDIA372-75 (4th ed. 1982). Reporters who have
personally witnessed a crime, as had two of the journalists in Branzburg, do not appear
to be eligible to claim a reporter's privilege. Id.
24. In German the term used to describe the reporter's privilege is
Zeugnisoerweigerungsrecht.
25. See, eg., P. CRAMER,DAS ZEUGNISVERWEIGERUNGSRECHT
VON PRESSE UND
RUNDFUNK
(1968); L. HENNEMANN,
PRESSEFRE~HE~T
UND ZEUGNISVERWEIGERUNGSRECHT
(Berliner Abhandlung zum Presserecht Heft 23, 1978); H. HUPPERTZ,ZEUGNISVERWEIGERUNGSRECHT, BESCHLAGNAHMEUND DURCHSUCHUNGSVERBOT
ZUGUNSTEN DES
RUNDFUNKS
IM STRAFPROZESS
(Instituts fiir Rundfunkrecht an der Universitat zu Koln
IM STRAFPROZESS.
EIN RECHTSGUTACHTEN
IM
Band 8, 1971); U KLUG.PRESSESCHUTZ
"SPIEGEL"
-VERFAHREN
(1965); Gross, Zum Zeugnisoerweigerungsrecht der Mitarbeiter
uon Presse und Rundfunk, in FESTSCHRIFT
FUR GERHARD
SCHIEDERMAIR
ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 223 (1976); Gross, Neuregelung des journalistischen Zeugnisoerweigerungsrecht,
1975 NEUE JURISTISCHE
WOCHENSCHRIFT
[N.J.W.] 1763; Kaiser, Die Verfassungsmassigkeit des Zeugnisoerweigerungsrechts der Presse, 1968 N.J.W. 1260; Kohlhaas, Das
Zeugnisverweigerungsrecht der Journalisten, in PRESSERECHT
UND PRESSEFREIHEIT:
FESTSCHRIFT
FUR MARTINLOFFLERZUM 75. GEBURTSTAG
143 (1980); Kunert, Das Gesetz
iiber das Zeugnisoerweigerungsrecht der Mitarbeiter oon Presse und Rundfunk, 1975
MONATSSCHRIFT
FUR DEUTSCHES
RECHT885; Loffler, Liicken und Mange1 irn neuen
Zeugnisoerweigerungs- und Beschlagnahmerecht oon Presse und Rundfunk, 1978
N.J.W. 913; Rengier, Die Reichweite des •˜ 53 Abs. 1 Nr. 5 StPO zum Schutze des namentlich preisgegebenen, aber unaufindbaren Informanten, 1979 JURISTENZEITUNG
[J.Z.] 797; Van Gelder, Die Verfassungswidrigkeit des landespresserechtlichen Zeugnisuerweigerungsrechte, 1969 J.Z. 698; Note, Das Neue Zeugnisuerweigerungs- und
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passed by the German Bundestag (parliament). Of the three
countries considered in this comment, West Germany is the only
one that has a federal statutory reporter's privilege.
The origin of the West German reporter's privilege statute
can be traced to statutes enacted in 1868 by three of the German Lander (states).26These first statutes were enacted in response to the Prussian government's failure to pass a similar law
that would have applied to all the German Lander controlled by
Prussia. A federal reporter's privilege statute was not enacted
until 1926, even though the unified German Reichstag had first
considered passing such a federal law in 1874.27By 1965, the
federal reporter's privilege statute stated:
Editors, publishers, distributors, printers and others who have
worked in the production or publication of a periodic publication [are permitted to withhold testimony] about the identity
of an author, source or informant of a publication of punishable contents, when an editor of the publication is punished or
nothing prohibits his p u n i ~ h m e n t . ~ ~

This formulation of the law gave reporters little protection
from compelled disclosure for four reasons. First, there was no
privilege for reporters who were not directly involved in the pro. ~ ~ left many reporters,
duction or publication of a p e r i ~ d i c a lThis
especially free-lance reporters, without protection. Second, even
reporters granted the privilege could not withhold the identity
of their sources unless their editor would be liable under the law
if the material were published. A reporter's sources were protected if an article was false or libelous, but not if the article was
accurate. Consequently, only unreliable informants, whose information is of little value to society, were protected under the
law.30 Third, the privilege did not arise until the information
Beschlagnahmerecht im Presse und Rundfunkbereich, 1978 N.J.W. 1617; Note, Die
Verfassungsmiissigkeit des Zeugnisuerweigerungsrechts der Presse, 1968 N.J.W. 2368.
, ZEUGNISVERWEIGERUNGSRECHT
DER PRESSE
IM STRAFUND DIS26. H.M ~ H LDAS
ZIPLINARVERFAHREN 23-24 (Zeitungs-Verlag und Zeitschriften-Verlag Band 2, 1963).
27. Id. at 25-26, 34. The federal law was not applied to the broadcast media until
1953. Id. at 39-42.
28. Strafprozessordnung [STPO] 1 53(1)(5), 1965 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBl] I 1374
(W. Ger.). Because this law was contained in the criminal procedure code it was only
applicable to criminal procedure. Other statutes exist for other types of procedure. Punishment in this context would apparently be for violation of the press laws. See generally
H. MBHL,supra note 26, at 60-74.
supra note 25, at 18.
29. See L. HENNEMANN,
supra note 25, at 19; L. HENNEMANN,
supra note 25, at 16; U.
30. See P. CRAMER,
KLUG,
supra note 25, at 21.
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supplied by the informant was published. Thus, authorities
could compel disclosure before publication, even if the material
was subsequently p ~ b l i s h e d .Fourth,
~~
only the name of the
source could be withheld. Information about the location of the
informant had to be revealed even though such information
might easily lead to the identification of the protected source.32
In response to this weak federal statutory privilege, by 1966
every West German Land had adopted a reporter's privilege
statute. These state statutes appeared to grant journalists a
broader privilege.33 However, the scope of the state statutory
privilege was unclear because of differences between the state
statutes.34 This confusion, combined with decisions by the
Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) and a
vast amount of scholarly work condemning the existing privilege,
eventually persuaded the Bundestag to enact a more inclusive
and comprehensible statute.
The first decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht that encouraged the enactment of a new federal statute was the Spiegel
decision in 1966.35 Spiegel primarily involved the search and
seizure of editorial material from a German magazine, but the
~~
opinion also discussed the federal reporter's p r i ~ i l e g e .The
court stated that the federal reporter's privilege statute was constitutional and partially protected editorial secrecy. However,
since the statute was not comprehensive, the court had to balance editorial secrecy against law enforcement interests, giving
editorial secrecy as much weight as possible until a new federal
statute could be e n a ~ t e d . ~ '
The need for a new federal statute was underscored again in
31. See R. GROSS.GRUNDZUECE
DES DEUTSCHEN PRESSERECHTS
146 (1969). But see P.
PRESSEPREIHEIT
UND STAATSSICHERHEIT
166. See generally L. HENNEMANN,
SCHNEIDER,
supra note 25, at 17.
32. L. HENNEMANN,
supra note 25, at 17.
DIE STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG
UND DAS
33. See, e.g., id. at 25-26; 1 LOWE-ROSENBERC,
GER~CHTSVERFASSUNGSGESETZ:
GROSSKOMMENTAR
•˜ 53 ll 37 (23d ed. 1976); see also Judgment of Aug. 5, 1966, Bundesverfassungsgericht, W. Ger., 20 Bundesverfassungsgericht
[BVerfG] 162, 189.
34. L. HENNEMANN,
supra note 25, at 24.
35. Judgment of Aug. 5, 1966, Bundesverfassungsgericht, W. Ger., 20 BVerfG 162,
189 [hereinafter cited as Spiegel].
36. West Germany has a separate statute according protection against searches and
seizures of media material in criminal procedure. It is codified under STPO 8 97(5). The
federal reporter's privilege in criminal procedure discussed above and mentioned by the
Court is codified at STPO 1 53(1)(5).
37. Spiegel, supra note 35, at 189.
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1973 when the Bundesverfassungsgericht held that the reporter's
privilege statutes of two Lander, Hesse and Hamburg, were unconstitutional in criminal actions.38 The court held that because
the federal government had already enacted legislation in the
area, articles 72 and 74 of the West German Basic Law (constitution) did not give the Lander power to promulgate criminal
procedure laws.39In dicta, the court also stated that a privilege
to withhold testimony did not flow directly from the freedom of
the press clause in the Basic Law.4o
In 1975 the Bundestag enacted a new federal reporter's
privilege statute applicable to criminal proceedings. The statute
states:
Persons, who in their profession participate or have participated in the preparation, production or distribution of a periodic publication or broadcast [are permitted to refuse to testify] about the identity of an author or source of contributions
or documents, as well as about the statements made by them
about their activity, to the extent that it concerns contributions, documents and statements for the editorial portion [of
the publication or b r ~ a d c a s t ] . ~ ~

In a 1978 decision, the Bundesgerichtshof in Strafsachen (the
highest West German federal court for criminal matters) discussed the new statute and noted that it eliminated three of the
limitations found in t h e previous reporter's privilege statute.42

First, no violation of the press laws was required. Second, the
editor did not have to be personally liable under the new law
38. Judgment of Nov. 28, 1973, Bundesverfassungsgericht, W. Ger., 36 BVerfG 193
[hereinafter cited as Hesse]; Judgment of Feb. 13, 1974, Bundesverfassungsgericht, W.
Ger., 36 BVerfG 314 [hereinafter cited as Hamburg].
[GG] arts. 72(1),
39. Hesse, supra note 38, a t 317. Among other rules, GRUNDGESETZ
74(1) (W. Ger.) provide that the states have power to promulgate criminally and judically related laws only if there are no conflicting federal laws. STPO 1 53(1)(5), the federal reporter's privilege statute, was a criminal procedure statute, thus making the state
legislation unconstitutional. See also Spiegel, supra note 35, a t 202.
40. Hamburg, supra note 38, a t 317. This dicta was a response to the theory, proposed by numerous scholars, that a reporter's privilege could be derived from the Basic
Law. See, e.g., P. CRAMER,
supra note 25, a t 36 ff.; R. GROSS,supra note 31, a t 152; U.
KLUG,supra note 25, a t 52-66; H. MBHL,supra note 26, a t 103; Kaiser, supra note 25;
Note, 1968 N.J.W. 2368. Some of the speculation appears to have been fostered by the
language of the Spiegel decision that appeared to indicate the privilege could be derived
directly from the Basic Law. Spiegel, supra note 35, a t 176.
41. STPO 8 53(1)(5), 1975 BGBl I 1973 (W. Ger.).
42. Judgment of Dec. 28, 1978, B~ndes~erichtshof
in Strafsachen, W. Ger., 28
Bundesgerichtshof in Strafsachen [BGHSt] 240, 245-246 (hereinafter cited as
Frankfurt].

4311

REPORTER'S PRIVILEGE

439

before the privilege attached. And third, identifying information,
as well as the identity of the reporter's source could be withheld.
The court stated that the new statutory privilege was intended
to be "friendly to the press."43 I t is an absolute privilege because
there are no exceptions that relate to the type of crime involved.
However, the statute does not protect journalists who have personally witnessed criminal activity.'* Additionally, after a journalist has revealed some information about the identity of the
informant, the statute no longer provides automatic p r o t e c t i ~ n . ~ ~
Instead, the court must weigh the competing law enforcement
and confidentiality interests to determine if the privilege should
be granted. The privilege will be extended only when (1)the interest in maintaining confidentiality clearly outweighs the interest in criminal justice, and (2) an "extraordinary publicity interest" is involved.46 The court also indicated that, although the
new law approaches the constitutional limits of the reporter's
privilege, the Bundestag's formulation must be respected because of the judicial principle: "When in doubt decide in favor of
the freedom of the press."47
The new "absolute" reporter's privilege is not perfect. The
most prominent problem that remains is identifying persons
who qualify for the privilege. The statute requires a journalist to
participate by profession in the publication or broadcast media
in order to qualify for protection." Commentators have postulated that this wording will continue to deny the privilege to
43. Id. a t 247.
44. Id. a t 247-48, 253.
45. Id. a t 244-45.
46. Id. a t 248-49. This standard appears to give courts discretion, but with emphasis
on the criminal prosecution interest. The court described an extraordinary publicity interest as being when, a t least a t the time of decision, the publication of the article serves
in the general interest to protect especially major rights and when the publication is an
appropriate means to protect those rights. Id. a t 249. This explanation offers little help
in understanding what an extraordinary publicity interest is. However, in the case before
it the court decided that a judicially granted privilege was not appropriate. The case
involved an article based on an interview with a person who was purported to have participated in a mass murder. The article pointed out that the source, still unknown to
authorities, was a "Frankfurt chap". The court held that the statutory privilege had been
waived by this disclosure, and the crime involved weighed against a judicially granted
privilege. The strictness of this holding has been criticized. See, e.g., Rengier, Die
Reichweite des J 53 Abs. 1 Nr. 5 StPO zum Schutze des namentlich preisgegebenen,
aber unaufindbaren Informanten, 1979 J.Z. 797.
47. Frankfurt, supra note 42, a t 248. See generally Judgment of May 10, 1983,
Bundesverfassungsgericht, W. Ger., 1984 EUROPXISCHE
GRUNDRECHTE
ZEITSCHRIFT
[EuCRZ] 90 (explanation of the extent of a constitutionally based reporter's privilege).
48. The German word used in the statute is berufsmiissig.
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part-time and free-lance journalists.4s A second problem is that
only those who work on a periodic publication or broadcast are
granted the privilege. Scholars have contended that the term
. ~ ~ term appears to exclude those
"periodic" is too r e s t r i c t i ~ e The
involved in publishing a book based on research done for a periodical publication, documentary filmmakers, and possibly
others. However, despite its defects, the new reporter's privilege
statute gives West German reporters a solid and broad basis for
protecting confidential sources.

In Switzerland the reporter's privilege has not received the
same amount of attention it has in West Germany. Unlike the
West German Bundestag, the Swiss Bundesversammlung (Federal Assembly) has refused to grant a federal reporter's privilege.
Therefore, much as in the United States, the fate of the privilege has been left to the individual cantons (the Swiss equivalent
of states). Some of the Swiss cantons have enacted reporter's
privilege statutes. However, for purposes of comparison, this section will focus on the canton of Zurich which does not recognize
the reporter's pri~ilege.~'
In 1972, the case of Danuser v. Bezirksanwaltschaft Ziirich" came before the highest federal court in Switzerland. Several juveniles who had escaped from a reformatory were interviewed on television while their whereabouts were unknown to
law enforcement authorities. The show's producer was questioned by the authorities regarding the location of the juveniles,
but he refused to answer.b3Although the canton had not enacted
a statutory reporter's privilege, the producer claimed a privilege
derived directly from the freedom of the press clause of the
49. See, e.g., L.HENNEMANN,
supra note 25, a t 48-50;Liiffler, supra note 25, a t 91314.
50. See, e.g., Loffler, supra note 25, a t 913-14.
51. Zurich is emphasized for two reasons. First, the Zurich canton is dealt with in
the major decision by the highest national court and other informative decisions involving reporter's privilege. Second, the purpose for including the Swiss system in this comment is to compare and contrast how systems with almost identical backgrounds can
reach totally different results. Zurich, one of the cantons to deny reporter's privilege, is a
good tool for comparison and contrast.
52. Judgment of June 28, 1972, Bundesgericht, Switz., 98 Entscheidungen des
Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts, Amtliche Sammlung [BC] I 418 [hereinafter cited as
Danuser].
53. Id. a t 420.
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Swiss con~titution.~'
The court rejected the producer's claim for
a reporter's privilege by relying on section 128 of the Zuricher
Strafprozessordung (Zurich Criminal Procedure Code), which requires full disclosure, with limited exceptions, to investigating
authorities. The court held that the producer had to disclose the
whereabouts of the youths.
A general reporter's privilege cannot be derived from either the
freedom of the press or freedom of expression because the
guaranteed basic rights are not directly affected by the obligation to testify. Whether the journalistic worth of anonymous
informants is of greater importance than the clarification of
particular fact situations so that the anonymity of the informant should be preserved in criminal proceedings, is a question
whose solution cannot be derived from the constitution, but
rather should be handled by the proper legi~lature."~

The court concluded that because neither the Zurich Criminal
Procedure Code nor the federal code contained a reporter's privilege, the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and
freedom of expression were not violated by requiring the producer to answer questions about the youths.56 The court reaffirmed this holding in another case in 1981.b7
The Zuricher Obergericht in Strafkammer (Zurich Superior
Criminal Court) also confronted the reporter's privilege issue in
a case involving the seizure of photocopies of arrest warrants
from a newsroom.b8Although seizure rather than nondisclosure
of the identity of news sources was involved, the court discussed
the reporter's privilege in detail. First, the court reiterated much
of the Danuser decision and pointed out that only doctors, lawyers, and clergy have the privilege not to testify. The court admitted that the confidential relationship between the press and
informants was protected by the freedom of the press clause, but
held that the Swiss Constitution does not provide an unlimited
p r i ~ i l e g e .Freedom
~~
of the press is only a part of the general
freedom of expression that is granted to all citizens and cannot
be used to avoid obligations that are common to all citizens.
54. BUNDESVERFASSUNG
[BVERF]art. 55 (Switz.).
55. Danuser, supra note 52, at 422 (emphasis added).
56. Id.
57. Judgment of July 1, 1981, Bundesgericht, Switz., 1982 EuGRZ 29.
58. Judgment of Sept. 4, 1979, Obergericht in Strafkammer, Zurich, Switz., 76
SCHWEIZERISCHE
JURISTENZEITUNG
317 [hereinafter cited as Zurich].
59. Id. at 320.
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Only the legislature can sanction withholding the identity of
news sources in criminal investigation^.'^ As a result, the court
held that reporters have no greater constitutional protection
from testifying than nonreporters.
The court did acknowledge that the confidentiality between
informant and reporter cannot be totally disregarded. Under
some circumstances the relationship may be considered by the
court, but the anonymity of sources does not require any special
prote~tion.~'
The court stated: "The press in Switzerland survived up until now without a statutory privilege. Despite that, or
perhaps because of that, the press has prevailed in its important
a ~ s i g n m e n t . "The
~ ~ defendant, citing a West German case as aut h ~ r i t yurged
, ~ ~ the court to balance the interest in the collection
of the news against the interest in prosecution in deciding
whether to grant a reporter's privilege. However, even after considering the role of the press the court found that (1)the criminal offense involved in the case was no less important than the
reporter's privilege, and (2) no extraordinary interest in publication was present in the case.64
As this case illustrates, the Swiss have relied on the legislature to decide whether or not to grant a reporter's privilege. The
Swiss constitution does not expressly grant a reporter's privilege
and the courts in the canton of Zurich have been unwilling to
interpret the constitution or criminal code as requiring a privilege. With few cantonal reporter's privileges and no uniform federal reporter's privilege, the reporter's position in Switzerland
remains precarious.
AND COMPARISON
IV. ANALYSIS

The federal reporter's privilege accorded the press in West
Germany is vastly different from that found in the United
States and Switzerland. In West Germany, journalists for periodic publications and broadcasts have an absolute privilege to
protect their sources without regard to the seriousness of the
crime involved. In contrast, in the United States and Switzerland, although some states and cantons have enacted reporter's
60. Id.
61. Id. To emphasize its point, the court stated that a source should not expect his
identity to be protected.
62. Id.
63. The German case referred to is apparently Frankfurt, supra note 42.
64. Zurich, supra note 58, at 320-21.
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privilege statutes, reporters in over half of the states and cantons have no significant privilege to withhold testimony in criminal proceedings. This difference is a result of the unique constitutional and philosophical theories of the three countries.

A. Constitutional Analysis
Journalists in all three countries claim a reporter's privilege
derived directly from a constitutional freedom of the press
clause.s6 The journalists' argument is based on two premises.
First, the press has a constitutionally granted function to inform
the public and stimulate public opinion. Second, a reporter's
privilege is necessary to carry out the press function. Journalists
argue that, without a reporter's privilege, sources are hesitant to
inform and consequently the function of the press is inhibited.
The journalists' first premise has been accepted in all three
c o u n t r i e ~ ?However,
~
the assertion that a reporter's privilege is
necessary in order to perform the press function has been rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Branzburge7and
by the Ziiricher Obergericht in Strafkammer.e8 The West German courts, on the other hand, have been reluctant to reject the
second argument.
Two cases that were discussed earlier illustrate the West
German position. First, in the Hamburg case the Bundesverfassungsgericht specifically denied the constitutional argument
while invalidating a state-level reporter's privilege statute, but
only after weighing the particular facts of the case.69 Second, in
the Frankfurt decision the Bundesgerichtshof in Strafsachen re65. For the claim of journalists' privilege in the United States see, e.g., Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U S . 665 (1972). In West Germany see, e.g., Spiegel, supra note 35; Frankfurt, supra note 42. In Switzerland see, e.g., Danuser, supra note 52; Zurich, supra note
58.
66. For the United States see generally Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19
(1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U S . 532, 539 (1965). For West Germany see generally P.
SCHNEIDER.
PRESSE-UND MEINUNGSFREIHEIT
NACH DEM GRUNDGESETZ
118-29 (1962). For
GRUNDRECHTE
Switzerland see generally P. SALADIN,
IM WANDEL:
DIE RECHTSPRECHUNG
DES SCHWEIZERISCHEN
BUNDESCERICHTS
zu DEN GRUNDRECHTEN
IN EINER SICH ANDERNDEN
UMWELT
43-48 (1970).
67. 408 U S . a t 698-99. Justice Powell's concurrence appears t o give more weight to
the second premise than does Justice White's plurality opinion. The Court's handling of
empirical evidence on the importance of reporter's privilege has also been criticized. See
supra note 12 and accompanying text.
68. Zurich, supra note 58, a t 320. The concept is also implied in Danuser, supra
note 52.
69. Hamburg, supra note 38, a t 317.
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fused to apply the federal statute because the journalist had already revealed some information about his source.70 However,
the court held that under some circumstances a journalist may
refuse further disclosure even when the federal statute is inappli~able.~'This limited privilege is arguably derived from the
constitution.
The reporter's privilege cases in West Germany demonstrate a friendliness toward the press not found in the United
States and Switzerland. This difference cannot be explained by
the history of the constitutional guarantees of free press in the
three countries. The history of the press in all three countries is
filled with struggles against government censorship and control.
As the governments' awareness for the need of an informed public became more acute, and the efforts of the press to eliminate
the shackles of government control correspondingly intensified,
the three countries established constitutional guarantees of a
free press.72 However, the free press provisions of the Swiss and
United States constitutions and the West German Basic Law
have had dissimilar effects on the reporter's privilege.
In Switzerland and the United States the judiciary has interpreted the pertinent constitutional guarantees as requiring
the government to remain neutral in matters dealing with the
press.73 Despite a constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the
press, the press is granted no more rights or privileges than the
average citizen, who is guaranteed freedom of expression. Freedom of the press is only a subpart of freedom of speech and
expression. Therefore, a journalist enjoys no more rights than a
nonj~urnalist.~'
70. Frankfurt, supra note 42; see supra note 46 and accompanying text.
71. Frankfurt, supra note 42; see supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text. For
application of this concept see Advertisement, supra note 47.
amend. I; B. VERF.art. 55 (Switz.); GG art. 5 (W. Ger.). The citation
72. US. CONST.
for the West German Basic Law is the new version, but varies little from the older versions. For a brief history of the press, see, e.g., H. NELSON& D. TEETER.LAWOF MASS
AND CONTROL
OF PRINTAND BROADCAST
MEDIA26-56 (4th ed.
COMMUNICATIONS:
FREEDOM
1982); M. L ~ F F L E&R R. RICKER.
HANDBUCH
DES PRESSERECHT
20-28 (1978); C. LUDWIG,
63-81 (1964). One German commentator has noted that
SCHWEIZERISCHE
PRESSERECHT
the government began compelling disclosure of sources and information once censorship
was no longer allowed in order to retain some control over the press. In effect, the granting of freedom of the press caused a need for reporter's privilege. H. M ~ H Lsupra
note
,
26, a t 22-23.
73. Bezanson, The New Free Press Guarantee, 63 VA.L. REV.731, 761 (1977); see
also Blanchard, The Institutional Press and its First Amendment Privileges, 1978 SUP.
CT. REV.225, 226.
74. Contra Meiklejohn, The Courts, the Press, and the Public: The Case of Myron
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The West German Basic Law contains a provision that
could justify a similar result. The Basic Law states that freedom
of the press can be limited by general laws, i.e., laws that apply
to all persons, and not just the press.'& This provision essentially
gives the legislature constitutional authority to regulate the
press to the same extent that it regulates the rest of society.
Thus, there is constitutional authority for requiring the press to
testify as long as the rest of society is also required to do so?
Although journalists in the United States, West Germany,
and Switzerland are all guaranteed the right to a free press by
the constitution or Basic Law, that right can be regulated to the
same extent the rest of society is regulated. However, in all three
countries legislative power exists to grant special privileges.
West Germany is the only country that has legislatively enacted
a federal statutory privilege. There is nothing notably different
about the West German concept of freedom of the press that
explains this more liberal approach with the exception of a possible government "friendliness" toward the press.

B. The Philosophies of the Three Systems and the Effect of
the ''Performance State" on the Reporter's Privilege
Although freedom of the press exists in all three countries,
the enactment of a federal statutory reporter's privilege in West
Germany may reflect the more encompassing legal theory espoused in that country. Scholars suggest that West Germany has
developed into a "performance state" that not only formally acknowledges basic rights by not allowing government interference
with those rights, but also places an affirmative duty on the
state to implement programs to secure and protect those
rights.77 In essence, the performance state extends the concept
Farber and The New York Times, 30 SYRACUSE
L REV.789 (1979).
75. GG art. 5 1 2 (W. Ger.). For explanation of "general law" see, e.g., R. GROSS,
PRESSERECHT:
EINFUHRUNG
I N G R U N D Z ~UND
G E SCHWERPUNKTE
DES DEUTSCHEN PRESSERECHTS 50-53 (1982); M. L ~ F F L E&
R R. RICKER,HANDBUCH
DES PRESSERECHTS
51-53
(1978).
76. All three countries allow privileges to be granted to some groups, e.g. doctors
and clergy, without requiring that the same privilege be given journalists. All three allow
the press to also receive special treatment from the law, but that special treatment may
not necessarily be derived from the constitutions or Basic Law.
77. See Haberle, Grundrechte im Leistungsstaat, 30 VEROEFFENTLICHUNCEN
DER
VEREIN~GUNG
DER DEUTSCHEN STAATSRECHTSLEHRER
[VVDSTRL] 43 (1972) (Professor Dr.
Peter Haberle was one of the instigators of the term "performance state"); see also
Benda, New Tendencies in the Development of Fundamental Rights in the Federal Republic of Germany, 11 J . MAR.J. PRAC.& PROC.1 (1977); Kommers, The Jurisprudence
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of the welfare state beyond the obligation to distribute welfare
benefits to the poor to include an affirmative duty to the entire
legal system.
One West German scholar has stated that in a performance
state the "performance law" sets the profile of the social constitutional state and, without such a performance law, basic rights
would be socially ineffective."' Merely granting freedom of the
press and formally acknowledging that right offers the journalist
little protection. However, the performance state brings about
the maximal actualization of that right by enacting affirmative
legislation, e.g., a statutory reporter's privilege.
The reporter's privilege in West Germany is an example of a
performance state carrying out its affirmative duty to protect
rights. In contrast, in most areas of the law, the United States
does little more than not interfere with basic rights.79The emergence of a welfare or performance state in the United States or
Switzerland may bring about changes in the reporter's privilege.

West Germany has enacted a national statutory reporter's
privilege that offers extensive protection from compelled disclosure. In the United States and Switzerland some of the states and
cantons have enacted reporter's privilege statutes, but there is
no uniform, nationally applicable law. There are no formal con-

stitutional interpretations that explain this difference. I t may result from the different legal philosophies of the three nations, inparticular the concept of a performance state. Whatever the underlying differences of the three systems, the West German reporter's privilege can serve as a model for a federal reporter's
privilege statute in the United States and Switzerland.

Jeff V. Nelson

of Free Speech in the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, 53 S. CAL.L.
REV.657, 673-77 (1980).
78. Haberle, supra note 77, at 47.
79. In the United States, the performance state concept has apparently only been
extended in limited economic situations and some areas of civil rights. See generally A.
AND FUNDAMENTAL
LAW:AMERICA'S
EVOLVING
CONSTITUTION
MILLER.SOCIAL
CHANCE
(Contributions in American Studies No. 41, 1979).

The Swedish Ban of Corporal Punishment
On July 1, 1979, Sweden became the first nation to prohibit
corporal punishment of children by their parents. The Swedish
Parenthood and Guardianship Code was amended to provide: "A
child may not be subjected to corporal punishment or other injurious or humiliating treatment."' The new Swedish law is distinctive because it allows greater intrusion into family life than
the laws of other countries that have considered the relationship
between corporal punishment and child abuse specifically2 and
children's rights g e n e r a l l ~ .The
~ law also represents the final
step in an attempt by lawmakers to change societal views without coercion.
This comment explores the history of legislative, judicial,
and societal attitudes toward corporal punishment in Sweden. I t
then outlines the legislative process involved in adopting the
new law. Finally, it examines government proposals aimed a t
eliminating corporal punishment and explores the prospects of
using more forceful measures in the future.

The 1979 law prohibiting corporal punishment reflects the
major transformation of Swedish attitudes against the punishment of children that has occurred over the past thirty years.
Traditionally, the right of parents to use corporal punishment in
raising their children was wholly accepted in Sweden. Both religious and legal codes reiterated the proverbial dictum that sparing the rod spoils the child.4
1. Svensk Forfattningssamling [SFS] 1979:122 (Swed.).
2. A number o f other countries have had debates about the propriety o f corporal
punishment. See Gil, The Social Context of Domestic Violence: Implications for Preuention, 6 V T L. REV.339, 356-58 (1981) (U.S.); Grandke & Stolpe, Zur Rechtsstellnung
der Kinder in der DDR, 29 STAATU N D RECHT528 (1980) (E.Ger.); Renchon, Attribution
et exercise de l'autoritt parental, 39 ANNALES
DE DROIT,REVUE
TRIMESTERELLE
DE DROIT
BELGE155 (1979) (Belg.); Schroder, "Erzieherpriuileg" i m Strafrecht, in FESTSCHRIFT
F U R RICHARD
LANCEZ U M 70. GEBURTSTAG
391 (1976) (W. Ger.).
3. See, e.g., Foster & Freed, A Bill of Rights for Children, 6 FAM.L.Q. 343 (1972);
Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some Reservations about
Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights," 1976 B.Y.U L. REV.605.
4. Lagutskottets betiinkande [LU] 1978/79:11; see also FONDEN
FOR DEN MORALISKA
RXTTEN I SVERIGE,
CAN YOUBRINGU P CHILDREN
SUCCESSFULLY
WITHOUT
SMACKING
AND
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When Swedish family law was codified in 1920, it expressly
gave parents the right to punish their ~ h i l d r e nThis
. ~ language of
the statute was extensively criticized6 because it resulted in the
widespread use of severe corporal punishment.? In an effort to
discourage the use of harsh punishments, the Parenthood and
Guardianship Code was amended in 1949 to replace the word
"punish" with "reprimand."' However, this change in the code
was not accompanied by comparable changes in the criminal
law. The Penal Code preserved the parental right to punish children and protected parents from criminal prosecution for actions against those under their supervision, as long as the injuries inflicted were not long-term.9 This exception from criminal
liability for parents and guardians made child abuse cases difficult to prosecute until the exception was eliminated from the
Penal Code in 1957."

A. The 1966 Amendment
In 1965, the rising number of child abuse cases led the justice minister to call for stronger statutory condemnation of corporal punishment. He proposed amending the Parenthood and
Guardianship Code to expressly state that corporal punishment
should be avoided." Justice Ministry officials concluded that an
express disavowal of the parental right to inflict corporal punishment was the only effective way to deal with the problem. Even
the 1957 repeal of the criminal assault exemption from the Penal Code had not stemmed the tide of child abuse.12 However,
prevailing societal views made an absolute prohibition of physiSPANKING?
(1979) [hereinafter cited as FONDEN].
5. See UTREDNINGEN
OM BARNENS
RATT, JUSTITIEDEPARTEMENTET,
BARNETS
RAm 1.
OM FORBUD MOT AGA, STATENS
OFFENTLIGA
UTREDNINGAR
[SOU] 1978:10, at 11 (1978).
6. SOU 1978:10, at 15.
7. Despite the long-standing concern about the rising number of child abuse cases,
the Swedish government has not kept official statistics on child abuse cases except from
1969-1970. The government found 777 cases of child abuse in the country during this
period. FONDEN,
supra note 4, a t 4.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 11.
10. SOU 1978!10, at 15. The current statute reads: "A person who inflicts bodily
injury, illness or pain upon another or renders him unconscious or otherwise similarly
helpless, shall be sentenced for assault to imprisonment for at most two years or, in case
the crime was petty, to pay a fine." THEPENAL
CODEOF SWEDEN,
ch. 3, 4 5 (T.Sellin & J.
Getz trans. 1972).
11. SOU 1978:10, at 15-18.
12. Id.
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cal punishment, subjecting parents to criminal prosecution for
all physical intrusions, entirely unenforceable.
Three bills were introduced in the RiksdagI3 in response to
the Ministry's proposal to amend the code. One proposal suggested that corporal punishment was necessary in raising children and that its elimination would interfere with family affairs.14 This proposal was flatly rejected. A second proposal
explicitly rejected corporal punishment, asserting that unless
corporal punishment was expressly banned parents would continue to assume the right to use it and government would continue to be saddled with the unmanageable task of determining
when parental reprimands become reprehensible.'This proposal was also rejected. The Riksdag's Law Committee supported a
third proposal that incorporated features of the second proposal
and Justice Ministry recommendation^.'^ The proposal neither
called for an acknowledgement of the right to punish nor expressly banned physical punishment. Rather, all references to
corporal punishment were to be extracted from the code. The
Committee expected this removal to operate, albeit passively, as
a ban of corporal punishment. A passive ban would clarify the
government's position on physical punishment without creating
the risk of frivilous criminal actions against parents."
The Riksdag adopted the third proposal in 1966. Despite
the passive nature of simply removing all references to corporal
punishment from the Code, the Riksdag considered this action a
ban on corporal punishment. Even later, when the Riksdag expressly banned corporal punishment in 1979, it insisted that its
action was merely a codification of the existing law.18
The ban of corporal punishment was contrary to the prevailing public opinion in Sweden concerning corporal punishment. A public opinion poll in 1965 showed that 53% of all
adult Swedes considered physical punishment occasionally necessary in child rearing. However, by 1968 the percentage of persons supporting physical punishment had fallen from 53% to
42% while opposition to corporal punishment had increased
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

The Swedish Parliament.
SOU 1978:10, at 17 (citing, Motionerna 1966:1:723 & Ik888).
SOU 1978:10, at 18 (citing Motionerna 1966:II:78 & II:889).
SOU 1978:10, at 17 (citing Motionerna 1966:k722 & II:887).
SOU 1978:10, at 18 (citing 1LU 1966:32).
LU 1978/79:11.
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from 35% to 54%.I0 This shift of opinion continued through
1971 when a survey indicated that support for corporal punishment had decreased to 35%.20 The 1971 survey also asked
whether people thought the law prohibited corporal punishment.
Sixty-one percent of the respondents felt that it was prohibited,
while the remaining 39% either felt physical punishment was
permitted by law or had no opinion on the issue.21
The reasons for this shift in public opinion are difficult to
pinpoint. The possible effect of the statutory change cannot be
discounted. However, corporal punishment has also come under
criticism in other countries that have not legislatively attempted
to ban corporal p ~ n i s h m e n t . ~ ~
Despite the change in public opinion and a clear legislative
intent to prohibit physical punishment, the Swedish legal community refused to treat the repeal of the right to reprimand as
A leading commentaan absolute ban of corporal p~nishment.'~
tor on family law wrote concerning the provision's repeal: "One
ought to proceed, nonetheless, from the premise that minor
physical intrusions are entirely permitted if the parent needs
them to ably guide the
A commentary on the criminal
code concluded: "Although a right to punish as such no longer
exists, it is clear that a physical correction can be minimally intrusive. Child abuse is not the necessary result. Indictments for
completely innocent acts can sometimes be an uncalled for interference with personal affairs."2b
Such statements by legal scholars have been blamed for the
judiciary's failure to recognize the 1966 amendment as a prohibition of corporal p u n i ~ h m e n t .A~ ~
1975 district court case exemplifies the judicial response to the new laws. The court dismissed
an indictment for abuse of a three-year-old child, stating: "Even
if such a charge could be supported, it does not prove that the
19. SWEDISH
SAVETHE CHILDRENFEDERATION.
CORPORAL
PUNISHMENT
AND CHILD
ABUSE 2 (A. Haeuser trans. 1981).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See Gil, supra note 2; Grandke & Stolpe, supra note 2; Renchon, supra note 2;
Schroder, supra note 2.
23. This seems to be a reflection of the conflict between extra statutory defenses and
positivism also found in other European systems. See G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING
CRIMINAL LAW779-84 (1978).
TILL FORXLDRABALKEN 118 (1971).
24. G. WALIN.KOMMENTAR
25. N.BECKMAN.
KOMMENTAR
TILL BROTl'SBALKEN 125 (1970).
26. See SOU 1978:10, at 19.
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force used by [the defendant] against his daughter has gone beyond the right to punish which parents have against children in
their care."27

B. Pressures for Additional Reform
A legislative response to the judicial failure to implement
the law was slow in coming. However, in 1972 legislators again
introduced proposals that explicitly outlawed corporal punishment.28 These proposals were again rejected.29 The Riksdag's
Law Committee investigated the proposals and concluded that a
public information campaign against physical punishment would
~ ~ decibe more appropriate than a statutory p r ~ h i b i t i o n .This
sion was applauded by many in the justice administration community who continued to fear that an express ban would give
prosecutors the onerous and unrealistic task of prosecuting parents for spanking their children.
In preparation for the International Year of the Child, the
Riksdag established the Commission on Children's Rights on
February 24, 1977. The Commission was charged with investigating ways of strengthening the legal position of children.31 In
1978 the Commission issued its first report, entitled Children's
. ~ ~ report proRights: A Ban Against Corporal P u n i ~ h m e n tThe
posed the enactment of an explicit ban of physical punishment.
Corporal punishment was viewed as "a form of degrading treatment" which results in a "lack of self-esteem and a personality
change" that could affect the child for life.33 The report found
that "[clhild psychiatrists and psychologists have long been in
agreement that physical punishment of children is
inappr~priate."~~
Influenced by such opinions and the need for society to
"work against all forms of violence," the Commission found an
express ban of corporal punishment necessary in order for children to grow up realizing that violence is not socially acceptable
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
SOU 1978:10, at 20 (citing Motionerna 1972:19; 1972:434).
SOU 1978:10, at 22 (citing LU 197223).
Id.
SOU 1978:10, at 3.
Id.
Id. at 11-12.
Id. at 23-24.
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behavior.3s The Commission noted that, while most Swedes felt
corporal punishment was prohibited, many people continued to
violate the law. The Commission felt greater public knowledge
of the law would result in increased compliance. However, the
Commission recognized the difficulty of publicizing the mere absence of permission to reprimand or punish. Unless the ban were
explicitly expressed, it would be difficult to increase public
knowledge concerning the illegality of corporal punishment beyond the 1971

In accordance with Swedish policy, the government3' sent
the Commission's proposal to a number of interested parties for
comments prior to legislative action on it. This process is called
.~~
allows a variety of groups to
remiss, or r e m i t t a n ~ eRemittance
comment on proposed legislation. Over twenty-five different government agencies, private organizations, and political parties
(including the law faculty of Uppsala University, the Housewives' Home and Society Federation, and the Swedish Save the
Children Federation) responded to the proposed ban on corporal
punishment. A majority of the respondents favored the ban.39
The Circuit Court of Appeals of Southern Sweden wrote to
35. Id. a t 24.
36. Id. a t 9.
37. In Sweden, as in Great Britain, West Germany, and other parliamentary systems, the term "the government" refers to the cabinet.
38. Regeringens proposition 1978/79:67. Although this practice is followed in other
European countries it has been the subject of little academic work. A limited discussion
of the Swedish remittance process is found in Dahlen, A Governmental Response to
IN THE GLOBAL
SYSTEM
148
Pressure Groups-The Case of Sweden, in PRESSURE
GROUPS
(P. Willetts, ed. 1982). An in-depth study of the advantages and disadvantages of the
remittance process is beyond the scope of this comment. The procedure presents an interesting addition to the legislative process that parallels the notice and comment requirements of American administrative law. The wide spectrum of views made available
to the legislature through the remittance procedure gives a breadth not always achieved
in the typical legislative hearing process in the United States.
However, the unanimity of the remittance comments on the corporal punishment
ban raises doubts about whether the process actually operates to solicit comments from
known opponents of a measure. Further, the remittance procedure creates substantial
delays in the legislative process, slowing the government's ability to respond. On the
other hand, for policy questions not requiring immediate legislative response, submission
to a diverse and objective expert audience for comment could, a t least in theory, provide
legislatures with a variety of innovative and valuable approaches to societal problems.
39. Regeringens proposition 1978/79:67, a t 3.
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the legislature reminding the government that in earlier remittances the court had "asserted the necessity of having state authorities take a fixed stand rejecting all forms of violence toward
children."" The court's remittance, focusing on the substance of
the legislation rather than on the impact of the legislation on the
judiciary, contrasts with the conventional American concept of
separation of powers. The Swedish Women's Leftist Alliance
commented simply, "It is about time that the child's right not to
be abused was legally settled."41 The Women's League of the
Moderate Party, Sweden's most conservative political party,
joined in the clamor of approval stating, "The regulations must
be so worded that no doubt can exist in courts and among juvenile authorities, guardians, and other involved parties that physical or psychological violence cannot be accepted as a method of
child rearing."42
The only objections to the proposal came from government
prosecutors who felt the proposed change would lead to a
greater frequency of child abuse complaints but no significant
increase in actual protection for children.43Surprisingly, no objections were made to the potential government intrusion into
family affairs resulting from the proposed law.
After the government received the remittance responses, the
Commission's proposal was introduced in the Rik~dag.~"
In a report of its own, the government emphasized the role of the law
in changing the attitudes of parents and guardians." The Riksdag's Law Committee proposed slight changes in some sections
of the law but did not substantively alter the ban.46 A nearly
unanimous vote of the Riksdag adopted the government

The law prohibiting corporal punishment of children was
not intended to include criminal sanctions requiring changes in
Id. at 10.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 9, 11.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 6.
LU 1978/79:11.
SWEDISH
SAVETHE CHILDREN
FEDERATION, THEOMBUDSMAN
AND CHILDMALTREATMENT 7 (1980) (the vote was 259 to 6).
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
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the Penal Code. The legislation was consciously designed as a
prohibition "without teeth." The Commission on Children's
Rights noted in its first report that no changes in the Penal
Code were proposed.4s The remittance comments also made reference to the noncriminal nature of the b a d s and suggested use
of a strong advertising campaign to increase public awareness
and obedience to the law.50The government adopted this suggestion as part of its own report.
After the law was passed the government attempted to increase public knowledge of the ~ t a t u t e . ~In' 1971, under the old
law, only 61% of all Swedes thought that the law prohibited corporal punishment. In 1980, 93% of the population was aware of
the prohibition, and 96% knew of it by 1981." Nevertheless, this
increased public awareness of the law has not resulted in its acceptance. The number of adults who felt that corporal punishment is sometimes necessary decreased by 9% between 1971 and
1979. However, the percentage has remained relatively constant
since 1979. In 1981, although 96% of Swedish adults knew corporal punishment was illegal, 26% continued to believe that it
was not only acceptable but sometimes necessary in child
rearing.53
The question of penalties for violation of the law is still undecided.64Even if additional criminal sanctions are not imposed,
48. SOU 1978:10, a t 24.
49. See, e.g., Regeringens proposition 1978/79:67, a t 11-12 (Uppsala University law
faculty's remittance comments).
50. Id. a t 16.
51. See, e.g., FONDEN,
supra note 4 (this pamphlet was distributed in ten different
languages by the Justice Ministry as part of the advertising campaign).
SAVETHE CHILDREN
FEDERATION,
supra note 19.
52. See SWEDISH
53. Id. A 1980 poll by a different pollster showed 93% of the adults knew of the law,
yet 31% felt corporal punishment is sometimes necessary in child rearing. BURKEMARKETING RESEARCH,
INDEXINFORMATION-"LAG
OM ACA" (1980).
54. Despite claims that the law has no penal sanctions, a recent UP1 newspaper
story from Stockholm, Sweden stated:
An 11-year-old boy walked into a police station and reported his parents
for spanking him, which is against the law in Sweden, authorities said.

....

It was believed to be the first case in which a child has actually used Sweden's 1979 Anti-Spanking Act, which bans any type of spanking or physical
disciplining of children.
Police confirmed Monday that the boy, who reported his parents last Saturday, had been given a spanking. He was taken to a social worker, who contacted the parents.
The father and mother could be fined or sent to prison if found guilty of
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the ban may severely impact child custody hearings. The law
presently allows parents to retain custody unless they grossly
However, a second
abuse or neglect parental responsibilitie~.~~
report issued by the Commission on Children's Rights proposed
new child custody laws that would remove children from parental custody when there is simple, rather than gross abuse or negIt is not clear whether the use
lect of parental resp~nsibilities.~~
of corporal punishment constitutes neglect or abuse under the
proposal. However, the fact that the suggestion for lowering the
standard for removing children from parental custody came
from the same commission that proposed the ban of corporal
punishment may provide justification for a judicial determination that corporal punishment is prima facie abuse or neglect
under the new custody laws. Although the Commission never
stated that the two reports were related, the combined effect of
the reports may be to encourage dissolution of the family as
punishment for parental use of corporal punishment.
The potential imposition of such harsh sanctions for parental use of physical punishment creates doubt about the future of
the law. Although the remittances raised no direct opposition to
the ban, they dealt with a law without sanctions or any mention
of potential implications in child custody disputes. It is unclear
what the government will do if corporal punishment can not be
eliminated among the 25-30% of the population that continues
to favor physical punishment despite the advertising campaign.
The road has already been cleared for the government to remove
children from homes as a means of eliminating physical punishment. The ban could also be strengthened by amending the Penal Code's assault provisions. This would parallel the government's amendment of the Penal Code in 1957 to strengthen the
1949 changes in the Parenthood and Guardianship Code. Such
aggressive governmental attempts to enforce the ban could spur
active opposition from the presently dormant segment of society
that uses corporal punishment.
spanking their child, [public prosecutor] Bjelle said.
Deseret News, May 1, 1984, at 12A. col. 4. It is unclear whether authorities would have
prosecuted the parents in this case for child abuse under the pre-1979 statutes.
55. SWEDISH
INFORMATION
SERVICE,
THE"ANTI-SPANKING''
LAW:TEXTOF THE LAW
BACKGROUND
(1979) (English summary of SOU 1979:63).
56. Id.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Swedish ban of corporal punishment provides an interesting study of the efforts of a legislature to change public opinion. The ban demonstrates how a democratic government can
interfere with traditional family relationships without creating
an explosive public backlash. The Swedish approach to corporal
punishment also suggests creative strategies for reform when a
government is satisfied with effecting gradual changes in societal
attitudes and behavior. The portion of the population that supports corporal punishment will not actively oppose the law so
long as it does not include any penalties. This allows time to
continue changing the attitudes and behavior of later generations. Thus, the strategy of passing an unenforceable ban may
prove more effective than a sudden and aggressive change in the
law. However, if the government ever aggressively enforces the
ban, the issue of family autonomy may still result in a volatile
political battle over the status of the family in modern Swedish
society.

Dennis Alan Olson
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And for easy reference, LAWWEEK
is fully indexed
by topic and by case
title
both for general law and Supreme Court actions.

-

-

Practicing attorneys: Write for details about
our no-risk, 45-day approval offer.
THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC.
1231 25th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037
Telephone: 202-452-4500

